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Claude Thau

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Claude Thau is president of Thau Inc., and works to help build a sound long term care insurance industry. Thau wholesales long term care-related products for brokers nationwide as Marketing Manager at BackNine Insurance. In addition to his duties at BackNine, Thau consults for insurers, consulting firms, regulators, etc., creates unique software to help advisors educate clients, and does LTCI and long term care pro bono work, as LTCI’s value relies on quality long term care being available. He also sells a little LTCI himself, as current sales experience is important to be a good wholesaler and consultant. Thau’s LTCI experience is unusually broad and deep. After a career as an actuary, he led a major insurer’s LTCI division, which then grew five times as fast as the rest of the LTCI industry for each of three consecutive years. Since setting up Thau, Inc. in 2000, he has consulted for the Federal government’s LTCI program, chaired the Center for Long-Term Care Financing, and, since 2005, led the Milliman LTCI Survey, published annually in the July and August issues of Broker World. A former inner-city public school teacher, Thau enjoys mentoring brokers individually to help them grow their business. Thau can be reached by telephone at 913-707-8863. Email: [email protected].

2021 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey

The 2021 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey is the 23rd consecutive annual review of stand-alone long-term care insurance (LTCI) published by Broker World magazine. It analyzes the marketplace, reports sales distributions, and describes available products.

More discussion of worksite sales, including a comparison of worksite sales distributions vs. non-worksite sales distributions will be in Broker World magazine’s August issue.

Unless otherwise indicated, references are solely to U.S. stand-alone LTCI sales, excluding exercised future purchase options (FPOs) or other changes to existing coverage. “Stand-alone” refers to LTCI policies that do not include death benefits (other than returning premiums upon death or waiving a surviving spouse’s premiums) or annuity or disability income benefits. Where referenced, “combo” products provide LTCI combined with life insurance or annuity coverage. “Linked benefit” policies are combo policies which can allow more than the death benefit or annuity account value to be used as LTCI.

Highlights from this year’s survey

Participants
Eight carriers participated broadly in this survey. Four others provided sales information so we could report more accurate aggregate industry individual and multi-life sales.

We estimate our statistical distributions reflect about 75 percent of total industry policies sold (85 percent of premium) and about 15 percent of worksite policies sold (30 percent of premium). Total industry sales and total worksite sales (the denominators) include authors’ estimates of sales for three companies.

Our worksite statistical distributions can vary significantly from year-to-year because insurers focusing on particular worksite markets may be over- or under-represented. Our worksite statistical analysis is overly weighted toward executive carve-out programs. The carriers which provided 2020 statistical data had an average worksite annual premium of $4,218 whereas the insurers which did not provide statistical data had an average worksite premium of $1,634.

CalPERS, Northwestern and the six insurers displayed in the Product Exhibit provided broad statistical information. Auto-Owners, Country, LifeSecure, and Transamerica contributed total and worksite sales (new premium and lives insured) but did not provide other information. However, in a few places we were able to reflect some of their product designs in our statistical distributions. We estimate approximately $10 million of sales for those insurers which did not contribute their sales data.

Country Life, Genworth and CalPERS stopped selling stand-alone LTCI in 2020; however, Genworth has since resumed sales and CalPERS intends to resume sales. MassMutual and Transamerica discontinued selling stand-alone LTCI early in 2021 but Transamerica continued to accept new worksite applications until mid-year and may be experiencing last minute sales as a result.

Sales Summary

  • After having reported an increase in new premiums in 2019 (for the first time since 2012), twelve insurers reported $139,562,096* in 2020 annualized new premium sales (including exercised FPOs) and 41,440 new policies, 9.7 percent less premium and 11.9 percent fewer policies than the same insurers sold in 2019. However, some insurers with limited 2020 activity did not report 2020 sales to us. Including estimated sales for those insurers we peg total stand-alone LTCI industry sales at about $150 million*, which is nearly 13 percent less than the 2019 sales of $171,634,536 (restated upward by nearly $900,000 from our report last year). As noted in the Market Perspective section, sales of policies combining life insurance with LTCI or Chronic Illness benefits dropped eight percent in the first half of 2020 and corresponding premium dropped 19 percent. *Single premium sales are counted at ten percent for the annualized premium calculations herein.
  • Although we are not able to quantify the magnitude, the COVID-19 pandemic could have had a material impact on sales.
  • Three insurers sold more new premium than in 2019.
  • The pandemic may have had a greater impact on worksite sales. We estimate worksite new annualized LTCI premium dropped 15 percent in 2020 (18 percent fewer new sales).
  • With FPO elections included in new premium, Northwestern retained the number one spot in sales. Mutual of Omaha was a strong second and again had a large lead in annualized premium from new policies sold. Together, these two insurers combined for 60 percent of new premium including FPOs, compared to 59 percent last year.

The number of policies inforce increased each year through 2014 but has decreased each year since, decreasing 0.9 percent in 2020. However, inforce premium continued to increase (1.9 percent) despite fewer policies inforce and more policies in paid-up status. Inforce premium rises due to sales, price increases, and benefit increases (including FPOs), and reduces from lapses, reductions in coverage, deaths, and shifts to paid-up status for various reasons. A major carrier did not report inforce data, likely suppressing the percentage of inforce premium increase.

Collectively, the seven participants which reported claims saw claims increase only 1.6 percent in 2020, partly because two insurers reported a reduction in claims. The other five insurers experienced a 5.2 percent increase in claims in 2020. Overall, the stand-alone LTCI industry incurred $12.9 billion in claims in 2019 based on companies’ statutory annual filings, raising total incurred claims from 1991 through 2019 to $154.4 billion. (Note: 2019 was the most recent year available when this article was written.) Most of these claims were incurred by insurers that no longer sell LTCI. The reported 2019 incurred claims are 11.2 percent higher than the $11.6 billion of incurred claims reported in 2018.

The placement rate dropped from 59.2 percent in 2019 to 57.8 percent in 2020, which is also lower than the 59.0 percent and 58.8 percent placement rates in 2017 and 2018, respectively. Difficulty in collecting underwriting information during the pandemic may have contributed to lower placement rates. Table 23 shows that three-fourths of the reduction in placement rate can be attributed to suspended and withdrawn applications and Table 26 shows that underwriting averaged about 3 days longer. The longer average underwriting time was also likely caused by the pandemic. However, due to 2020 pending applications that will be reported in 2021, as well as the 2019 applications that were pending at the end of that year, some of our statistics such as underwriting processing time do not fully reflect the impact of the pandemic.

About the Survey
This article is arranged in the following sections:

Highlights provides a high-level view of results.
Market Perspective provides insights into the LTCI market.
Claims presents industry-level claims data.
Sales Statistical Analysis presents industry-level sales distributions reflecting data from 8 insurers.
Partnership Programs discusses the impact of the state partnerships for LTCI.

Available here at www.BrokerWorldMag.com:

  • Product Exhibit shows, for 6 insurers: financial ratings, LTCI sales and inforce, and product details.
  • Product Details, a row-by-row definition of the product exhibit entries, with some commentary.
  • Premium Exhibit shows lifetime annual premiums for each insurer’s most common underwriting class, for issue ages 40, 50, 60, and 70 for single females, single males, and heterosexual couples (assuming both buy at the same age), based on $100 per day (or closest equivalent weekly or monthly) benefit, 90-day facility and most common home care elimination period, three-year and five-year benefit periods or $100,000 and $200,000 maximum lifetime buckets, with and without Shared Care and with flat benefits or automatic three or five percent annual compound benefit increases for life. Worksite premiums do not reflect any worksite-specific discount, though some carriers offer this.
  • Premium Adjustments (from our Premium Exhibit prices) by underwriting class for each participant.
  • Distribution by underwriting class for each participant
  • State-by-state results: percentage of sales by state, average premium by state and percentage of policies qualifying for Partnership by state.

MARKET PERSPECTIVE (more detail in subsequent parts of the article)

“Both buy” and married discounts are reaching stable points. In the past year, some insurers lowered couples’ discounts significantly, to the 15 to 20 percent range. One-of-a-couple discounts are also dropping, to the zero to five percent range. The histories of these discounts are related.

When all LTCI had unisex prices, insurers’ single-person prices reflected that single buyers were predominantly female. Couples who bought policies were nearly 50 percent male; insurers did not have to charge them two prices weighted toward females, so they raised the couples’ discount. When the industry converted to gender-distinct pricing, the justification for couples’ discounts decreased substantially; however, large couples’ discounts continued to be common until now.

As an example, a single person price of $1,500 led to a couples’ combined price of $1,800 when couples’ discounts were 40 percent. If insurers took away the couples’ discount when one spouse was declined, consumers would be disappointed that the spouse about whom they were most concerned was declined, and the price for the healthy insured would be 5/6 of their combined price (5/7 if the discount was 30 percent). Fearing that the healthy spouse would refuse the policy, insurers typically cut the discount in half, rather than removing it completely. In the above example, the healthy spouse would have been charged $1,200 to $1,275, depending on whether the couples’ discount was 40 or 30 percent, respectively.

In the 2019 article “Is Your Spouse Contagious?,” Milliman analyzed the additional cost of LTC incurred by people whose spouses already had LTCI claims. As people who are LTC caregivers are likely to have worse LTCI claims experience than single people, a discount is inappropriate if the spouse is uninsurable. Of course, sometimes only one spouse buys even though both are healthy; for example, perhaps one spouse already has coverage. Nonetheless, their results make it hard to justify an across-the-board one-of-a-couple discount.

We summarized the “Is Your Spouse Contagious?” findings in our survey questionnaire, asking what the industry can do to lower claim costs after the claim or death of a spouse. The same five insurers responded to each question and their recommendations mostly cut across both situations. They cited proactive outreach to provide supportive services to help clients age in place, including preventive measures and care management, examples being home safety assessments and technology to monitor an insured’s health if they live alone. Following the death of a spouse, one carrier suggested informal care options with low daily limits which would permit relatives to be paid caregivers and another suggested a new plan of care, answers that seemed to anticipate that the survivor was already on claim. There were some concerns, however, with one insurer indicating that “cost will be a barrier” and another commenting “if appropriate”.

When one spouse is on claim, two insurers suggested offering respite care options to support the non-claim spouse.

Some specific steps the respondents may have had in mind in their general comments include brain fitness training; helping the healthy spouse marshal and manage resources to help the care recipient; access to cognitive tests that provide early detection of cognitive slippage; lifestyle suggestions including diet and sources of prepared meals; home modification projects; document organization; end-of-life planning; tele-medicine; information to access available government benefits and local services; help in finding and evaluating potential commercial caregivers; products and information about reducing risk and/or facilitating improved caregiving; etc.

We noted that the 10-year Treasury yield as of January 1, 2021 was 0.93 percent and asked what insurers projected it would be in 5 and 10 years. The range in five years was scattered between 1.5 to 3.0 percent and in ten years was two to three percent, with four of the five answers being 2.9 to 3.0 percent. Although all envisioned rising interest rates, only two mentioned that it would ease pressure on profit margins.

The June issue of Broker World magazine had an article about the impact of the pandemic which included data from this survey. Rather than repeat that data here, we refer readers to the June issue.

Government-provided LTCI programs continue to be a topic of discussion.

The Affordable Care Act (2010) included a LTCI program (the “CLASS” Act). Criticisms of the design were validated when, after passage of the ACA, the government dropped the LTCI program because it could not find a way to make it work.

Since then, there have been state efforts to create LTCI programs. On January 1, 2022, the Washington Long-Term Care Trust (WLTCT) will begin collecting 0.58 percent payroll tax to fund a $36,500 lifetime pool of money starting in 2025 (the pool of money is intended to inflate according to the Washington consumer price index). The program provides coverage for vested individuals receiving care in the state of WA. Government-provided LTCI programs will be watched closely for their potential impact on LTCI sales.

Since 2009 (varies by jurisdiction), if an insurer concludes that a claimant is not chronically ill, the insurer must inform the claimant of his/her right to appeal the decision to independent third-party review (IR), which is binding on insurers. As shown in our Product Exhibit, most participants have extended IR beyond statutory requirements, most commonly to policies issued prior to the effective date of IR. It is hard to get data relative to IR. Regulators in some states have not set up the required panel of independent reviewers and regulators do not collect IR statistics. Insurers often do not track IR. It is complimentary of the industry’s claims processing that there has not been a clamor for IR; that there have been significantly fewer requests in the past two years; and that insurers have consistently been completely upheld 70 percent or more of the time based on data we have received over the years from insurers and from Steve LaPierre, President of LTCI Independent Eligibility Review Specialists, LLC (LTCIIERS). In other cases, the reviewer might agree with the insurer partly (e.g., that the claimant did not satisfy the triggers initially, while concluding that the claimant satisfied the triggers later).

Current prices are more stable than past prices, partly because today’s prices reflect much more conservative assumptions based on far more credible data and lower assumed investment yields. Three participants have never increased premiums on policies issued under “rate stabilization” laws. The others reported no increases on policies issued since 2015, 2014 (2 insurers), and 2013 (2 insurers). Nonetheless, many financial advisors presume new policies will face steep price increases, and hence may be reluctant to encourage clients to consider LTCI.

As shown in Table 23, the placement rate for the past 8 years has remained at about 60 percent. Improving the placement rate is critical to encourage financial advisors to mention LTCI to clients. The industry may be able to improve placement rates as follows.

  • Utilize E-applications for faster submission and reduced processing time, thereby increasing placement.
  • Pre-qualify an applicant’s health. Effectively and efficiently increasing the percentage of applicants who are pre-qualified will decrease declines.
  • More effective education of distributors by insurers, such as drill-down questions in on-line underwriting guides and eApps.
  • Require cash with the application (CWA). CWA led to about five percent more of the apps being placed according to our 2019 survey.
  • Continue to improve messaging regarding the value of LTCI and of buying now (rather than in the future). Such messaging would increase the number of applications and improve the placement rate by attracting younger and healthier applicants.

Once again, more than 80 percent of our participants’ policyholders exercised their FPOs (future purchase option, a guarantee that, under specified conditions, a policyholder can purchase additional coverage without demonstrating good health). As both the additional coverage and unit price increase over time, FPOs become increasingly expensive, even more so with the price increases that the industry has experienced. The high election rate demonstrates the importance of LTCI to policyholders and the effectiveness of annual (as opposed to triennial) negative-election FPOs. (Negative-election FPOs activate automatically unless the client rejects them, as opposed to positive-election FPOs which activate only if the client makes a request.) At least in some markets and with some designs, policyholders reliably exercise FPOs when they must do so to continue to receive future offers. Considering such FPOs and other provisions, we project a maximum benefit at age 80 of $305/day for an average 58-year-old purchaser in 2020, which is equivalent to an average 2.9 percent compounded benefit increase between 2020 and 2042. Purchasers may be disappointed if the purchasing power of their LTCI policies deteriorates over time.

Linked benefit products are attractive because even if the insured has no LTC claim, their family will receive benefits and because they often have guaranteed premiums and benefits. According to LIMRA, 516,809 stand-alone LTCI and combination (life and LTCI and life and Chronic Illness) policies were sold in 2019 and were distributed as follows, with stand-alone LTCI’s 11 percent market share the same as 2018. (ADB= “Accelerated Death Benefit)

The stand-alone column and the linked-benefit column are both much more significant in terms of LTC protection than indicated above, for the following reasons:

  1. The Accelerated Death Benefit (ADB) provisions do not increase over time. By the time the average claim payment is made, the stand-alone policies’ maximum monthly benefit (on plans with benefit increase features) will have risen significantly. The linked-benefit portion would also have increased significantly.
  2. The stand-alone and linked-benefit policies have significantly lower lapse rates than the policies with ADB. Thus, they are much more likely to be around when care is needed.
  3. The stand-alone and linked-benefit policies may have lower mortality rates because of their better persistency and because they are purchased with LTCI in mind whereas the ADB policies are generally purchased for their life insurance and the ADB benefit may be incidental in the minds of the buyers.
  4. The ADB policies are less likely to be used to pay for care, as it may be preferable to have the death benefit be paid to the beneficiary.

A small offset is that the stand-alone policies are more likely to be reimbursement-based benefits, which are less likely to result in the full benefit being paid each month.

According to LIMRA, in the first half of 2019, combination life sales dropped slightly, but then rebounded strongly in the latter half of the year to finish ten percent higher than 2018 in terms of premium (although, one percent lower in terms of the numbers of policies). However, in the first half of 2020 (the most recent data available as this article was being written), premiums were 19 percent lower and new policies eight percent lower than the weak first half of 2019. In addition to the pandemic, LIMRA noted that the new 2017 CSO Mortality Table and low interest rates led to higher premiums which depressed sales. The policies with the most significant LTCI benefits (linked benefits) dropped the most (27 percent in premium; 21 percent in policy count).

Only four participants offer coverage in all U.S. jurisdictions; no worksite insurer does so. Insurers are reluctant to sell in jurisdictions which have unfavorable legislation or regulations, restrict rate increases, or are slow to approve new products.

All but one of our participants use third party administrators (TPAs) and five of the eight participants use reinsurers. The number of insurers using TPAs for the following functions is shown in parentheses: Underwriting (6), Issue (5), Billing (5), Commissions (3), and Claims (6). Two insurers noted they use their underwriting and claims TPAs for only some functions and another, which responded that it does not use TPAs for underwriting and claims, noted that it sometimes receives help from its TPA, but the TPA never makes the decision. We thank CHCS, DMS, LifeCare Assurance, Long-Term Care Group, RGA, and Wilton Re for their contributions to the LTCI industry. Other reinsurers and TPAs may support insurers not in our survey. In some cases, affiliated companies provide reinsurance or guarantees.

CLAIMS

  • Seven participants reported 2020 claims. As some companies are not able to provide detailed data, some statistics are more robust than others.
  • The insurers’ combined claim payments on individual policies rose 1.6 percent in 2020 over 2019. Two insurers reported a decrease in claims, while the other five insurers reported a 5.2 percent increase.
  • The LTCI industry has had a much bigger impact than indicated above, because a lot of claims are paid by insurers that do not currently sell LTCI or did not submit claims data to us.

LTCI claims paid by insurers no longer selling LTCI may differ significantly from the following statistics as their claimants are more likely to have facility-only coverage, be older, etc.

Table 1 shows the total dollar and number of reported individual and multi-life (not group) LTCI claims. It reflects the same carriers for both years. As noted above, total claims rose only 1.6 percent. The impact of the pandemic is not clear in the data, but some claimants likely died prematurely and/or spurned facility care, particularly nursing home care. Some claimants likely abandoned facilities, thereby losing coverage either because they did not hire commercial home caregivers or because they had a facility-only policy and did not qualify for exemptions that some insurers provided. Claimants and commercial caregivers potentially were hesitant to meet during a large part of the year, likely dampening home care claims.

Table 2 shows the distribution of those claims by venue, which have shifted away from nursing homes over the years (except in 2019) due to consumer preferences and more claims coming from comprehensive policies. The distribution reflects different insurers from year-to-year; 2019’s aberration was caused by the absence of data from an insurer which resumed providing data this year.

The inception-to-date number of claims is surprisingly more weighted to Nursing Home than the dollar of claims. It seems that nursing home claims come from older policies with lower maximum daily benefits.

In the distribution based on number of claims, a person who received care in more than one venue is counted once for each venue, but not double-counted in the total line.
Six carriers reported their number of open individual claims at year-end, ranging between 51 and 81 percent of the number of claims paid during the year, averaging 64 percent overall.

Table 3 shows average size individual claims since inception. Because 41 percent of claimants since inception have submitted claims from more than one type of venue, the average total claim might be expected to exceed the average claim paid for any particular venue. However, individual Assisted Living Facility (ALF) claims stand out as high each year, probably because:

  • ALF claims appear to have a longer duration compared with other venues.
  • Nursing home costs are most likely to exceed the policy daily/monthly maximum, hence nursing home claims are most likely to understate the cost of care.
  • People who maximize the use of their maximum monthly benefits can generally spend as much in an ALF as in a nursing home.
  • Although some surveys report that ALFs cost about half as much as nursing homes on average, ALFs often charge more for a memory unit or for levels of assistance that align more closely with nursing home care. Upscale ALFs seem to cost a higher percentage of upscale nursing home costs than the average ALF/nursing home ratio.

Several insurers extend ALF coverage to policies which originally did not include ALF coverage, providing policyholders with significant flexibility at time of claim, but contributing to the insurers’ need for rate increases.

The following factors contribute to a large range of average claim results by insurer (see Table 3), which results in significant year-to-year differences in Table 3 because different insurers contribute data:

  1. Different markets (by affluence; worksite vs. individual; geography; etc.)
  2. Demographic differences (distribution by gender and age)
  3. Distribution by benefit period, benefit increase feature, shared care and elimination period.
  4. Distribution by facility-only policies vs. 50 percent home care vs. 100 percent home care vs. home care only, etc.
  5. Different lengths of time in the business.

The following factors cause our average claim sizes to be understated.

  1. For insurers reporting claims this year, nine percent of inception-to-date individual claims are still open. Our data does not include reserve estimates for future payments on open claims.
  2. People who recover, then claim again, are counted as multiple insureds, rather than adding their various claims together.

Besides being understated, average claim data does not reflect the value of LTCI from some purchasers’ perspectives, because the many small claims drive down the average claim. LTCI can provide significant financial return for people who need care one year or longer. A primary purpose of insurance is to protect against adverse results, so the amount of protection, as well as average claim, is important.

Five insurers provided their current individual (excludes group) monthly LTCI claim exposure, which exceeds $5 billion (note: reflects only initial monthly maximum for one insurer). As shown in Table 4, this figure is thirty times their corresponding monthly LTCI premium income and more than 41 times their 2020 LTCI monthly paid claims. Eight insurers contributed data regarding their inforce distribution by benefit period. Treating endless (lifetime benefit periods) as a 15-year benefit period, we found that their average inforce benefit period is 6.85 years. Changing the assigned value of the endless benefit period by one year has an impact of approximately 0.25 years on the average inforce benefit period. With annual exposure thirty times annual premium and assuming an average benefit period of about 6.85 years, we estimate that total exposure is 207 times annual premium.

Three insurers reported their current average individual maximum monthly maximum benefit for claimants, with results ranging from $4,121 to $6,729.

Nursing home (NH) claims are more likely to use the policy’s maximum daily/monthly benefit than ALF claims, because ALF daily/monthly costs are generally lower and because policies sometimes have lower maximums for ALFs. ALF claims correspondingly are more likely to use the policy maximum than are adult day care and home care claims.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Bankers Life, CalPERS, Knights of Columbus, Mutual of Omaha, National Guardian, New York Life, Northwestern and Thrivent contributed significant background data, but some were unable to contribute some data. Four other insurers (Auto-Owners, Country, LifeSecure and Transamerica) contributed their number of policies sold and new annualized premium, distinguishing worksite from other sales, but not clarifying whether FPOs were included in the premium.

Sales characteristics vary significantly among insurers based on market differences (individual vs. worksite, affluence, gender distribution, etc.). Year-to-year variations in policy feature distributions may reflect industry trends but may also reflect changes in participants, participant practices and designs, participant or worksite market shares, etc. The statistical differences between the worksite and non-worksite sales will be reported in the August issue of Broker World.

Market Share
Because new coverage is being issued, we include purchased increases on existing policies in new premium (we call them FPOs and include board-approved increase offers). FPOs increased in 2020, cushioning the reduction in premium from new sales. Removing FPOs spotlights insurers with more new policy sales. Table 5 lists the top 8 participants in 2020 new premium including FPOs and without FPOs. Northwestern ranks #1 including FPOs, with Northwestern and Mutual of Omaha accounting for 60 percent of the market. Ignoring FPOs, Mutual of Omaha is #1. The premium includes 100 percent of recurring premiums plus ten percent of single premiums.

Worksite Market Share
After a strong 2019, worksite premium dropped about 15 percent in 2020, accounting for a lower percentage of total sales than in 2019. It is possible that the worksite market could have produced a bigger percentage of total sales than in 2019 had the pandemic not occurred. However, with Transamerica leaving the market and other changes, the future of the worksite LTCI market (except executive carveout) is unpredictable. LifeSecure, Mutual of Omaha, and National Guardian may pick up market share; linked-benefit worksite products might pick up market share; and/or LTC risk covered in the worksite might drop.

Worksite sales consist of three different markets, the first two of which produce a higher percentage of new insureds than of new premiums:

  • Voluntary group coverage generally is less robust than individual coverage.
  • Core/Buy-Up programs have particularly young age distributions and modest coverage because a lot of people do not buy-up and are less likely to insure spouses.
  • Executive carve-out programs generally provide the most robust coverage. One- or two-couple executive carve-out sales may not qualify for a multi-life discount with some insurers, hence may not be labeled as worksite sales in submissions to our survey.

The amount of worksite sales reported and its distribution among the three sub-markets significantly impact product feature sales distributions. Table 6 is indicative of the full market (including our estimates for two insurers which did not report sales), but this year’s policy feature distributions significantly underweight the voluntary and core/buy-up markets, as most of those markets are not reflected in our statistical data. More information about worksite sales will appear in the August issue of Broker World magazine.

Affinity Market Share
Affinity groups (non-employers such as associations) produced 8.1 percent of new insureds (see Table 7), and 6.0 percent of new business premium. Less than 20 percent of the lower affinity average premium is attributable to the affinity discount. The balance may be due to younger issue age or less robust coverage. It would seem that, over time, an increasing number of associations would have discounts, which might cause the affinity group percentage to increase over time, but our data does not demonstrate such a pattern.

Characteristics of Policies Sold
Average Premium Per Sale
The average new business (NB) premium per insured (Table 8), subtracting FPOs for the insurers that reported statistics, and the average premium per buying unit (a couple comprise a single buying unit) increased six to seven percent each to $2,706 and $3,847, respectively.

Data for 2018 and earlier years included FPOs in these calculations, overstating the average premium per new insured and buying unit.

Average premium per new policy ranged from $1,029 to $3,792 among the 12 insurers.
The lowest average new premium (including FPOs) was in Puerto Rico ($2,511), followed by Indiana ($2,642) and Kansas ($2,915), while the highest was in the District of Columbia ($5,336), followed by Connecticut ($4,820), and New York ($4,656).
For those insurers which reported results for 2019 and 2020, the average inforce premium (reflecting rate increases, FPO elections and termination of older policies) increased from $2,246 to $2,309, a 2.8 percent increase. However, Table 8 shows a decrease due to a change in insurers reporting inforce premium.

Issue Age
Table 9 summarizes the distribution of sales by issue age band based on insured count. The average issue age remained 57.7. All insurers reported an average issue age between 55 and 60. The age distributions for 2016 and earlier had more worksite participants than recent years. Note: one survey participant has a minimum issue age of 40, one will not issue below 30, and one will not issue below 25.

Benefit Period
Table 10 summarizes the distribution of sales by benefit period. For the first time since 2014, endless benefit periods registered a measurable percentage, albeit only 0.2 percent. The average benefit period for limited benefit period policies dropped back to 3.75, but if we treat endless benefit periods as 15 years, the average benefit period was 3.82. Because of Shared Care benefits, total coverage was higher than the 3.75 average suggests. Three-year benefit periods accounted for 52.9 percent of the sales.

Monthly Benefit
Monthly determination applied to a record 83.0 percent of 2020 policies (Table 11). With monthly determination, low-expense days leave more benefits to cover high-expense days. One insurer offers only daily determination; one insurer offers a choice; and the other insurers automatically have monthly determination.

Table 12 shows the largest concentration ever in the $4,500-$5,999 initial monthly maximum range (32.3 percent). The average maximum monthly benefit increased slightly to $4,888.

Benefit Increase Features
Table 13 summarizes the distribution of sales by benefit increase feature. Most notably, only 14.6 percent of the policies were sold without a benefit increase feature.

“Indexed Level Premium” policies are priced to have a level premium, but the benefit increase is tied to an index such as the consumer price index (CPI).

As shown in Table 14, we project the age 80 maximum daily benefit by increasing the average initial daily benefit from the average issue age to age 80, according to the distribution of benefit increase features, using current future purchase option (FPO) election rates and a five percent/year offer for fixed FPOs. The maximum benefit at age 80 (in 2042) for our 2020 average 58-year-old purchaser projects to $305/day (equivalent to 2.9 percent compounding). Had our average buyer bought an average 2019 policy a year ago at age 57, her/his age 80 benefit would be $316/day (equivalent to 2.9 percent compounding). Most policyholders seem likely to experience eroding purchasing power over time if cost of care trends exceed three percent.

FPOs are important to insureds in order to maintain purchasing power, and 82 percent of our participants’ 2019 to 2020 FPOs were exercised. The high election rate is noteworthy, considering that the cost increases each year due to larger coverage increases each year, increasing unit prices due to age, and additional price increases due to rate increases.

One insurer had an election rate of 91 percent, two insurers had 68 to 70 percent, two insurers had 43 to 45 percent, and one insurer had 19 percent. It seems clear that higher election rates occur if FPOs are more frequent (every year vs. every 3 years) and are “negative-election” (activate automatically unless the client rejects them) as opposed to “positive-election” (which activate only if the client makes a request). At least some blocks of business demonstrate that policyholders will exercise FPOs if they must do so to continue to receive future offers.

FPOs are also important to insurers, accounting for at least 22 percent of new premium in 2020. Two insurers had nearly half their new premium come from FPOs.

Elimination Period
Table 16 summarizes the distribution of sales by facility elimination period (EP). Ninety-two percent (92 percent) of buyers opt for elimination periods between 84 and 100 days. The percentage of EPs of 100 days or more was 5.2 percent, lower than any other year in the table.

Table 17 shows the percentage of policies with zero-day home care elimination period (but a longer facility elimination period). For insurers offering an additional-cost zero-day home care EP option, the purchase rate is sensitive to the cost.

Table 17 also shows the percentage of policies with a calendar-day EP. It is important to understand that most calendar-day EP provisions do not start counting until a paid-service day has occurred.

Sales to Couples and Gender Distribution
Table 18 summarizes the distribution of sales by gender and single/couple status.

In 2012, the last year in which all sales were unisex, 54.9 percent of buyers were female. In 2013, the female percentage spiked to 57.2 percent as females purchased unisex pricing that was still available. Since unisex pricing has disappeared entirely except in the worksite, the female percentage has plateaued at slightly above 54 percent. The percentage of females varies significantly based on an insurer’s markets. This year, the percentage of females varied from 45 to 63.9 percent among insurers.

The percentage of accepted applicants who purchase coverage when their partners are declined also varies significantly by insurer based on their couples’ pricing and their distribution system. Few insurers are able to report this data.

Shared Care and Other Couples’ Features
Table 19 summarizes sales of Shared Care and other couples’ features.

  • Shared care allows one spouse/partner to use the other’s available benefits if their own coverage has been depleted or offers a third independent pool that the couple can share.
  • Survivorship waives a survivor’s premium after the first death if specified conditions are met.
  • Joint waiver of premium (WP) waives both insureds’ premiums if either qualifies for benefits.

Changes in distribution between carriers can greatly impact year-to-year comparisons in Table 19, because some insurers embed survivorship or joint waiver automatically (sometimes only in some circumstances) while others offer it for an extra premium or do not offer the feature.

In the top half of Table 19, percentages are based on the number of policies sold to couples who both buy (only limited benefit, for Shared Care). The bottom half of Table 19 shows the (higher) percentage that results from dividing by sales of insurers that offer the feature. For insurers reporting Shared Care sales, the percentage of both-buying couples who opted for Shared Care varied from 8 to 89.7 percent. The corresponding percentage of couples with Joint WP varied from 10 to 100 percent and for Survivorship ranged from 2.1 to 14.1 percent.

Table 20 provides additional breakdown on the characteristics of Shared Care sales. As shown on the right-hand side of Table 20, two- to four-year benefit period policies are most likely (26 to 31 percent) to add Shared Care. Partly because three-year benefit periods comprise 53 percent of sales, most policies with Shared Care (61 percent) have three-year benefit periods, as shown on the left side of Table 20.

Above, we stated that Shared Care is selected by 36.4 percent of couples who both buy limited benefit period policies. However, Table 20 shows Shared Care comprised no more than 31 percent of any benefit period. Table 20 has lower percentages because Table 19 denominators are limited to people who buy with their spouse/partner whereas Table 20 denominators include all buyers.

Shared Care is more concentrated in two- to four-year benefit periods (88.4 percent of shared sales) than are all sales (73.0 percent). Couples are more likely to buy short benefit periods because couples plan to help provide care to each other and Shared Care makes shorter benefit periods more acceptable. Single buyers are more likely to be female, hence opt for a longer benefit period.

Existence and Type of Home Care Coverage
Four participants reported sales of facility-only policies, which accounted for 0.7 percent of total sales. One insurer was responsible for more than 80 percent of such sales. Ninety-six percent (96.4 percent) of the comprehensive policies included home care benefits at least equal to the facility benefit. No participant has reported home-care-only sales since 2018.

Other Characteristics
As shown in Table 21, partial cash alternative features (which allow claimants, in lieu of any other benefit that month, to use between 10 and 40 percent of their benefits for whatever purpose they wish) were included in 52.5 percent of sales, including non-participant sales.

Return of premium (ROP) features were included in 10.4 percent of policies. ROP returns some or all premiums (usually reduced by paid LTCI benefits) when a policyholder dies. Approximately 75 percent of ROP features were embedded automatically in the product. Embedded features are designed to raise premiums minimally, typically decreasing the ROP benefit to $0 by age 75.

Nearly sixteen percent (15.8 percent) of policies with limited benefit periods included a restoration of benefits (ROB) provision, which typically restores used benefits when the insured has not needed services for at least six months. Approximately 90 percent of ROB features were automatically embedded.

Insurers must offer shortened benefit period (SBP) coverage, which makes limited future LTCI benefits available to people who stop paying premiums after three or more years. The insurers able to report SBP sales, sold SBP to 3.7 percent of buyers.

Only one insurer issued non-tax-qualified (NTQ) policies, which accounted for 0.1 percent of industry sales.

“Captive” (dedicated to one insurer) agents produced 53.1 percent of the coverages. Brokers produced 46.3 percent and a direct-to-consumer carrier accounted for 0.6 percent. At one time, “captive” agents who sold LTCI tended to specialize in LTCI. Now many are agents of mutual companies.

Sales distribution by jurisdiction is posted on the Broker World website.

Limited Pay and Paid-Up Policies
In 2020, two insurers sold policies that become paid-up in 10 years or less, accounting for 1.1 percent of sales, the highest percentage since 2014, as shown in Table 22.

Because today’s prices are more stable, premium increases are less likely. One of the key reasons for buying 10-year-pay (avoidance of rate increases after the 10th year) is greatly reduced, while the cost of 10-year-pay has increased, making it less attractive than in the past. Nonetheless, limited-pay and single-pay policies are attractive to minimize post-retirement outflow and to accommodate §1035 exchanges.

Seven participants reported that 3.0 percent of their inforce policies are paid-up, a lower percentage than last year because an additional insurer participated.

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM BACKGROUND
When someone applies to Medicaid for long-term care services, most states with Partnership programs disregard assets up to the amount of benefits received from a Partnership-qualified policy (some Indiana and New York policies disregard all assets). Except for California, states with Partnership programs grant reciprocity to Partnership policies issued in other jurisdictions. Partnership programs are approved in 44 jurisdictions, all but AK, DC, HI, MA, MS, UT, and VT, but MA has a similar program (MassHealth).

Four states (CA, CT, IN and NY) blazed the trail, legislating variations of the Robert Woods Johnson approach (“RWJ” states), whereas “DRA” states use simpler, more consistent rules developed later, in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. For example, RWJ states require a separate Partnership policy form, generally still have more stringent benefit increase requirements and sometimes assess a fee for insurers to participate (none of which apply in DRA states).

Approximately 60 percent of Partnership states now allow one percent compounding to qualify for Partnership, which can help low-budget buyers qualify for Partnership and also enables worksite core programs to be Partnership-qualified. A higher percentage of policies would qualify for Partnership in the future if insurers and advisors leverage these opportunities. However, currently only three insurers offer one percent compounding.
Partnership programs could be more successful if:

  1. Advisors offer small maximum monthly benefits more frequently to the middle class. For example, a $1,500 initial maximum monthly benefit covers about four hours of home care every two days and, with compound benefit increases, may maintain buying power. Many middle-class individuals would like LTCI to help them stay at home while not “burning out” family caregivers and could be motivated further by Partnership asset disregard. (This approach does not work in RWJ states with high Partnership minimum daily benefit requirements.)
  2. Middle-class prospects were better educated about the importance of benefit increases to maintain LTCI purchasing power and to qualify for Partnership asset disregard.
  3. The four original Partnership states migrate to DRA rules.
  4. More jurisdictions adopt Partnership programs.
  5. Programs that privately finance direct mail educational LTCI content from public agencies were adopted more broadly.
  6. Financial advisors were to press reluctant insurers to certify their products and offer one percent compounding.
  7. More financial advisors were certified. Some people argue that certification requirements should be loosened. At a minimum, the renewal certification process could be improved.
  8. Linked benefit products became Partnership-qualified.

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM SALES
Participants reported Partnership sales in all 44 authorized states except CT and NY. No participant sold Partnership policies in more than 41 states in 2020. Two had Partnership sales in 38 states, three in 29 to 34 states, one in 1 state, and the other has chosen not to certify Partnership conformance.

Insurance brokers do not have access to Partnership policies in CA, CT and NY and from only one insurer in IN. However, in some of those states, consumers can purchase Partnership-qualified coverage from one or two other entities.

In the DRA states, 55 percent of policies qualified for Partnership status. Minnesota (81.4 percent) leads each year. Georgia, Maine and Wisconsin were also above 70 percent.

The original RWJ states had few Partnership sales. In New Mexico, a recent Partnership state, only 4.7 percent of sales qualified, which should increase in the future. Kentucky had only 25.2 percent.

UNDERWRITING DATA
Case Disposition
Seven insurers contributed application case disposition data to Table 23. In 2020, 57.8 percent of applications were placed, the lowest ever, seemingly impacted by the pandemic. One insurer reported a 76.4 percent placement rate; all others were below the average, with three insurers between 40 and 47 percent.

Decline rates and suspended/withdrawn rates hit records. While we thought the suspended/withdrawn rate would rise with the pandemic, of the six insurers who have reported such data for both 2019 and 2020, two had a noticeably lower suspended/withdrawn rate in 2020 and two were +/-0.1 percent.

Decline rate by carrier varied from 11.9 to 38.4 percent, but all but two insurers were between 23.2 and 29.1 percent, varying based on factors such as age distribution, distribution system, market, underwriting requirements, and underwriting standards. Our placed percentages reflect the insurers’ perspective. A higher percentage of applicants secures coverage because applicants denied by one carrier may be issued either stand-alone or combo coverage by another carrier or may receive coverage with the same insurer after a deferral period.

Table 24 shows that, compared to 2019, the placement rate increased below age 60 and decreased above age 60, which seems consistent with a theory that the lower placement rate was related to the pandemic. This data is a subset of the placement data in Table 23.

Low placement rates increase insurers’ cost per placed policy. More importantly, low placement rates discourage advisors from discussing LTCI with clients. In addition to not wanting to waste time and effort, advisors fear that declined clients will be dissatisfied. In the Market Perspective section, we listed ways to improve placement rates. This is a critical issue for the industry. If readers have suggestions, they are invited to contact the authors.

Underwriting Tools
Six insurers contributed data to Table 25, which divides the number of uses of each underwriting tool by the number of applications processed. For example, the number of medical records was 82 percent of the number of applications. That does not mean that 82 percent of the applications involved medical records, because some applications resulted in more than one set of medical records being requested.

Insurers are trying to speed underwriting to increase placement rates. In the worksite market, insurers are less likely to use some of these tools.

Year-to-year changes in distribution of sales among insurers significantly impact results. Lower maximum ages result in fewer face-to-face exams. Insurers might underreport the use of an underwriting tool because they may lack a good source for that statistic. For example, an insurer might not be able to split phone interviews by whether or not they include cognitive testing.

The biggest change was the drop in Face-to-Face assessments, perhaps because it was hard to schedule them due to the pandemic.

Underwriting Time
Table 26 shows the average processing from receipt of application to mailing the policy time (40 days) reversed the trend of speedier processing. Of the six insurers that reported this data in both 2019 and 2020, the three fastest processors of 2019 all got faster and the three slower processors of 2019 all got slower, expanding the range from 28.9-60.3 to 26.9-65.9.

Rating Classification
Table 27 shows that a lower percentage of policies was issued in the most favorable rating classification, but the highest percentage was placed in the two most favorable classes since 2012. That’s surprising because prior to 2016, we had more worksite business in the rating classification table. For more information, look for the August issue of Broker World magazine where we will separate data by worksite vs. non-worksite business.

Only 7.7 percent of policies were issued beyond the second-best classification, but three insurers placed 11.0 to 12.4 percent of policies in such a class and another insurer placed 19.2 percent of policies in such a class.

Two insurers placed more than 80 percent of their applicants in the best underwriting class. The other five insurers placed 19 to 25 percent in their best class.

Lastly, Table 27 shows the percentage of decisions which were either declined or placed in the 3rd or less-attractive classification is reducing. Hence, we conclude that industry is making more favorable decisions rather than declining applicants in lieu of giving them a substandard rating,

Tables 28 and 29 show the 2020 percentages of policies issued in the most favorable category and decline decisions by issue age. Tables 27 and 28 do not exactly match Table 26 because some participants provide all-age rating or decline data. The percentage placed in the most favorable classification increased for ages 65 and older, likely statistical fluctuation. Although overall decline rates increased, the by-age decline rates decreased, except for under age 30; that anomaly results because only some insurers can provide decline data by issue age.

CLOSING
We thank insurance company staff for submitting the data and responding to questions promptly. We also thank Sophia Fosdick, Margaret Liang, Nicole Gaspar, and Alex Geanous of Milliman for managing the data expertly.

We reviewed data for reasonableness and insurers reviewed their product exhibit displays. Nonetheless, we cannot assure that all data is accurate.

If you have suggestions for improving this survey (including new entrants in the market), please contact one of the authors.

Reference:
Society of Actuaries (November 2016). Long-Term Care Insurance: The SOA Pricing Project. Retrieved May 16, 2020, from https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/static-pages/sections/long-term-care/ltc-pricing-project.pdf (PDF).

LTCI During The Pandemic

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The pandemic challenged long term care insurers in several respects. This article describes some of the ways that insurers made exceptions to help policyholders during the pandemic, underwriting practices they chose and the potential impact on pricing.

Claims processing during the Pandemic
Some long term care insurance companies offered outstanding accommodations to support claimants and their families during our unprecedented pandemic. Despite the losses which insurers incur on LTCI policies and their reluctance to set precedents which could come back to haunt them, some insurers belied the theory that they focus on how to avoid paying claims.

Here is a partial list of actions that some LTCI companies’ claims departments took in order to serve their clients better.

  1. Paid for home care when people moved from facilities to home care (even if the policy did not cover home care), perhaps done by temporarily broadening what could be covered under an alternative plan of care provision or with an extracontractual letter that included a statement of Reservation of Rights to avoid setting precedent or a claim of waiver or estoppel.
  2. Paid for care by family members, even for policies that did not cover the cost for family members or had lower limits for such care.
  3. Extended bed reservation periods (sometimes even when bed reservation was not included in the policy).
  4. Extended the period for satisfying the elimination period (e.g., 90 days in a 360-day period).
  5. Did not enforce a second elimination period where there was a discontinuation, then resumption, of benefits.
  6. Continued to waive premium for claimants who stopped receiving covered services, contrary to policy provisions.
  7. Used video or telephone for claimant assessments.
  8. Benefit Eligibility Assessments became more varied and customized.
  9. Recertification procedures were loosened, particularly for those not expected to recover, largely because face-to-face recertification was not possible while facilities were closed to outsiders.
  10. Relied more on electronic medical records, even if not as comprehensive as desired.
  11. Repatriated services that had been shipped overseas.
  12. At the same time, insurers were investing in and rolling out software to facilitate the claims process.

a) Added authentication to increase security and permit enhanced transactions.
b) Permitted claimants’ representatives to access and provide information electronically at any time.
c) Smart forms to garner the necessary information while avoiding questions that are irrelevant to the situation.
d) Moved uploaded documents directly to claims processing queues.
e) Created automated follow-ups for claimants to remind them of outstanding requirements and due dates and also automated follow-ups for claims staff to perform various activities.
f) Electronic payment to claimants’ bank accounts.
g) More electronic reporting systems for providers, including electronic visit verification.

Underwriting during the Pandemic
As part of its annual LTCI Survey published in Broker World magazine in the July and August issues, Milliman asked some questions about underwriting practices during the pandemic.

Four of eight insurers indicated a variance in face-to-face interview (F2F) practices, in one or another of the ways documented in Table 1.

Table 1

Two insurers required face-to-face interviews in fewer situations and one of them expects to continue to have fewer face-to-face interview requirements.

Three insurers now hold off on scheduling a face-to-face interview until medical records have been reviewed.

Two insurers did F2F interviews by Zoom and one of them expects to continue to do so post-pandemic. Another insurer indicated that they might consider this change in the future “dependent on reinsurer’s willingness to accept this in place of traditional face-to-face interviews.”

Only one of seven insurers responded that they did personal phone interviews by Zoom. Apparently, as phone interviews were not done face-to-face, modification was not necessary. However, three insurers expect to do such interviews by Zoom in the future.
Three insurers reduced their maximum issue age. We are aware of one stand-alone LTCI carrier which reduced its maximum issue age from 79 to 65 on April 16, 2020, because of difficulties completing face-to-face interviews, but these restrictions were removed in 30 jurisdictions by June 14 and in others as stay-at-home orders were rescinded. One insurer expects the reduction in maximum issue age to continue post-pandemic.
Linked-benefit insurers were more likely than stand-alone long term care insurers to reduce their maximum issue age, not only because of the pandemic but also because of low investment yields. Of the five linked-benefit insurers for which we have information, four cut off sales above age 70 and the fifth discontinued, above age 70, recurring premium, some designs and substandard sales but continued to accept single premiums.
Three of seven carriers ask the applicant whether he/she has had COVID-19 or been in contact with someone who has COVID-19. Based on the comments of the four insurers who reported not asking these questions, it appears that some companies relied on medical records, symptoms, and/or a catch-all “not otherwise disclosed” question to expose having (had) COVID-19. At least two insurers are monitoring the longer-term impact of COVID-19 before deciding whether to refile their applications with COVID-19 (or related) questions.

People who have had COVID-19 are deferred 60 to 180 days depending on the insurer, the CDC’s recommended quarantine period and on hospitalization, severity, residual impact, and potential impact on existing comorbidities. As noted in Table 1, some insurers routinely defer more than 60 days.

Five of seven insurers indicated that having been in contact with someone with COVID-19 will result in deferral. Generally, the contact period and deferral period were the same, either 14 or 30 days. For example, if someone was in contact with a person who had COVID-19 in the past 14 days, they would be deferred for 14 days. One insurer responded that if someone has been in contact, within the past 14 days, with a person who had COVID-19, the application would be deferred for 30 days, noting that the 30 days is measured from recovery.

Three insurers reported different deferral periods for traveling outside the USA: 21 days; 30 days; or 28 days if it was a cruise. Three insurers had no deferral because of COVID-19 concerns over foreign travel.

In addition to the above questions, when asked to look into the impact of the pandemic in the future, one insurer predicted tighter underwriting, one predicted increased prices (five predicted no change in pricing), and one predicted a change in policy design to reflect a shift from facility to home care and care by family members.

Impact on the Future Cost of LTCI
LTCI companies saved money during the pandemic. Clients, particularly in nursing homes, died. Non-claimant insureds who might have become claimants in the near future also died. Claimants and potential claimants vacated facilities, replacing facility claims with generally less-costly home care claims and even less expensive family caregiving. According to a study3 by FitchRatings, the LTCI industry improved from a $2.3 billion loss in 2019 to a $241 million profit in 2020. The factors mentioned in this paragraph contributed to the improved results as well as other factors such as price increases and perhaps less reserve strengthening.

Table 2

As noted above, most insurers do not envision an increase in the unit price of LTCI. However, the impact of COVID-19 on future claims is unknown. Are COVID-19 survivors more vulnerable to needing long term care? Is there a residual cognitive or physical impact? What will be the long-term impact of inability to address chronic or other conditions due to skipped doctors’ and physical therapy appointments, postponed surgery, or psychological and physical reaction to disrupted routines and relationships?
It will also be interesting to see how much “salvage” there is in LTCI policies in the future. Insurer pricing reflects that claimants do not necessarily use their full daily or monthly maximum. To the degree that insurers anticipate such wastage in their pricing, the resultant premium goes down.

As explained below, we anticipate that the cost of care in each major type of venue (nursing home (NH), assisted living facility (ALF), home care (HC)) will increase. Hence, we expect the wastage percentage factor for each venue to reduce.

A lower wastage percentage assumption would result in a small increase in LTCI premiums. However, even with a lower wastage factor for each of the three mentioned venues, the average wastage ratio could rise because of a shift from facility care to home care.

Because the cost of care is likely to increase, consumers may feel a need for a higher LTCI monthly maximum. If the initial maximum monthly benefit is tied to the cost of a nursing home or assisted living facility, applicants will experience higher premiums even if the unit price (e.g., per $10 of initial daily benefit) remains unchanged.

However, that could be offset by applicants who shift how they determine the desired initial maximum monthly benefit. To the degree that they decide an initial monthly maximum that would cover ALF cost instead of NH cost or the likely cost of home care rather than facility care, they may accept more risk in lieu of buying more insurance.
The cost of facility care is likely to increase because facilities may incur higher costs due to physical and procedural modifications as a result of the pandemic and a likely need for a higher staff-to-resident ratio. Furthermore, occupancy rates slumped significantly during the pandemic and people needing rehab avoided facilities. If lower overall occupancy and/or a loss of rehab business continues, facilities seem likely to have to raise prices to cover their overhead costs.

A December 2020 survey of nursing homes1 found that 65 percent were operating at a loss and another 25 percent were operating on a zero to three percent margin. Similarly, a survey2 found that 50 percent of assisted living facilities were operating at a loss, with 13 percent operating at zero to three percent profitability. The post-pandemic recovery will help (reducing overtime for example) but seems unlikely to fully restore their prior financial results. Therefore, facility prices may have to increase, and a significant number of facilities might close. A reduction in the number of facilities would improve the profitability of the remaining facilities but it might also reduce the pressure for competitive pricing.

Home care hourly costs are likely to increase for several reasons. Significantly increased demand will raise the cost of limited supply. Additional costs are for protective equipment similar to masks with a particle filter on them to prevent contagion, or of course, testing and training which could also contribute to higher prices. Other independent factors could also lead to higher prices, such as continuing consolidation and a higher minimum wage.

The ultimate impact of the pandemic won’t be known for a long-time, but it seems likely that there will be direct and indirect impacts. So far, the LTCI industry has weathered the pandemic well, keeping a focus on taking care of its claimants. That story deserves to be told.

References:

  1. Survey by the American Health Care Association and the National Center for Assisted Living, December 2020, https://www.ahcancal.org/News-and-Communications/Fact-Sheets/FactSheets/State-of-Nursing-Home-Industry_Dec2020.pdf.
  2. Survey by the National Center for Assisted Living, August 8-10, 2020, https://www.ahcancal.org/News-and-Communications/Fact-Sheets/FactSheets/Survey-AL-COVID-Costs.pdf.
  3. Jamie Tucker and David Gorak, FitchRatings; found at https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2021/04/07/covid-19-helped-long-term-care-insurers-in-2020-fitch/, which offered a link to https://www.fitchratings.com/research/insurance/long-term-care-insurance-dashboard-2020-improved-results-view-of-reserve-adequacy-unchanged-06-04-2021.

2020 Analysis Of Worksite LTCI

The 2020 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey, published in the July issue, was the 22nd consecutive annual review of long term care insurance (LTCI) published by Broker World magazine. It analyzed individual product sales and Genworth group sales, reporting sales distributions and detailed insurer and product characteristics.

From 2006-2009, Broker World published separate group LTCI surveys, but discontinued those surveys when the availability of group LTCI policies shrank. In 2011, Broker World began annual analysis of worksite sales of individual products in August to complement the July overall market analysis.

The worksite market consists of individual policies and group certificates (“policies” henceforth) sold with employer support, such as permitting on-site solicitation and/or paying or collecting premiums. If a business owner buys an individual policy and pays for it through her/his business, some participants may report such policies as “worksite” policies while others might not if it was not processed as a worksite group. If a business sponsors general LTC/LTCI educational meetings, with employees pursuing any interest in LTCI off-site, such sales are not counted here as WS sales.

We limit our analysis to U.S. sales and exclude “combination” products except where specifically indicated. (Combination products pay meaningful life insurance, annuity, or disability income benefits in addition to LTCI.)

About the Survey
Our survey includes worksite (WS) sales and statistical distributions from MassMutual, National Guardian Life, New York Life, and Northwestern, and worksite sales data from Genworth, LifeSecure and Transamerica. We compare WS sales to individual LTCI policies that are not worksite policies (NWS) and to total sales (Total).

The July issue also included sales of the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) program. CalPERS eligibility is based California public employment, but the program operates more like an affinity group than a worksite group, so it was counted as affinity sales in July and is not included as a worksite product in this article.

Ten percent of single premiums are included as annualized premiums.

Highlights from This Year’s Survey

  • Participants reported 2019 WS sales of 11,483 policies (21.0 percent of total sales) for $22.85 million (13.4 percent of new annualized premium). The premium includes 2019 future purchase options exercised on policies issued in the past.
  • In 2019, WS sales rebounded from the 2018 results we reported last year. The three insurers which are most focused on voluntary worksite LTCI programs all had sales increases of between 62 and 76 percent in 2019, despite increased competition from a new entrant and from life insurance LTCI linked-benefit programs.
  • Our worksite sales total includes nearly 100 percent of the stand-alone WS LTCI market, but our statistical distributions reflect only about 12 percent of worksite policies sold (28 percent of premium). Our worksite statistical distributions can vary significantly from year-to-year because insurers focusing on particular worksite markets may be over- or under-represented. Last year, we commented that the worksite business in our statistical analysis was overly weighted toward executive carve-out programs. This year that imbalance has increased. The carriers that provided 2019 statistical data had an average worksite annual premium of $4,568 whereas the ones that provided only total sales had an average worksite premium of $1,627. The corresponding 2018 averages were $2,015 and $1,561. In 2017, the difference was in the other direction ($1,015 vs. $1,441).

MARKET PERSPECTIVE
The three segments of the worksite market (which may apply to different employee classes in a single case):

  • In “core” (also known as “core/buy-up”) programs, employers pay for a small amount of coverage for generally a large number of employees; the employees can buy more coverage. “Core” programs generally have lower average ages, short benefit periods, low daily maximum benefits and a small percentage of spouses insured.
  • In “carve-out” programs, employers pay for robust coverage for generally a small number of executives and usually their spouses. Generally, employees can buy more coverage for themselves or spouses. Compared to “core” programs, a higher percentage of insureds are married, more spouses buy coverage and the age distribution is older.
  • In “voluntary” programs, employers pay nothing toward the cost of coverage. Coverage is more robust than “core” programs, but less robust than “carve-out” programs. Voluntary programs tend to be most weighted toward female purchasers.

MassMutual, National Guardian, New York Life and Northwestern write mostly executive carve-out programs, whereas Genworth, Transamerica and LifeSecure business includes significant voluntary and core buy-up business as well. Because the insurers that write mostly executive carve-out business provided statistical data this year and the other insurers provided only total sales, our statistical distributions are more representative of the executive carve-out subset of the market than all types of worksite sales.

Insurer Challenges in the Worksite Market
COVID-19: In 2020, worksite insurers, like most businesses, experienced challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Most scheduled enrollments were canceled or delayed. Enrollments of newly-eligible employees continued, being done in web meetings. As a result, we expect 2020 worksite (and individual) LTCI sales to be lower than 2019.

We suspect 2021 will remain suppressed because a lot of new 2021 sales would typically be enrolled in the 4th quarter of 2020. Even if the worksite LTCI market were to bounce back quickly, we anticipate that a lot of 2021 activity would produce 2022 sales. Moreover, potential unemployment and reduced profitability (due to reduced sales and increased expenses) may blunt enthusiasm for new employee benefit programs. Employers may focus instead on protecting employees and clients from communicable diseases by testing and providing protective equipment to employees and clients. More comments about the impact of COVID-19 on the LTCI market were published on the Broker World Magazine website as part of our July analysis.

Pricing considerations: Most people interpret Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to require that employer-involved LTCI programs use unisex pricing if the employer has had at least 15 employees for at least 20 weeks either in the current or previous year. Thus, to sell at the WS, insurers must create a separate unisex-priced product. The expense of separate pricing, marketing and administration discourages insurers from serving both the WS and NWS markets.

Because healthy, young, and less affluent people are less likely to buy, insurers and enrollers fear health anti-selection (less-healthy people buying, while healthier people do not buy). Health concessions can exacerbate this risk, hence are less common and generous than in the past. There is no “guaranteed issue” stand-alone LTCI coverage; however, some combination products offer some guaranteed issue with adequate WS participation.

WS programs rarely offer “preferred health” discounts; insurers may not get enough health information to grant such a discount. Thus, heterosexual couples might pay more for a WS policy than a corresponding NWS policy, if the male spouse is older or buys more coverage and/or one or both spouses would qualify for a “preferred health” discount in the NWS market. In the carve-out market, a costlier LTCI product can still produce savings on an after-tax basis, because of the tax advantages when employers pay the premium.

Females get a good deal in a WS program compared to NWS pricing, but males pay more in the WS. Insurers fear that most worksite buyers might be female, hurting WS profitability. To the degree that sales skew to females, unisex pricing must approach sex-distinct female pricing (because females have higher expected future claims).

In addition to health and gender distribution, insurers are also careful about age and income distributions of WS cases they accept. Younger and less affluent people are less likely to buy LTCI, so insurers are more vulnerable to health- or gender-anti-selection if the group has a lot of young or less affluent employees.

Some insurers have raised their minimum issue age to avoid anti-selection (few people buy below age 40) and to reduce exposure to extremely long claims. Such age restrictions can discourage employers from introducing a program, especially a carve-out program if they have executives or spouses under age 40.

To control risk, most insurers will not accept a voluntary WS program if there are fewer than 100 employees. However, one insurer (which offers no health concessions) will accept voluntary LTCI programs with as few as two to five employees buying (minimum varies by jurisdiction).

Availability of coverage: With increased remote work, more employers have employees stretched across multiple jurisdictions and eligible non-household relatives might live anywhere. But insurers are less likely than in the past to offer LTCI in jurisdictions with difficult laws, regulations or practices. So, it can be difficult to find an insurer which can cover everyone unless LTCI is sold on a group chassis and the employer does not have individuals in extra-territorial states.

One WS insurer no longer offers WS LTCI to non-household relatives. Reduced availability for such relatives does not have much impact on sales, because few non-household relatives buy WS LTCI. However, it undermines the suggestion that WS LTCI programs might reduce the negative impact of employees being caregivers.

Prior to sex-distinct pricing, an executive carve-out for two partners of a company with more than 15 employees could have been serviced by any LTCI company, but now it is hard to find a carrier that will offer unisex pricing under such circumstances. Such executives may buy policies with sex-distinct pricing either because they are unaware of the requirement under Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, they are confident that no female will file a civil rights complaint, or they disagree with the interpretation that such policies should have unisex pricing to avoid the risk of a civil rights complaint.

Some employee benefit brokers are reluctant to embrace LTCI because of declinations, the enrollment effort, certification requirements, their personal lack of expertise, etc. Increased WS sales are likely to depend upon LTCI specialists forming relationships with employee benefit brokers.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the tax savings for C-Corporations buying LTCI for their employees and employees’ life partners. Pass-through entities may be the more attractive market now. Although the eligible premium is capped in a pass-through entity, a much higher marginal tax rate might apply than for a C-Corporation.

Voluntary worksite LTCI sales lack the tax advantages of employer-paid coverage. Therefore, voluntary programs for young and less-affluent groups may gravitate toward combo products as they include life insurance that is viewed as a more immediate potential need by young employees with families.

The worksite is a great venue to serve people who can benefit from the state Partnership programs (described in the Partnership section). In 2019, 30.5 percent of WS qualified for Partnership programs compared to only 10.3 percent in 2018. However, the increase is at least partly because executive carve-out sales dominate our statistical distributions. As executives are less likely to benefit from Partnership programs the increase may not be meaningful. Core/buy-up programs rarely include compounded benefits and employees often are not willing to pay for the compounding necessary to qualify for the Partnership program.

Regulators have “stepped up,” as 26 jurisdictions now accept policies issued at any age to qualify as Partnership policies even if maximum benefits compound by only one percent. The inclusion of one percent compounding at all ages can make core and voluntary WS programs more attractive. There is a potential market opportunity for an insurer willing to allow a lower minimum monthly maximum for core/buy-up programs with one percent compounding. Four other states permit one percent but only for ages 61+.

The worksite market should be poised for growth given the acceptance of one percent compounding benefits, Partnership qualification, attractive tax breaks, challenged government budgets, advantages over life/LTCI linked benefits (that lack Partnership and tax advantages), and a growing need for LTC insurance coverage. However, employers perceive that offering LTCI to their employees has little value for the employer. By the time the employee or spouse needs LTC, the employee will likely have terminated employment. Employee benefit brokers can help employers more effectively by expanding existing services that reduce the likelihood that employees’ elders will need LTC, which may make LTC more effective, more efficient, safer and less expensive. Enabling employees and their families to have better LTC experiences and to use more (not necessarily 100 percent) commercial care should boost productivity at work.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
As mentioned earlier, insurers’ sales distributions can vary greatly based on the submarket they serve (for example, in the WS market: core, voluntary or carve-out). Therefore, distributions may vary significantly from year to year due to a change in participating insurers, in distribution within an insurer or in market share among insurers. Our sales distributions reflect only about 12 percent of worksite policies and certificates issued in 2019 and are mostly representative of the executive carve-out market. For example, two insurers provided data regarding the number of worksite cases they opened up. Their combined average size was only three policies per worksite. Policies in the carve-out market are designed similarly to those in the NWS (non-worksite) market.

Sales and Market Share
Table 1 shows historical WS sales for all insurers reporting sales. The WS market increased in 2019 relative to 2018 but did not reach the level of sales experienced in 2016-2017. As noted earlier, the three carriers specializing in voluntary sales all had increases between 62-76 percent in 2019.

Lower sales in 2018 appears to be mostly attributable to a significant player temporarily leaving the market that year. Its competitors did not seem to get additional 2018 sales in that carrier’s absence, but their sales grew significantly in 2019. As voluntary worksite cases have a meaningful gestation period and are often enrolled late in the year with effective dates early in the next year, there may be a lag before competitors can fill in after an insurer drops out.

Table 1 also shows the overall average worksite premium compared to the average worksite premium for the participants who contributed statistical data beyond sales. As shown in the table, worksite statistics likely represented the broad worksite market well through 2016. However, beginning in 2017, our worksite distributions reflected sales that were not representative of the whole worksite market.

Table 2 shows the above WS sales as a percentage of total LTCI sales. For the most part, this percentage has stayed relatively level in the past four years and much higher than prior to 2016.

As shown in Table 3, three insurers wrote 60 percent or more of their 2019 new premium in the worksite, while the other insurers wrote ten percent or less of their business in that market. The percentage of each insurer’s new premium that comes from WS sales did not change dramatically from 2018 to 2019.

Average Premium Per Buyer
Table 4 shows that, in 2019, the NWS average premium per buying unit (a couple comprise a single buying unit) was 41.1 percent higher than the average premium per insured. This dropped to 31.5 percent in the worksite, because more buyers in the worksite are single and because spouses are less likely to buy in the worksite. These numbers reflect all participants, but the ratio of buying unit to insured unit is determined solely by the participants who are able to report sales based on marital status. The worksite ratio is probably somewhat overstated because the participants who reported premium by marital status for the worksite were not characteristic of the entire market.

Issue Age
The balance of the statistical presentations is non-representative of the entire worksite market. We report the results we have available, though we urge you to be selective in how you use the data. Not surprising, Table 5 shows the WS market is much more weighted to the younger ages, even with data that is disproportionately weighted to executive carve-out programs. However that data bias seems to have reduced the difference between average age inside and outside the WS market.

Table 7 displays the relative age distribution of the population compared to purchasers in the NWS and WS markets.

Rating Classification
Most WS sales are in the “best” underwriting class (see Table 8) because there generally is only one underwriting class. Insurers often do not get enough information in WS to determine whether a “preferred health” discount could be granted and use the additional revenue (from not having a “preferred health” discount) to fund extra cost resulting from health concessions. Carve-out programs are more likely to offer a “preferred” discount, which means a higher percentage of carve-out policies are issued in the second-best underwriting class.

Benefit Period
Originally, the WS average benefit period was lower than the individual market average benefit period. The relative benefit periods have come closer together over time because the average benefit period in the NWS market has dropped. The executive carve-out portion of the WS market seems to have dropped to a lesser degree. This year, many short benefit period WS sales are not reflected, resulting in the WS average benefit period being essentially identical to the NWS market. Table 10 shows similar results in the 2013-2016 era. As noted elsewhere, this data can jump around based on which insurers provide such detail and also based upon whether some large core/buy-up cases are written in a particular year.

As discussed later, the WS market issues much less Shared Care, so the NWS market is still generally buying longer coverage.

Maximum Monthly Benefit
Even with a lot of executive carve-out business, Table 11 shows that the WS market has significantly more coverages that are less than $100/day (and also less than $3000/month). Many core programs are sold with a $50/day or $1500/month initial maximum benefit.
Table 12 shows that the WS initial monthly maximum has varied more over time than the whole market, because of participant changes and how many core/buy-up plans were sold in a particular year.

Benefit Increase Features
As shown in Table 13, the WS market has more future purchase options (FPO), because of its core programs.

Future Protection
Based on a $23/hour cost for non-professional personal care at home ($23 is the median cost according to Genworth’s 2019 study), the average WS initial maximum daily benefit of $156.47 would cover 6.8 hours of care per day at issue, whereas the typical NWS initial daily maximum of $162.94 would cover 7.1 hours of care per day, as shown in Table 14.

The number of future home care hours that could be covered depends upon when care is needed (we have assumed age 80), the home care cost inflation rate between now (age 45 for WS and 58 for NWS) and age 80 (we have calculated with two, three, four, five and six percent inflation), and the benefit increases provided by the LTCI coverage between now and age 80.

Table 14 shows calculations for 3 different assumptions relative to benefit increase features:

  • The first line presumes that no benefit increases occur (either sold without any benefit increase feature or no FPOs were exercised).
  • The second line reflects the average benefit increase design using the methodology reported in the July article, except it assumes that 40 percent of FPOs are elected (intended to be indicative of “positive” election FPOs, in which the increase occurs only if the client elects it) and provide five percent compounding.
  • The third line is like the second line except it assumes 90 percent of FPOs are elected (intended to be indicative of “negative” election FPOs, in which the increase occurs unless the client rejects it).

Table 14 indicates that:

  1. Without benefit increases, purchasing power deteriorates significantly, particularly for the worksite purchaser because there are more years of future inflation for a younger buyer.
  2. The “composite” (average) benefit increase design assuming that 40 percent of FPO offers are exercised preserves purchasing power better than when no increase are assumed, but still generally leads to significant loss of purchasing power. The exceptions: both WS and NWS clients gain a bit of purchasing power if the inflation rate is only two percent (the composite with a 40 percent FPO election rate is equivalent to a bit more than two percent compounding). With three percent inflation, the loss in purchasing power is a bit less than ten percent.
  3. With 90 percent FPO election rates, insured people retain more purchasing power compared to no increases or 40 percent election rates. The average WS buyer would experience increased purchasing power if inflation averages less than 3.9 percent, but would lose purchasing power if inflation exceeds 3.9 percent. The average NWS buyer would experience increased purchasing power if inflation average less than 3.25 percent but would lose purchasing power if inflation exceeds 3.25 percent.

Table 14 underscores the importance of considering future purchasing power when buying LTCI. Please note:

a) The average WS buyer was 13 years younger, hence has 16 more years of inflation and benefit increases in the table. The effective inflation rate to age 80 is not likely to be the same for 45-year-olds versus 58-year-olds purchasing today.

b) WS sales have less automatic compounding and more FPOs, so WS results are more sensitive to FPO election rates.

c) Results vary significantly based on an insured’s issue age, initial maximum daily benefit, and benefit increase feature, as well as the inflation rate and the age at which the need for care occurs.

d) By the median age of starting to need care (about age 83) and the median age of needing care (about age 85), more purchasing power would be lost.

e) Table 14 does not reflect the cost of professional home care or a facility. According to the aforementioned 2019 Genworth study, the average nursing home private room cost is $280/day, which is currently comparable to 12.2 hours of non-professional home care. However, the inflation rate for facility costs is likely to differ from the inflation rate for home care. From 2004-2019, Genworth’s studies showed the following compound growth rates: Private room in a nursing home (3.1 percent), an ALF (3.6 percent), home health aide (1.7 percent), and home care homemaker (2.1 percent).

f) Table 14 could be distorted by simplifications in our calculations. For example, we assumed that the FPO election rate does not vary by age, size of policy or market and that everyone buys a home care benefit equal to the average facility benefit.

Partnership Program Background
When someone applies to Medicaid for long term care services, most states with Partnership programs disregard assets up to the amount of benefits received from a Partnership-qualified policy (some Indiana and New York policies disregard all assets). Partnership sales were reported in 43 jurisdictions in 2019, all but California (no participants offer California Partnership policies) and Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah, and Vermont, where Partnership programs do not exist. Massachusetts has a somewhat similar program (MassHealth).

To qualify for a state Partnership program, a policy must have a sufficiently robust benefit increase feature, the requirement varying by issue age and jurisdiction. Historically, a level premium with permanent annual three percent or higher compound increases or an otherwise similar consumer price index (CPI) increase was required for ages 60 or less. For ages 61 to 75, five percent simple increases also qualified, and for ages 76 or older, policies qualified without regard to the benefit increase feature. As noted, many states now confer Partnership status with compounding as low as one percent. Two insurers offer one percent compounding in worksite products.

The WS venue provides an efficient opportunity to serve less-affluent employees and relatives who would most benefit from Partnership qualification. However, only 30.5 percent of WS sales in 2019 qualified for Partnership programs and most of those policies were probably executive carve-out programs. If additional states permit one percent compounding and if insurers design products to offer one percent compounding, the percentage of Partnership policies sold in the WS market is likely to grow.

Jurisdictional Distribution
On the Broker World website, you can find a chart of the market share of each US jurisdiction relative to the total, WS and NWS markets, split by Partnership combined with non-Partnership policies and separately solely Partnership policies. This chart indicates where relative opportunity may exist to grow LTCI sales.

Elimination Period
About 90 percent of the NWS market buys 90-day elimination periods (EPs). For that reason, most WS programs offer only a 90-day EP. The WS 90-day EP percentage of 89.7 percent shown below is understated because we lacked data for some participants which are almost entirely 90-day EP.

Table 15 also shows how many policies had a 0-day home care feature and a longer facility EP and how many policies had a calendar-day EP (as opposed to a service-day EP). We have reflected that all LifeSecure policies are 90-day EP with a calendar-day definition and that all Transamerica sales have zero-day home care EP. Policies which have zero-day home care EP, but define their EP as a service-day EP operate almost identically to a calendar-day EP.
The significant differences in zero-day home care EP and in calendar-day EP by market are reflective of specific insurers’ design preference; they do not appear to be driven by the market.

Gender Distribution and Sales to Couples and Relatives
In 2013, insurers started to use sex-distinct pricing, but, as explained, that change has not extended to the worksite market.

The 2012 NWS percentage of female sales in Table 16 reflects a relatively high percentage of female sales in 2012 due to recognition that sex-distinct pricing would occur in 2013. The 2013-2015 percentages of females in the NWS market remained high as insurers which still offered unisex pricing attracted single females.

In the past four years, the percentage of female buyers in the NWS has been stable, fluctuating from 54.3 to 54.9 percent.

Until 2019, the percentage of WS buyers who are female had increased since insurers started using sex-distinct pricing in the NWS market. Perhaps the biggest reason is that women are more interested in LTCI, perhaps especially so in the worksite market because of the WS unisex pricing. Furthermore, the percentage of workers who are female was probably increasing as was the percentage of females among executives (hence included in executive carve-out programs). We noted last year that women constituted 51.2 percent of the U.S.A age 20-79 population in 2018,* but only 46.8 percent of the workers,* which underscores the significance of a higher female percentage of sales in the worksite.

In 2019, the percentage of female sales in the worksite dropped to 51.7 percent from 57.7 percent in 2018. Of this 6.0 percent arithmetic drop, only 0.6 percent was attributable to different insurers providing data in 2019 compared to 2018. The bulk of the difference is attributable to a drop in female sales for a major insurer. *Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm

Table 17 digs deeper, exploring the differences between the WS and NWS markets in single female, couples and Shared Care sales. It shows that the decrease in female sales at the worksite was primarily among single people.

Couples who both buy are less likely to purchase Shared Care in the WS market than in the NWS market, because Shared Care is less commonly offered in the WS market and because executive carve-out programs often do not include Shared Care. The bottom row of Table 17 adjusts for insurers not offering Shared Care in the WS market, but does not adjust for advisors and employers choosing not to offer it or not to pay for it. (Married executives generally benefit more from executive carve-out LTCI programs than do single executives, because the employer typically pays for the spouse. Employers may shy away from paying for Shared Care because it would favor married executives even more.)

Type of Home Care Coverage
Table 18 summarizes sales by type of home care coverage. Historically, the WS market sold few policies with a home care maximum equal to the facility maximum. But with increasing emphasis on home care and simplicity, that difference faded. The increase in the percentage of WS policies with a maximum home care benefit equal to the nursing home maximum (81.7 percent in 2018 vs. 93.9 percent in 2019) is attributable to a change in participants. Table 18 also shows that monthly determination dominates the NWS market, but daily determination still dominates the WS market, albeit less so in the executive carve-out market.

Many worksite products embed a “partial cash alternative” feature (which allow claimants, in lieu of any other benefit that month, to use approximately one-third of their benefit for whatever purpose they wish, with the balance extending the benefit period) or a small informal care benefit.

Other Features
Table 19 suggests that Return of Premium (ROP) became more common in the WS market and that a lot more of the WS ROP coverages were permanent; however, if the data is limited to participants that provided data each year, the frequency of ROP would have been unchanged and the percentage that were permanent would have actually decreased. ROP was less common in the NWS market in 2019 than in 2018. ROP with expiring death benefits can provide an inexpensive way to encourage more young people to buy LTCI but may not provide a meaningful benefit.

Table 20 shows little change in the sales of Joint Waiver of Premium and Survivorship to couples, but that Restoration of Benefits (ROB) appears to have been sold more often in the WS in 2019. The increase in WS ROB sales is more than explained by a change in participants. All WS sales are tax-qualified.

CLOSING
We thank insurance company staff for submitting the data and responding to questions promptly. We also thank Nicole Gaspar, Alex Geanous and Anders Hendrickson of Milliman for managing the data expertly.

We reviewed data for reasonableness. Nonetheless, we cannot assure that all data is accurate.

If you have suggestions for improving this survey, please contact one of the authors.

2020 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey

The 2020 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey is the 22nd consecutive annual review of stand-alone long term care insurance (LTCI) published by Broker World magazine. It analyzes the marketplace, reports sales distributions, and describes available products, including group insurance.

More analysis of worksite sales will appear in the August issue of Broker World magazine.

Unless otherwise indicated, references are solely to U.S. stand-alone LTCI sales, excluding exercised future purchase options (FPOs) or other changes to existing coverage. “Stand-alone” refers to LTCI policies that do not include death benefits (other than returning premiums upon death or waiving a surviving spouse’s premiums) or annuity or disability income benefits. Where referenced, “combo” products provide LTCI combined with life insurance or annuity coverage. “Linked benefit” policies are combo policies which can allow more than the death benefit or annuity account value to be used as LTCI.

Highlights from this year’s survey

Participants
Nine carriers participated broadly in this survey. Six others provided sales information so we could report more accurate aggregate industry individual and multi-life sales.

We estimate our statistical distributions reflect about 75 percent of total industry policies sold (85 percent of premium) but only about 12 percent of worksite policies sold (28 percent of premium). Our worksite statistical distributions can vary significantly from year-to-year because insurers focusing on particular worksite markets may be over- or under-represented. Last year, we commented that the worksite business in our statistical analysis was overly weighted toward executive carve-out programs. This year, that imbalance has increased. The carriers which provided 2019 statistical data had an average worksite annual premium of $4,568 whereas the ones which provided only total sales had an average worksite premium of $1,627. The corresponding 2018 averages were $2,015 and $1,561, respectively. In 2017, the difference was in the other direction ($1,015 and $1,441, respectively).

National Guardian Life contributed statistical distributions for the first time, but CalPERS and Genworth did not provide statistical distributions this year. Country Life, which has been a consistent participant in this survey, discontinued LTCI sales effective May 1, 2020.

The insurers displayed in the Product Exhibit all provided broad statistical information, although they were not all able to provide all the data we requested. Northwestern also provided such information. Auto-Owners, CalPERS, Genworth, LifeSecure, Transamerica and United Security Assurance contributed total and worksite sales (new premium and lives insured) but did not provide other information. However, in a few places we were able to reflect some of their product designs in our statistical distributions.

Sales Summary

  • The 15 carriers reported sales of 54,563 policies and certificates (“policies” henceforth) with new annualized* premium of $170,770,732 (including exercised FPOs) in 2019, which compared to 2018 industry sales of 56,287 policies with new annualized* premium of $169.7 million (both slightly restated from last year’s report), a 3.1 percent drop in the number of policies but a 0.6 percent increase in new annualized premium, the first increase in new premium since 2012. As noted in the Market Perspective section, sales of policies combining LTCI with other risks dropped slightly. *Single premium sales are counted at 10 percent for the annualized premium calculations herein.
  • Seven of the top 10 insurers sold more new premium than in 2018, while four sold more new policies. This difference resulted largely because elected FPOs add premium but not new policies.
  • Worksite LTCI rebounded in 2019. The three stand-alone LTCI carriers specializing in worksite each saw sales jump by 62 to 76 percent despite increased competition from a major new carrier and from linked-benefit policies.
  • With FPO elections included in new premium, Northwestern garnered the number one spot in sales. Mutual of Omaha was a strong second and had a large lead in annualized premium from new policies sold. Together, these two companies combined for 59 percent of new premium including FPOs, compared to 57 percent last year.
  • Based on our analysis, for the fifth straight year (and fifth time ever), our participants’ number of inforce policies dropped, but less than one percent.
  • Despite the reduced number of policies and increased number of policies in paid-up status, inforce premium increased 10.0 percent and the average inforce premium per policy rose from $2,208 to $2,426. Inforce premium rises due to sales, price increases, and benefit increases (including FPOs), and reduces from lapses, reductions in coverage, deaths, and shifts to paid-up status for various reasons.

Participants’ claims rose 8.1 percent. Overall, the stand-alone LTCI industry incurred $11.6 billion in claims in 2018 based on companies’ statutory annual filings, raising total incurred claims from 1991 through 20187 to $141.5 billion. (Note: 2018 was the most recent year available when this article was written.) Most of these claims were incurred by insurers that no longer sell LTCI. The reported 2018 incurred claims are 5.5 percent higher than the $11.0 billion of incurred claims reported in 2017.

The placement rate rose to 59.2 percent, higher than 58.8 percent in 2018 and 59.0 percent in 2017. The small increase occurred despite the increase in average age. The more favorable and faster underwriting decisions documented below contributed to the higher placement rate. As discussed in the Market Perspective section, the industry may be able to increase placement rates further, which should make financial advisors more comfortable suggesting that their clients consider LTCI, all else equal.

About the Survey
This article is arranged in the following sections:

  • Highlights provides a high-level view of results.
  • Market Perspective provides insights into the LTCI market.
  • Claims presents industry-level claims data.
  • Sales Statistical Analysis presents industry-level sales distributions reflecting data from 11 insurers.
  • Partnership Programs discusses the impact of the state partnerships for LTCI.

Available at www.BrokerWorldMag.com:

  • Product Exhibit shows, for eight insurers: Financial ratings, LTCI sales and inforce, and product details. Please note that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, some insurers have temporarily discontinued sales that would require face-to-face interviews. Our Exhibit ignores such temporary restrictions.
  • Product Details, a row-by-row definition of the product exhibit entries, with some commentary.
  • Premium Exhibit shows lifetime annual premiums for each insurer’s most common underwriting class, for issue ages 40, 50, 60, and 70 for single females, single males, and heterosexual couples (assuming both buy at the same age), based on $100 per day (or closest equivalent weekly or monthly) benefit, 90-day facility and most common home care elimination period, three-year and five-year benefit periods or $100,000 and $200,000 maximum lifetime buckets, with and without Shared Care and with flat benefits or automatic 3 or 5 percent annual compound benefit increases for life. Worksite premiums do not reflect any worksite-specific discount, though some carriers offer this.
  • Premium Adjustments (from our Premium Exhibit prices) by underwriting class for each participant.
  • Distribution by underwriting class for each participant
  • State-by-state results: percentage of sales by state, average premium by state and percentage of policies qualifying for Partnership by state.

Market Perspective (more detail in subsequent parts of the article)

  • Since 2009 (varies by jurisdiction), if an insurer concludes that a claimant is not chronically ill, the insurer must inform the claimant of his/her right to appeal the decision to independent third-party review (IR). The IR determination is binding on insurers. As shown in our Product Exhibit, most participants have extended IR beyond statutory requirements, most commonly to policies issued prior to the effective date of IR. It is hard to get data relative to IR. Regulators do not collect statistics and insurers often do not track it. It has been a positive sign that few IR requests have been made and that insurers seem to have been upheld approximately 90 percent of the time based on data we have received over the years from insurers and from Steve LaPierre, President of LTCI Independent Eligibility Review Specialists, LLC (LTCIIERS). Mr. LaPierre reported a 40 percent drop in IR requests in 2019, but an increase to approximately 30 percent of cases in which insurers were overruled. Part of the increase may be explained by statistical fluctuation because the number of IRs is low. Generally, if the appeal rate drops, the strongest cases are likely to continue to be appealed, resulting in a higher percentage being overruled. Another factor, in the experience of one of the authors, is claims examiners’ unfamiliarity with old policy forms in which standard wording was modified to fit a state-specific requirement, a problem that can be exacerbated if the claim function is transferred to a new entity lacking the historical knowledge. Because the number of IRs is so low, even a small percentage of such errors could cause the IR overturn rate to spike.
  • Third Party Notification (TPN) provisions provide another consumer protection. When someone incurs dementia, bills often accumulate unpaid. Under contract law, insurers could then terminate policies for non-payment of premium, despite the cause of non-payment being unknown claim qualification. In response to this issue, insurers and regulators agreed long ago to encourage applicants to name a third-party who must be notified before a policy can be terminated for non-payment of premiums. Insurers do not contact such a third-party until the grace period is over, and then provide at least another 30 days for the third-party to stave off cancellation. Every two years, insurers give policyholders an opportunity to update the contact information or change the third party. The benefit of this provision to policyholders often receives little attention, perhaps partly because no one seems to have ever studied the impact.

    This year, we asked some one-time questions related to TPNs. Only two participants were able to provide data. One had TPNs identified for 63 percent of its inforce policies and the other had TPNs identified for 77 percent of its policies. One-fifth of the policyholders who had identified a TPN increased their protection by identifying more than one TPN. Only about 10 percent of single purchasers have named a TPN, despite seemingly having a greater need for a TPN. Financial advisors could serve an important role by stressing the importance of a TPN for single people. Not surprisingly, fewer than half of the policies with third-party billing have TPNs. Thus direct-billed policies and couples have distinctly higher percentages of TPNs than indicated above.
  • Current prices are more stable than past prices because today’s prices reflect much more conservative assumptions based on far more credible data1 and lower assumed investment yields. Many financial advisors presume that new policies will face steep price increases, hence can be reluctant to encourage their clients to consider LTCI. Although three participants have never increased premiums on policies issued under “rate stabilization” laws, it may take a long time before the market is comfortable that prices are stable.
  • Linked benefit products have increased market share, due to influences such as: i) regardless of whether the policyholder has a long-term care claim, their family will receive benefits, ii) they often have guaranteed premiums and benefits, iii) they no longer need to be funded with single premiums; and iv) they are issued to younger ages than before.

    According to LIMRA, in the first half of 2019 (the most recent data available when this article went to print), combination life sales dropped slightly, even in the recurring-premium market which continued to gain market share compared to single premiums. The biggest drop (six percent both in premium and policies) was in the Chronic Illness market.
  • As noted earlier, roughly 59 percent of applications have resulted in placed policies in the past three years, with the low placement rates contributing to financial advisors being hesitant to recommend that clients consider LTCI. The industry may be able to improve placement rates in a variety of ways.
    • Utilize E-applications for faster submission and reduced processing time by assuring that all apps are “in good order.” The speed and accuracy increase placement. It would be helpful if brokerage general agents could populate an eApp with quote information, then forward that partial eApp to the broker for completion.
    • Pre-qualify an applicant’s health. It is important to stress the importance of such pre-qualification to advisors and prospects and to continue to find effective ways to accomplish quality pre-qualification.
    • More effective education of their distribution system by insurers, such as with drill-down questions in on-line underwriting guides and eApps.
    • Require cash with the application (CWA), which led to about five percent more of the apps getting placed according to our 2019 survey.
    • Continue to improve messaging regarding the value of LTCI and of buying now (rather than in the future). Such messaging would increase the number of applications and improve the placement rate by attracting younger and healthier applicants.
  • Over the past two years, 79 percent of our participants’ policyholders exercised their FPO (future purchase option, a guarantee that, under specified conditions, a policyholder can purchase additional coverage without having to demonstrate good health). As both the additional coverage and price per unit increase over time, such options become increasingly expensive, even more so with the price increases that the industry has experienced. The high election rate demonstrates the importance of the coverage to the policyholder and the effectiveness of annual (as opposed to triennial) negative-election FPOs (negative-election FPOs activate automatically unless the client rejects them, as opposed to positive-election FPOs which activate only if the client makes a request). At least in some markets and with some designs, policyholders reliably exercise FPOs when they must do so to continue to receive future offers. Considering such FPOs and other provisions, we project a maximum benefit at age 80 of $306/day for an average 58-year-old purchaser in 2019, which is equivalent to an average 2.9 percent compounded benefit increase between 2019 and 2041. Purchasers may be disappointed if the purchasing power of their LTCI policies deteriorates over time.
  • Only four participants offer coverage in all U.S. jurisdictions and no worksite insurer does so. Insurers continue to be reluctant to sell in jurisdictions which are slow to approve new products, restrict rate increases, or have unfavorable legislation or regulations.
  • Eight of our nine participants use third party administrators (TPAs) and seven use reinsurers. We thank American United, LifeCare Assurance, Manufacturers, Munich American, RGA, Wilton Re, Long-Term Care Group, Life Plans, and CHCS for their contributions to the LTCI industry. Other reinsurers and TPAs support insurers not in our survey. In some cases, affiliated companies provide reinsurance or guarantees.
  • As we reported last year, the NAIC adopted a significantly improved 2019 version of the Shopper’s Guide, covering combination products as well as stand-alone LTCI and adding other information, while reducing the number of pages from 80 to 76. We asked last year’s readers to email [email protected] to comment on the new Guide and how (much) it is used to educate consumers. We received no comments. This year, we polled insurers; their answers suggest they view the Shopper’s Guide primarily as a regulatory requirement. Their suggestions to improve the usefulness for consumers included shortening it, linking to it from state department of insurance websites, and regulators using the guide in a campaign to encourage long term care planning. We visited 31 jurisdiction websites to see if they linked to the NAIC Shopper’s Guide. We found that 13 jurisdictions use their own guides. Five (plus the Federal government) link to the 2019 NAIC Guide, while four link to the 2013 NAIC Guide. One state links to an AHIP Guide, and we found no guide or minimal wording in the remaining eight states.

Claims

  • Eight participants reported 2019 claims. As some companies are not able to provide detailed data, some statistics are more robust than others.
  • The eight insurers’ combined claim payments on individual policies rose 8.1 percent in 2019 over 2018, despite only a 0.2 percent increase in inforce policies and a 3.7 percent increase in their inforce premium.
  • The LTCI industry has had a much bigger impact than indicated above, because a lot of claims are paid by insurers that do not currently sell LTCI or did not submit claims data to us.

LTCI claims paid by insurers no longer selling LTCI may differ significantly from the following statistics as their claimants are more likely to have facility-only coverage, be older, etc.

Table 1 shows the total dollar and number of reported individual LTCI claims. The large drop in claims is primarily the result of having Genworth data in 2018 but not in 2019.

Table 2 shows the distribution of those claims by venue, which have shifted away from nursing homes over the years (except in 2019) due to consumer preferences and more claims coming from comprehensive policies. Regarding the change in 2019, we note that, for insurers that contributed data in both 2018 and 2019, the number of claims in nursing homes dipped 0.6 percent following the prior years’ patterns.

The inception-to-date data shows 53.3 percent of the number of claims being in Nursing Homes (vs. 45.0 percent last year). Here again, if we limit data to insurers reporting each year, we see a drop of 0.8 percent instead of an increase of 8.3 percent. Surprisingly, the inception-to-date number of claims is more weighted to Nursing Home than the dollar of claims. The nursing home claims seem to come from older policies with lower minimums.

In the distribution based on number of claims, a person who received care in more than one venue is counted once for each venue, but not double-counted in the total line.

Seven carriers reported their number of open individual claims at year-end, ranging between 59 and 107 percent of the number of claims paid during the year, averaging 75 percent overall. The insurer reporting 107 percent noted that they include open claims that have had no payments made yet. With that carrier excluded, the overall ratio was 76 percent.

Table 3 shows average size individual claims since inception. Because 41 percent of claimants since inception have submitted claims from more than one type of venue, the average total claim generally exceeds the average claim paid for any particular venue. Nonetheless, individual Assisted Living Facility (ALF) claims stand out as high each year, probably because:

a) ALF claims appear to have a longer duration compared with other venues.

b) Nursing home costs are most likely to exceed the policy daily/monthly maximum. Hence the maximum daily benefit negates part of the additional daily cost of nursing homes.

c) People who maximize the use of their maximum monthly benefits can generally spend as much in an ALF as in a nursing home.

d) Although some surveys report that ALFs cost about half as much as nursing homes on average, ALFs often charge more for a memory unit or for levels of assistance that align more closely with nursing home care. Upscale ALFs seem to cost a higher percentage of upscale nursing home costs than the average ALF/nursing home ratio.

Several insurers extended ALF coverage to policies which originally did not include ALF coverage. Providing these additional benefits provides the policyholder with significant flexibility at time of claim, but has contributed to the insurers’ need for rate increases.

The following factors contribute to a large range of average claim results by insurer (see Table 3):

  • Different markets (by affluence; worksite vs. individual; geography; etc.).
  • Demographic differences (distribution by gender and age).
  • Distribution by benefit period, benefit increase feature, shared care and elimination period.
  • Distribution by facility-only policies vs. 50 percent home care vs. 100 percent home care vs. home care only, etc.
  • Different lengths of time in the business.

The following factors cause our average claim sizes to be understated.

  • For the carriers reporting claims this year, 11 percent of the inception-to-date individual claims are still open. Our data does not include reserve estimates for future payments on open claims.
  • People who recover, then claim again, are counted as multiple insureds, rather than adding their various claims together.

Besides being understated, average claim data does not reflect the value of LTCI from some purchasers’ perspectives, because the many small claims drive down the average claim. LTCI can provide significant financial return for people who need care one year or longer. The primary purpose of insurance is to protect against adverse results, so the amount of protection, as well as average claim, is important.

Six insurers provided their current individual (excludes group) monthly LTCI claim exposure, which exceeds $4.8 billion (note: reflects only initial monthly maximum for one insurer). As shown in Table 4, this figure is thirty times their corresponding monthly LTCI premium income and more than 47 times their 2019 LTCI monthly paid claims.

Eight insurers contributed data regarding their inforce distribution by benefit period. Treating endless (lifetime benefit periods) as a 15-year benefit period, we found that their average inforce benefit period is 6.8 years. Changing the assigned value of the endless benefit period by one year has an impact of approximately .25 years on the average inforce benefit period. With annual exposure thirty times annual premium and assuming an average benefit period of about 6.8 years, we estimate that total exposure is 202 times annual premium.

Four insurers reported their current average individual maximum monthly maximum benefit for claimants, with results ranging from $4,696 to $6,552.

Nursing home (NH) claims are more likely to use the policy’s maximum daily/monthly benefit than ALF claims, because ALF costs are generally lower and because policies sometimes have lower maximums for ALFs. ALF claims correspondingly are more likely to use the policy maximum than are adult day care and home care claims.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Nine insurers contributed significant background data, but some were unable to contribute data in some areas. Six other insurers (Auto-Owners, CalPERS, Genworth, LifeSecure, Transamerica and United Security) contributed their number of policies sold and new annualized premium, distinguishing worksite from other sales, but not clarifying whether FPOs were included in the premium.

Sales characteristics vary significantly among insurers based on market differences (individual vs. worksite, affluence, gender distribution, etc.). Year-to-year variations in policy feature distributions may reflect changes in participants, participant practices and designs, participant or worksite market shares and industry trends.

Market Share
We include purchased increases on existing policies in new premium (we call them FPOs and include board-approved increase offers) because new coverage is being issued. However, looking at new premiums ignoring FPOs spotlights insurers with more new policy sales. Table 5 lists the top 10 participants in 2019 new premium including FPOs and shows their sales (if submitted) without FPOs. Northwestern ranks #1 including FPOs, with Northwestern and Mutual of Omaha accounting for 59 percent of the market. Ignoring FPOs, Mutual of Omaha is #1, 63 percent ahead of #2 Northwestern. The premium includes 100 percent of recurring premiums plus 10 percent of single premiums.

Worksite Market Share
The three stand-alone LTCI carriers specializing in worksite each saw sales jump by 62 to 76 percent despite increased competition from a major new carrier and from linked-benefit policies. Thus, worksite business produced 21.0 percent of new insureds (see Table 6) and 13.4 percent of new annual premium (including FPOs but excluding single premium). Worksite sales consist of three different markets, the first two of which produce a higher percentage of new insureds than of new premiums:

  • Voluntary group coverage generally is less robust than individual coverage.
  • Core/Buy-Up programs have particularly young age distributions and modest coverage because a lot of people do not buy-up and are less likely to insure spouses.
  • Executive carve-out programs generally provide the most robust coverage. One- or two-couple executive carve-out sales may not qualify for a multi-life discount with some insurers, hence may not be labeled as worksite sales in submissions to our survey.

The amount of worksite sales reported and its distribution among the three sub-markets significantly impact product feature sales distributions. Table 6 is indicative of the full market, but this year’s policy feature distributions significantly underweight the large group market, as most of that market is not reflected in our statistical data. More information about worksite sales will appear in the August issue of Broker World.

Affinity Market Share
Affinity groups (non-employers such as associations) produced 8.5 percent of new insureds (see Table 7), but only 5.9 percent of new business premium. Less than 20 percent of the lower affinity average premium is attributable to the affinity discount. The balance may be due to younger issue age or less robust coverage.

Characteristics of Policies Sold
Average Premium Per Sale
Table 8 shows the average new business premium per insured ($2,551), subtracting FPOs for the insurers that reported statistics. For insurers that reported distribution by couples vs. individuals, the number of insureds was 41.5 percent higher than the number of buying units (a couple comprise a single buying unit), boosting the $2,551 to $3,608.

The average premium for new policies for the 15 insurers rose 1.7 percent compared to 2018 (we recalculated the 2018 results to include more carriers). Our statistics show a higher average initial maximum monthly benefit, a higher issue age and a slightly higher benefit period, which generate a larger increase in average premium for the insurers which provided statistical data.

Data for 2017 and earlier years included FPOs in these calculations, overstating the average premium per new insured and buying unit.

Average premium per new policy ranged from $1,443 to $3,701 among the 15 insurers.
The lowest average new premium (including FPOs) was in Puerto Rico ($2,036), followed by Oklahoma ($2,586) and Kansas ($2,646), while the highest was in the District of Columbia ($4,575), followed by Connecticut ($4,531), West Virginia ($4,349), and New York ($4,270).
Due to rate increases, FPO elections and termination of older policies, the average inforce premium jumped to $2,426, 9.8 percent more than at the end of 2018.

Issue Age
Table 9 summarizes the distribution of sales by issue age band based on insured count. The average issue age increased to 57.7 mostly due to change in participants. The age distributions for 2016 and earlier had more worksite participants than recent years. Note: Two survey participants have a minimum issue age of 40, one will not issue below 30, and two will not issue below 25.

Benefit Period
Table 10 summarizes the distribution of sales by benefit period. The average notional benefit period increased slightly from 3.74 to 3.79 because of change in participants. Because of Shared Care benefits, total coverage was higher than the 3.79 average suggests. Three-year to five-year benefit periods accounted for 75.2 percent of the sales, quite a concentration compared to the past.

Monthly Benefit
Table 11 shows that, because of the change in participants, monthly determination applied to a record 83.2 percent of 2019 policies. With monthly determination, low-expense days leave more benefits to cover high-expense days. Among companies which make monthly determination optional, the percentage electing monthly determination ranged from 16 to 43 percent.

Table 12 shows that the average maximum monthly benefit increased from $4,763 in 2018 to $4,882 in 2019, two-thirds of which increase resulted from the change in participating insurers.

Benefit Increase Features
Table 13 summarizes the distribution of sales by benefit increase feature. The big increase in three percent compounding is less meaningful considering that there was a big decrease in “Other compound” most of which was a variation of three percent compounding.

“Indexed Level Premium” policies are priced to have a level premium, but the benefit increase is tied to an index such as the consumer price index (CPI).

As shown in Table 14, we project the age 80 maximum daily benefit by increasing the average initial daily benefit from the average issue age to age 80, according to the distribution of benefit increase features, using current future purchase option (FPO) election rates and a five percent/year offer for fixed FPOs. The maximum benefit at age 80 (in 2041) for our 2019 average 58-year-old purchaser projects to $306/day (equivalent to 2.9 percent compounding). Had our average buyer bought an average 2018 policy a year ago at age 57, her/his age 80 benefit would be $313/day (equivalent to three percent compounding). The two percent drop is attributable to the change in participants this year. The increase in the FPO election rate added $4/day to the 2041 benefit. Most policyholders seem likely to experience eroding purchasing power over time if cost of care trends exceed three percent.

FPOs are important to insureds in order to maintain purchasing power, and as demonstrated by the fact that 82 percent of our participants’ 2018-2019 FPOs were exercised. The high election rate is very impressive, considering that the cost increases each year due to larger coverage increases each year, increasing unit prices due to age and additional price increases due to rate increases.

The high election rate, coupled with a range of responses from 20 to 90 percent election, demonstrates the effectiveness of annual (as opposed to triennial) options and negative-election (negative-election FPOs activate automatically unless the client rejects them) as opposed to positive-election FPOs (which activate only if the client makes a request). At least some blocks of business demonstrate that policyholders will exercise FPOs if they must do so to continue to receive future offers.

FPOs are also important to insurers, accounting for at least 18 percent of new premium in 2018 and at least 22 percent in 2019. Two insurers had nearly half their new premium come from FPOs.

Elimination Period
Table 16 summarizes the distribution of sales by facility elimination period (EP). Ninety-one percent (91 percent) of buyers opt for 90-day elimination periods. However, two carriers report 23 to 30 percent of their sales in the 20-44-day EP range. Three carriers reported six to 11 percent of their sales having more than a 200-day EP.

Table 17 shows the percentage of policies with zero-day home care elimination period (but a longer facility elimination period). With most insurers offering an additional-cost zero-day home care EP option, 15 to 30 percent of buyers purchased a zero-day home care elimination period, but one insurer had nearly a 50 percent election rate.

Table 17 also shows the percentage of policies with a calendar-day EP. It is important to understand that most calendar-day EP provisions do not start counting until a paid-service day has occurred.

Sales to Couples and Gender Distribution
Table 18 summarizes the distribution of sales by gender and single/couple status.

The percentage of buyers who are female dropped to 54.2 percent and the percentage of females among single insureds dropped to 64.8 percent. Changes in participants accounted for only 33 and 17 percent of those respective drops. The percentage of females varies significantly and consistently among companies each year based on their markets.

The 81.8 percent of accepted applicants who purchased coverage when their partners were declined is the highest we have seen. However, some insurers which reported approximately 50 percent success in the past did not contribute data this year.

Shared Care and Other Couples’ Features
Table 19 summarizes sales of Shared Care and other couples’ features.

  • Shared care—allows one spouse/partner to use the other’s available benefits if their own coverage has been depleted or offers a third independent pool that the couple can share.
  • Survivorship—waives a survivor’s premium after the first death if specified conditions are met.
  • Joint waiver of premium (WP)—both insureds’ premiums are waived if either qualifies for benefits.

Changes in distribution by carrier can greatly impact year-to-year comparisons in Table 19, because some insurers embed survivorship or joint waiver automatically (sometimes only in some circumstances) while others offer it for an extra premium or do not offer the feature. However, the 2019 increased percentages of Shared Care and Joint WP are not attributable to changes in participants.

In the top half of Table 19, percentages are based on the number of policies sold to couples who both buy (only limited benefit, for Shared Care). The bottom half of Table 19 shows the (higher) percentage that results from dividing the number of buyers by sales of insurers that offer the feature. Four participants sold Shared Care to more than half their limited benefit period couples; four others sold Shared Care to fewer than half of such couples. Three insurers sold Joint WP to 50 percent or more of their couples; three others sold joint WP to fewer couples. Three carriers sold Survivorship ranging to nine to 16 percent of their couples, while two insurers sold Survivorship to 2.5 to three percent of their couples.

Table 20 provides additional breakdown on the characteristics of Shared Care sales. As shown on the right-hand side of Table 20, two- to four-year benefit period policies are most likely (26 to 32 percent) to add Shared Care. Partly because three-year benefit periods comprise 52 percent of sales, most policies with Shared Care (62 percent) have three-year benefit periods, as shown on the left side of Table 20.

Above, we stated that Shared Care is selected by 35.9 percent of couples who both buy limited benefit period policies. However, Table 20 shows Shared Care comprised no more than 31 percent of any benefit period. Table 20 has lower percentages because Table 19 denominators are limited to people who buy with their spouse/partner whereas Table 20 denominators include all buyers.

Shared Care is more concentrated in two- to four-year benefits periods (88.3 percent of shared sales) than are all sales (71.5 percent). Couples are more likely to buy short benefit periods because couples plan to help provide care to each other and Shared Care makes shorter benefit periods more acceptable. Single buyers are more likely to be female, hence opt for a longer benefit period. Shared Care percentages rebound at the longer benefit periods reflecting buyers who are trying to cover catastrophic risk and might prefer an endless benefit period.

Existence and Type of Home Care Coverage
For the first time, no participant reported home-care-only sales. Five participants reported sales of facility-only policies, which accounted for 0.7 percent of total sales. Ninety-six percent (96.4 percent) of the comprehensive policies included home care benefits at least equal to the facility benefit.

Other Characteristics
As shown in Table 21, partial cash alternative features (which allow claimants, in lieu of any other benefit that month, to use between 30 and 40 percent of their benefits for whatever purpose they wish) were included in 49.1 percent of sales, including some non-participant sales.

Return of premium (ROP) features were included in 10.4 percent of policies. ROP returns some or all premiums (usually reduced by paid LTCI benefits) when a policyholder dies. Approximately 80 percent of ROP features were embedded automatically in the product. Embedded features are designed to raise premiums minimally, typically decreasing the ROP benefit to $0 by age 75.

Nearly fourteen percent (13.6 percent) of policies with limited benefit periods included a restoration of benefits (ROB) provision, which typically restores used benefits when the insured does not need services for at least six months. Approximately 89 percent of ROB features were automatically embedded.

Shortened benefit period (SBP) makes limited future LTCI benefits available to people who stop paying premiums after three or more years. Although every insurer is obligated to offer SBP, some carriers did not report any SBP sales. Removing their sales from the denominator, we found that 3.1 percent of buyers selected SBP.

Only one insurer issued non-tax-qualified (NTQ) policies, which accounted for 0.1 percent of industry sales.

“Captive” (dedicated to one insurer) agents produced 57.0 percent of the policies. The balance was produced by brokers. At one time, “captive” agents who sold LTCI tended to specialize in LTCI. Now many are agents of mutual companies.

Sales distribution by jurisdiction is posted on the Broker World website.

Limited Pay and Paid-Up Policies
In 2019, only two insurers sold policies that become paid-up in 20 years or less, accounting for 0.8 percent of sales.

Because today’s prices are more stable, premium increases are less likely. One of the key reasons for buying 10-year-pay (avoidance of rate increases after the 10th year) is greatly reduced, while the cost of 10-year-pay has increased, making it less attractive than in the past. Nonetheless, limited-pay and single-pay policies are attractive to minimize post-retirement outflow and to accommodate §1035 exchanges.

Participants reported that 3.8 percent of their inforce policies are paid-up. Less than one percent (0.8 percent) are paid-up because they have completed their premium period. Another 0.8 percent are paid-up due to shortened benefit period and 0.4 percent are due to survivorship features. Almost half of the paid-up policies are paid up for unidentified reasons. For example, shortened benefit period percentages could be as much as three times as high as suggested herein.

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM BACKGROUND
When someone applies to Medicaid for long term care services, states with Partnership programs disregard assets up to the amount of benefits received from a Partnership-qualified policy. Partnership sales were reported in 43 jurisdictions in 2019, all but California (no participants offer California Partnership policies) and Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah, and Vermont, where Partnership programs do not exist. Massachusetts has a somewhat similar program (MassHealth).

The Partnership rules in California, Connecticut, Indiana and New York (“original” Partnership states) are significantly different than in other Partnership jurisdictions (“Deficit Reduction Act (DRA)” jurisdictions). The “original” states legislated variations of the Robert Woods Johnson Partnership (RWJ) proposal, whereas the “DRA” jurisdictions use more consistent rules based on the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. For example, the “original” states require a separate Partnership policy form, generally still have more stringent benefit increase requirements and assess a fee for insurers to participate (none of which applies in DRA states). As a result, only two to five insurers sell Partnership policies in CA (two), CT (four), IN (five) and NY (two). At the time that this article is written, insurance brokers do not have access to Partnership policies in CA and NY.

The National Reciprocity Compact (NRC) requires member states to recognize Medicaid Asset Disregard earned in any other member state. States creating Partnerships under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 were automatically enrolled in the NRC but had the right to secede. The four original Partnership states (California, Connecticut, Indiana and New York) had the right to opt in. California is now the only jurisdiction with a Partnership program that is not a member of the NRC. Last year, we reported that New Hampshire had created a unique regulation in 2018, limiting asset disregard for policies sold in other jurisdictions. New Hampshire has reversed that limitation.

PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM SALES
Insurers sometimes delay certifying policy forms as “Partnership” because of other priorities (e.g., needing time to comply with state-specific requirements to notify existing policyholders or offer an exchange). Such delay is not harmful, as certification is retroactive to policies already issued on that policy form if the policies have the required characteristics. For this reason, the “original” Partnership issues mentioned above and because some insurers are not licensed in all jurisdictions, none of our participants sold Partnership policies in more than 40 jurisdictions in 2019. Three had Partnership sales in 38-40 jurisdictions, four in 29-34 jurisdictions, one in six jurisdictions, and the other has chosen not to certify Partnership conformance.

In the DRA states, 55 percent of policies qualified for Partnership status. Once again, Minnesota led the way; 82.5 percent of the policies sold qualified as Partnership. Maine (75 percent) and Wisconsin (74 percent) followed. North Dakota and Georgia were also above 70 percent.
In the original RWJ states, only 0.4 percent of the issued policies qualified as Partnership: Indiana (3.5 percent), Connecticut (1.0 percent), New York (0.4 percent) and California (zero percent).

Partnership policies are expected to have higher average premiums because of the requirement that Partnership policies issued under age 76 have benefit increase features. In our survey, most states did not have such a relationship because we asked insurers to include FPOs in their sales and the carriers with the most FPOs had high average premiums while selling few Partnership policies.

Approximately 60 percent of Partnership states now allow one percent compounding to qualify for Partnership, which can help low-budget buyers qualify for Partnership and also enables worksite core programs to be Partnership-qualified. A higher percentage of policies would qualify for Partnership in the future if insurers and advisors leverage these opportunities. However, currently only three insurers offer one percent compounding.

Partnership programs could be more successful if:

  1. Advisors offer small maximum monthly benefits more frequently to the middle class. For example, a $1,500 initial maximum monthly benefit covers about four hours of home care every two days and, with compound benefit increases, may maintain buying power. Many middle-class individuals would like LTCI to help them stay at home while not “burning out” family caregivers and could be motivated further by Partnership asset disregard. (This approach does not work where a Partnership minimum daily benefit is required such as CA, $230/day; CT, $291; or NY, $337.) When policies reflecting CA SB 1248 become available in California, California’s minimum size policy will drop to $100/day. South Dakota requires a $100 minimum size for all LTCI and Indiana’s Partnership requires $115.)
  2. Middle-class prospects were better educated about the importance of benefit increases to maintain LTCI purchasing power and to qualify for Partnership asset disregard.
  3. The four original Partnership states migrate to DRA rules.
  4. More jurisdictions adopt Partnership programs.
  5. Programs that privately finance direct mail educational LTCI content from public agencies were adopted more broadly.
  6. Financial advisors were to press reluctant insurers to certify their products and create one percent compounding.
  7. More financial advisors were certified. Some people argue that certification requirements should be loosened. At a minimum, the renewal certification process could be improved.
  8. More insurers offer one percent compounding.
  9. Linked benefit products became Partnership-qualified.

UNDERWRITING DATA
Case Disposition
Eight insurers contributed application case disposition data to Table 22. In 2019, 59.2 percent of applications were placed, including those that were modified, a little higher than in 2017 and 2018. Half of the improvement was related to change in participants.

One insurer reported a 76.7 percent placement rate, the second highest being 58.3 percent. Two insurers placed fewer than 50 percent of their apps, the lowest placement rate being 32.3 percent. Low placement rates increase insurers’ cost per placed policy. More importantly, low placement rates can discourage advisors from discussing LTCI with clients. In addition to not wanting to waste time and effort, advisors fear that declined clients will be dissatisfied.
Decline rates slipped slightly for the second straight year. The decline rate by carrier varied from 11.2 to 41.8 percent, affected by factors such as age distribution, market, underwriting requirements, and underwriting standards. Our placed percentages reflect the insurers’ perspective. A higher percentage of applicants secures coverage because applicants denied by one carrier may be issued either stand-alone or combo coverage by another carrier or may receive coverage with the same insurer after a deferral period.

Underwriting Tools
Eight insurers contributed data to Table 23, which divides the number of uses of each underwriting tool by the number of applications processed. For example, the number of medical records was 86 percent of the number of applications. That does not mean that 86 percent of the applications involved medical records, because some applications resulted in more than one set of medical records being requested.

Insurers are trying to speed underwriting to increase placement rates. In the worksite market, insurers are less likely to use some of these tools.

Year-to-year changes in distribution of sales among insurers significantly impact results. Lower maximum ages result in fewer face-to-face exams. Insurers might underreport the use of an underwriting tool because they may lack a good source for that statistic. For example, the cognitive phone calls are understated below because one insurer could not split them apart from their other phone interviews (PHI) and reported them all as PHI with no or minimal cognitive testing.

Underwriting Time
Table 24 shows the average processing from receipt of application to mailing the policy (37.0 days) was 2.4 days faster than in 2018, which in turn had been 3.4 days faster than in 2017. About 38 percent of the reduction was due to the change in survey participants.

The reduction came at both ends of the spectrum, a much higher percentage processed within 29 days and many fewer taking 45 or more days. All but one insurer reported an increase.

Rating Classification
Table 25 shows that a lower percentage of policies was issued in the most favorable rating classification, but for participants which contributed data both years, the percentage increased 0.4 percent despite a higher average issue age. Two insurers placed more than 80 percent of their applicants in the best underwriting class. Only 8.1 percent of the applicants were placed beyond the second-best classification. In 2016 and prior years, the “best” percentage was lower partly because we received more data from insurers writing worksite business, which does not offer preferred health discounts and because one insurer eliminated its preferred health discount (hence “standard” ratings became its “best”).

Underwriting placements have become more favorable. To gauge whether insurers are declining applicants rather than placing them in a less-attractive rating, we added a line in Table 25 that shows the percentage of decisions which were either declined or placed in the third or less-attractive classification. This approach confirms the more favorable decisions in 2019.

Tables 26 and 27 show by issue age range the percentage of policies issued in the most favorable category in 2019 and the percentage of decisions that were declines. One participant was not able to provide the by-issue-age data, so Tables 26 and 27 do not exactly match Table 25.

Please click on the links below to find the following additional information:

  • Product Exhibit shows, for eight insurers: Financial ratings, LTCI sales and inforce, and product details. Please note that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, some insurers have temporarily discontinued sales that would require face-to-face interviews. Our Exhibit ignores such temporary restrictions.
  • Product Details, a row-by-row definition of the product exhibit entries, with some commentary.
  • Premium Exhibit, which shows lifetime annual premiums for each insurer’s most common underwriting class, for issue ages 40, 50, 60, and 70 for single females, single males, and heterosexual couples (assuming both buy at the same age), based on $100 per day (or closest equivalent weekly or monthly) benefit, 90-day facility and most common home care elimination period (other aspects vary), three-year and five-year benefit periods or $100,000 and $200,000 maximum lifetime buckets, with and without Shared Care and with flat benefits or automatic three or five percent annual compound benefit increases for life. The exhibit includes facility-only policies, as well as comprehensive policies. Worksite products do not reflect any worksite-specific discount, though some carriers offer this.
  • Premium Adjustments (from our Premium Exhibit prices) by underwriting class for each participant.
  • Distribution by underwriting class for each participant.
  • State-by-state results: percentage of sales by state, average premium by state and percentage of policies qualifying for Partnership by state.

CLOSING
We thank insurance company staff for submitting the data and responding to questions promptly. We also thank Nicole Gaspar, Alex Geanous, and Anders Hendrickson of Milliman for managing the data expertly.

We reviewed data for reasonableness and insurers reviewed their product exhibit displays. Nonetheless, we cannot assure that all data is accurate.

If you have suggestions for improving this survey (including new entrants in the market), please contact one of the authors.

Reference:

  1. Society of Actuaries (November 2016). Long-Term Care Insurance: The SOA Pricing Project. Retrieved May 16, 2019, from https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/static-pages/sections/long-term-care/ltc-pricing-project.pdf.

Potential Impact Of COVID-19 On The LTCI Industry

COVID-19 will have significant impacts on the long term care insurance (LTCI) industry in 2020 and perhaps beyond. The following comments are speculative and should be viewed as intending to encourage thought and discussion rather than being relied upon.

Every 100,000 deaths from COVID-19 would increase 2020 deaths by close to 3.5 percent and represent 1/30 of one percent of the population of the United States.

Claims

  • Higher mortality could lead to shorter claim durations. People in nursing homes appear to be among the most vulnerable to COVID-19. To the degree that COVID-19 causes premature deaths of LTCI claimants, this tragic result could reduce the financial instability of older blocks of policies.
  • Home care claims may be depressed. “Sheltering in place” is expected to reduce commercial home care expenditures, as home care providers are less willing to visit and less welcome in homes, and spouses and children may be more available to provide home care services while staying home.
  • Future claims on inforce blocks may decrease somewhat because of terminations due to death and inability to pay premium. On the other hand, people may avoid seeking treatment unless it is absolutely necessary and doctors may shift their focus to COVID-19 (at least in the short term). As a result, chronic conditions may be less effectively diagnosed, monitored and treated, which could cause somewhat higher LTCI claims in coming years.
  • Future claims could increase if people who survive COVID-19 become more susceptible to needing long term care, but this will not be known for some time.
  • If COVID-19 ends up having an “annual” season (like the flu) or even less frequent recurrences, it could have an impact on claims incidence and claims length. The greatest impact might be higher mortality rates at older ages, which would reduce the cost of claims. But if vaccines are developed, there may not be a significant impact on the claims experience of today’s sales.

Premium income and persistency

  • Unemployment will likely cause some policyholders to be unable to continue premiums and some employers might stop paying LTCI premiums or might pare their executive carve-out ranks. Because terminations (deaths and lapses) will likely increase in the short term, COVID-19 should lower future premium income. However, as a result of such terminations, insurers will release reserves, which might more than offset the loss of income.
  • Insurers are generally extending grace periods by 30 to 61 days. It is our interpretation that the Third Party Notification will be delayed, but the subsequent time available for the Third Party to cure the overdue premium will be the normal length. Some insurers seem to be a bit slower to respond than for previous emergency situations, despite having their past precedents. Because regulators from various states were instituting requirements, insurers held off to avoid having to repeatedly update their COVID-19 response. For example, Alaska mandated that policies cannot be lapsed prior to June 1. Delaware forbid lapses during the pendency of the emergency order.¹ West Virginia seems to have mandated an open-ended restriction on terminating coverage.¹ California requested a 60-day grace period,² and Wisconsin requested flexibility.¹ To the degree that insurers grant such grace periods to consumers with adversely-impacted cash flow, insurers will suffer inferior cash flow.³ To the degree that they never receive some of the due premium, they would have extended a short period of coverage with no corresponding premium income. However, in that case, they would be experiencing higher lapse rates than anticipated, which should improve profitability.

Investment income

  • Reduced investment income may result due to COVID-19. For inforce business, mortgage and bond defaults would be harmful, but a low interest rate climate may be less harmful for older blocks experiencing negative cash flow.
  • A prolonged recession or depression might keep interest rates low. On the other hand, some people believe that the increased government spending resulting from COVID-19 will spur inflation that would cause nominal investment yields to increase. Inflation would likely make today’s sales more profitable (less exposed to price increases) because it could increase investment income on future premiums and reinvestment of assets. Although inflation would drive higher long term care costs, which could increase claims, the daily or monthly maximums of LTCI policies put a limit on the degree to which claims could increase.
  • Insurers may respond to expected lower investment income by raising new business prices and restricting single premium options.

Expenses

  • Insurer expenses may drop somewhat in 2020 primarily due to lower new business expenses and other administrative expense reductions. In the long run, expense variations due to COVID-19 are not likely to be significant.

Sales

  • Sales to individuals and couples will rise or drop for conflicting reasons:
    • Economic activity is depressed in the early stages of this pandemic, and income instability makes it unwise to commit to more on-going outflow.
    • Reduced asset values may cause some people to reconsider LTCI instead of self-insuring. According to Don Levin, President and CEO of USA-BGA, GE Financial had its best LTCI sales the month after 9/11, “Because it showed the country how quickly life can change in the blink of an eye.”
    • Some people who were convinced that the government would take care of them may become less confident as a result of the COVID-19 related government debt.
    • More people may be reviewing and seeking to increase their financial security, and people quarantined at home may be more easily available for remote solicitation, education, and sales.
    • Some insurers discontinued older age sales because they cannot complete face-to-face interviews.
  • A desire to replenish one’s estate and increased conservatism may accelerate interest in linked-benefit products.
  • New worksite sales may decrease significantly as employers are focused on other business and employee issues. Furthermore, workforce continuity is unusually uncertain and face-to-face enrollment temporarily discontinued. In 2021, the market might benefit from pent-up demand, but resulting enrollments might not take place until late 2021 or early 2022.
  • Worksite enrollments of new employees in existing programs are less affected because people become eligible automatically without executive decision-making. However, decreased hiring means decreased add-on sales.
  • Core/buy-up elections and voluntary participation are likely to decrease as employees are less confident of family net income.
  • Insurers should see a spike in the use of eApps and fillable apps as face-to-face solicitation will ebb.

Operations

  • Insurance operations are well-suited for remote employment and insurance company staff have the knowledge and resources to work remotely. Reduced sales should reduce stress on some operational staff and may result in some layoffs.
  • LTCI underwriting should be less affected than underwriting of products which require more time-of-sale health screening. However, in addition to difficulty scheduling face-to-face assessments, potential problems such as slower transmission of medical records may occur. If an insurer requires someone to go to the doctor before applying or if an insurer wants an updated test, the related application is likely to flounder because people may not want/be able to go to their doctor’s office. As noted above, insurers are capping the sales age due to inability to perform face-to-face assessments. In response, insurers are developing capability to do face-to-face assessments electronically.
  • Some states have temporarily suspended fingerprint requirements, at least in some cases, issuing temporary insurance licenses to brokers. Such brokers will be required to complete the fingerprint process at a later date.
  • Some insurers are expanding electronic policy delivery, which may change typical processing even post-COVID-19.
  • Particularly where cash benefits are payable, insurers will be diligent to assure that they become aware of deaths.

Other

  • A. M. Best has committed to stress test insurers regarding COVID-19.⁴
  • West Virginia required insurers to provide a “preparedness plan” by April 2 to address maintaining an adequate workforce, assuring on-going processing, evaluating the ability of third parties to continue necessary service, a communications strategy, etc., under a variety of COVID-19 projections (determined by the insurer). The “preparedness plan” must also have been tested by April 2. In addition, West Virginia required an assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on reserve requirements, credit exposure and counter-party credit risk, assets that may be adversely impacted and the overall resultant potential impact on earnings, profit, capital, and liquidity.⁵
  • Wisconsin has ended its normal deemer provision that results in insurance policy filings being approved if the state does not respond within a particular time frame.⁶

References:

  1. https://www.onedigital.com/blog/covid-19-relief-states-begin-extending-insurance-premium-grace-periods/, accessed on Mary 29, 2020.
  2. https://www.wvinsurance.gov/Portals/0/pdf/pressrelease/20-07%20COVID-19%20Regulatory%20Guidance.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-195235-360, accessed on Mary 29, 2020.
  3. https://oci.wi.gov/Pages/PressReleases/20200320COVID-19.aspx, accessed on Mary 29, 2020.
  4. http://www.ambest.com/about/coronavirus.html, accessed on Mary 29, 2020.
  5. http://www.pciaa.net/docs/default-source/industry-issues/20-04-preparedness-bulletin.pdf, accessed on Mary 29, 2020.
  6. https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2020/03/covid-19-and-additional-regulatory-directives-for-insurance-companies/covid19_additional_regulatory_directives_for_insurance_companies.pdf, accessed on Mary 29, 2020.

What’s In Your Wallet: The Impact Of Covid-19 On Retirement And Estate Planning

Trapped at home, trying to remember what day it is, finishing the “must-do’s” for work and for the family, has prompted many people to become short-term focused. There is going to be life after the pandemic, and we all need to be thinking in terms of the long term, and what retirement can look like if we are proactive now and in the immediate future. It is our responsibility to provide alternatives and solutions to our clients as they come out of their individual bunkers blinking in the light of day as they attempt to adjust to the post-pandemic world’s New Normal.

Risk of Recession or Depression
More than ever in our lives, we fear an extended recession or major depression because of COVID-19.

  1. The reality is that many restaurants will not re-open; some had marginal profitability even before COVID-19, and the strain of takeout and curbside delivery, with reduced sales in a dining room, will doom many of these veritable institutions not to re-open.
  2. Retail stores with inventory already faced tough competition from the internet; now an ever increasing number of buyers have bought more things over the internet, and previously-valued face-to-face interaction is less cherished.
  3. Movie theaters are endangered, as people become more aware of the dangers, as well as the inconveniences, of leaving home compared to the relative ease and convenience of “streaming.”
  4. With employers and employees having adapted to remote work, Gartner determined that 25 percent of employers expect 20 percent of their employees to work remotely while another 50 percent expect five percent more of their employees to work remotely,* impacting the transportation and its supporting industries and the clothing and dry-cleaning industries, as well as restaurants and food trucks, etc.
  5. Commercial real estate will suffer from business closures and remote employment.
  6. Commercial and residential construction will be depressed.
  7. While more virtual meetings could benefit productivity and generate savings for employers, this will greatly and adversely impact the travel and convention industry.
  8. The overall demand for energy will reduce.
  9. Unemployment in any sector can lead to unemployment in other sectors. Suppliers and vendors will be impacted. For example, reduced advertising will hurt PR agencies, newspapers, broadcast media, printers, the post office, etc.
  10. State and local government revenues will decrease leading to layoffs and reduced services.
  11. Mortgage delinquencies threaten residential real estate, banks, and other lenders.
  12. The insurance industry, which has been reeling from low investment yields for years, will continue to suffer from poor returns and some lines of business will have increased claims prompting carriers to implement changes in available coverages.
  13. While facing more demand for services, donation-dependent non-profits will receive less funding because donors’ incomes and assets will be depressed.
  14. International trade is likely to reduce.
  15. Colleges may be harmed if the value of a diploma is depreciated by poor job prospects, applicants cannot afford attending or people choose not to be on college campuses (the last item seems to be only a short-term threat, though some colleges and universities have already announced no on-campus classes for the Fall 2020 term).
  16. Artists will face reduced demand.
  17. Childcare businesses may be harmed by unemployment and more people working from home, or simply from the fear of exposing their children.

Pollution and other environmental challenges might ease because of some of the above factors, as it has in China, Europe, and parts of California, but people’s fiscal and physical health will most likely deteriorate.

Reduced Profitability
Many people do not understand that a small drop in business can plunge an otherwise-healthy business into a loss position and downward spiral. Most businesses, even those which do not suffer reduced revenues, will experience increased expenses and risk.

Equipping employees and possibly customers with protective equipment involves both capital and on-going expenses. Social distancing, ventilation changes, and other necessary business practice changes require re-modeling and reduce the number of clients who can be served. Testing increases operational costs. These factors can also reduce efficiency in serving clients.

Crime rates generally increase when the economy suffers, leading to losses as well as increased security costs.

As a result of these environmental and cultural issues, insurance costs are likely to rise.

Litigation has been an increasing threat in our society and COVID-19 risks elevating litigation risk to an even higher level.

Tax rates are likely to rise as governments try to keep operating at the same level despite reduced taxable income and as the Federal government tries to post-fund its unprecedented legislative responses to the pandemic.

Investment Options
Investment options look bleak. Many of us fear further stock market sell-offs amid a long road to recovery. Of course, we can all identify some industries/businesses which will thrive in the post-COVID-19 economy, but the price of such stocks may be driven up too quickly and to unprecedented levels.

Converting to bonds is scary. With the government printing unprecedented amounts of money, inflation is a threat. Coupled with current low interest rates, the risk of capital losses on current bond purchases seems huge.

Commercial and residential real estate and mortgages could remain safe forms of investments. Taking a look at a Charleston, SC house for sale indicates the market remains resilient. And those businesses that are yet to invest in commercial or industrial real estate, ought to carry detailed research before investing. That is, financing, understanding the business goals, and more importantly, finding the right property. Fortunately, resources like https://patmcbride.com/industrial-property-buyers-guide/ and similar real estate guides can help them plan better.

Commodities also seem riskier.

As in other post-Black Swan periods, many people will value stodgy reliable investments.

Financial advisors are likely to be very busy consulting with clients about allocation and security of assets as well as recent losses. Clients are also more concerned about outliving their own (reduced) assets and the time and money their elders’ potentially debilitating need for long term care could demand.

Financial Services’ Client Mentality
Whether or not their income suffers, most clients have experienced a reduction in the value of their assets and estate. Even those who believe the market will bounce back fear volatility and that the recovery period might outlast their available time frame. That is, they may not have enough years left in their lives to experience the next boom. This might seem to be pessimistic thinking, but pessimism will dominate many people’s investment choices and strategies in the next three to five years.

The proverbial two-edged sword is that not only are their assets and estate lowered, but perceived future risk has increased. People feel a stronger need to protect their children and grandchildren as well as their own lifestyle and ancillary retirement.

Clients may feel both more physically and financially vulnerable than at any other time in history. The fear or mere risk of a sudden disease taking its toll, may prompt many to take preventive or protective measures to deal with such a situation if it were to arise.

People who intended to rely upon their family as caregivers may now question whether they can really count on their family for support. They may recognize that their spouse may not be alive or might not be capable of being a caregiver. They may anticipate that their children might be so stressed trying to protect the child’s spouse and offspring that they may be unable to provide care. Having seen their children trying to balance working from home with home-schooling, etc., they may realize more strongly that they do not want to rely on their family members even if they could do so.

Some people who were convinced that the government would take care of their long term care needs may become less confident because of the COVID-19-related government debt. People with income and assets are now more likely to understand that they will continue to be ineligible for government programs funding long term care costs. Furthermore, government long term care financing has gone almost exclusively to nursing homes, which are a much less attractive caregiving venue post-COVID-19 given the horrific loss of life in these facilities due to the lack of available social distancing, the physical plant, as well as air recirculation in the facility.

If we are to look for silver linings to the otherwise very dark cloud known as COVID-19, then it must be that for an ever growing number of people they are treating it as a wake-up call or fire drill, and are proactively pursuing remedies that will protect depleted portfolios and retirement accounts while taking stock of how the pandemic impacted their families. How many children were available to be of assistance to their parents while at the same time attempting to meet the needs of their own (remote) employment, the home schooling and care of children, as well as the demands of life in general?

In good times many people do not prepare adequately for the unexpected. Like the COVID-19 crisis, the development of a need for long term care suddenly changes the world radically (albeit, unlike COVID-19, only one family at a time). Crisis management, time demands, and financial pressures (increased expenses, loss of income, and potentially untimely liquidation of assets or penalty-laden withdrawals from retirement accounts) dramatically converge and can last a long time, disrupting a family’s future-possibly permanently.

COVID-19 demonstrates how these crises catch us by surprise and the stress of being amid an emergency of uncertain length and impact. Like COVID-19, once the need for long term care starts to develop it is too late to prepare in ways that would have made the situation easier to manage. Stock market, general economy and personal finance fluctuations demonstrate that there is a good chance that a family might have to cope with a long term care situation and economic challenges simultaneously. Indeed, if a family is experiencing a financial setback, a long term care need could absolutely overlap with other economic challenges with disastrous outcomes. How would a family maintain income while providing care? Because of experiencing today’s uncertainty, many people treasure downside protection more than they did in the past.

Clearly, reduced cash flow and assets make it harder to commit to a new on-going insurance premium commitment. But if a commitment is possible, it is more likely to be made.

Linked-Benefit Products are Particularly Attractive Post-COVID-19
Of course, just as one size does not fit all, some people will favor different strategies, but many people will be responsive to linked-benefit life insurance/LTCI products (LB) and may be eager to fund such products by transferring, or re-allocating, assets from low-performing or risky assets.

Insurers will be concerned about profitability but will value the LB market because LB products offset mortality and longevity exposure. If mortality costs increase, long term care costs are likely to decrease and vice versa.

Clients will find LB products very attractive now, for the following reasons:

  • Many LB policies are guaranteed. At this time of increased risk and conservatism, guarantees look great to both analytic and emotional buyers.
  • The death benefit immediately replenishes some of the client’s estate that has withered in the recent stock market.
  • LB products also protect against long term care needs. Earlier, we commented on the increased costs of doing business. The long term care industry will be a magnet for such higher expenses, which means that the cost of long term care services will increase. In turn, those higher costs mean that people will be more inclined to insure.
  • LB policies are a better way to self-insure as your beneficiaries risk their death benefit (generally over the first two years of needing long term care) but then inexpensive catastrophe coverage kicks in. The value of such a “stop-loss” type coverage is more appreciated in an era when asset value and income are less secure.
  • Maximum long term care benefits can compound at three percent or according to a medical cost index depending on product. An index could be particularly attractive for those who fear inflation.
  • Some LB products permit (out-of-work, perhaps) family members to be paid for providing care, which can be a nice alternative for generations who are concerned about one another or simply wish to be together.
  • An inability to afford separate LTCI and life insurance protection may also accelerate interest in linked-benefit products.
  • LB policies can do well in any economic environment. In a deflationary economy such as the 1930s, the increasing benefit is further leveraged by reduced cost of care. In an inflationary economy, a medical cost index helps. In a gyrating muddle economy, steady performance is appreciated.
  • For clients looking for guaranteed rates, this could be another safe haven for them.
  • The tax advantages for employer-paid coverage may have increased value in the future if the USA grapples with spiraling debt by increasing tax rates.

Time to Act
Some of our clients are feeling vulnerable, while others will simply be more receptive to well-placed comments by you on the necessity for insuring themselves against what some consider to be the greatest singular risk that we each face in our retirement.

The need for these insurance products is greater now than ever before; advances in medicine and pharmaceuticals are extending our lives, allowing us to live longer and to die slower. With fewer children in the nuclear family, often scattered across the country (or even the world), and more women in the workplace, we are simply no longer the Walton clan with multi-generational families living under the same roof.

This may be a good time to revisit long term care planning with some clients who did not establish an LTCI plan. Reassure/compliment clients who purchased such coverage (from you or someone else); they may like to purchase more or may have family or friends interested in your help.

While our focus should always be on the best interests of our clients, we must also consider the fact that for any and all of us who shoulder any form of fiduciary responsibility there is an accompanying liability that squarely places targets on all of our chests if we are not addressing this risk with our clients. The Doctrine of Reliance has become a very powerful weapon being successfully utilized by the plaintiffs’ bar before ever increasingly sympathetic courts of law and juries.

Reference:

* https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2020-04-03-gartner-cfo-surey-reveals-74-percent-of-organizations-to-shift-some-employees-to-remote-work-permanently2?mod=article_inline.

The Combination Life Insurance Market Continues To Grow And Evolve

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Combination life insurance (life insurance with long term care insurance features) continues to grow and evolve.

Table 1 (from LIMRA) shows the number of combination life insurance policies and related new premium from 2007-2018. It excludes work-site sales and combination annuities. Two percent more combination life insurance policies were sold in 2018 than in 2017. Premium dropped two percent, but that’s misleading as will be discussed.

Table 2 shows the distribution of those combination life policies in 2018. As will be discussed later, “CI” means “chronic illness” as opposed to “LTCI” which means “long term care insurance” and “ADB” means “accelerated death benefit” only as opposed to “EOB” which means that an “extension of benefit” is available as well as an ADB.

There are many ways the combination market can be divided, one of the most significant ones being in terms of coverage provided (risk borne by insurers). As Table 2 shows, only nine percent of 2018 combination policies were sold on products that permitted more than the death benefit to be used, if a need for long term care (LTC) occurs, by offering an EOB feature. More than 90 percent of the policies were sold on products which offered only an accelerated death benefit (ADB) for LTC.

Product differences explain some of the price variations between insurers shown below. Insurers may differ in their assumptions of LTC incidence and in their assumptions regarding how often insureds choose to access their ADB when they do need LTC. Different lapse assumptions or ADB election assumptions based on market can have a significant impact. Also, insurers may differ as to whether they assume that an LTC feature improves product persistency and how such persistency improvement is reflected in pricing. ADBs and EOBs can generate different capital requirements for various insurers based on their mix of business, and insurers vary in how they allocate expenses to “riders” (for example, optional features that add additional cost). Underwriting requirements or classification can make a difference (there are definitely distinctions of that type below), because a healthier class should have a lower mortality premium but may have a higher LTCI premium because more survive to ages of LTC incidence. Differences in pricing techniques (particularly for newer features) might cause inadvertent differences.

Accelerated Death Benefit (ADB)
ADBs are an inexpensive way for insurers to help consumers cover LTC costs, by giving them the flexibility to use their ADB, if they wish, when LTC is needed. The insurer does not pay out more money; instead the insurer simply pays it out earlier (a loss of investment income). If a lot of the death benefit is paid out as an ADB benefit, it seems likely that the insured would have died fairly soon thereafter; a short period of foregone interest involves low cost. If little was advanced, the foregone interest on that advanced money is low. Furthermore, the cost is low to the degree that people save their death benefit for their beneficiaries, using the ADB as a last resort.

Comparing only two carriers, I found significant difference in the cost of adding an ADB provision as shown in Table 3.

ADB costs more (in dollars) for females than for males because females are more likely to need LTC (hence to use ADB), are likely to need LTC longer (hence are likely to use more of their ADB) and are more likely to continue to live after the full ADB has been advanced (which means more loss of interest from advancing the death benefit). The gender difference in percentage add-ons for ADB is even larger, because the female’s life premiums (denominator) are lower.

It is interesting that the percentage add-ons for ADB differ so much by insurer. One insurer’s percentage add-on increases as age increases, whereas the other insurer’s add-on generally decreases as age increases. At the end of the previous section, I explained some of the factors that can impact pricing.

Extension of Benefits (EOB)
Extension of benefits (EOB) provisions continue to pay benefits after the death benefit has been used up (and often provide a residual death benefit). Thus, the insurer takes a much more meaningful LTC risk, rather than simply lost investment income.

From a consumer’s perspective, a life insurance policy with an extension of benefits provision is a better way to “self-insure.” The consumer “self-insures” the first two or three years of LTC with their beneficiary’s death benefit, as that death benefit is used to pay for LTC. After the death benefit is used up, the consumer has an inexpensive partial stop-loss or catastrophe type of coverage because the self-insurance portion represents a two-year or three-year elimination period before true LTCI risk transfer occurs.

Table 4 (see page 22) shows that EOB provisions add more cost than ADB provisions, even though they are much less likely to be used, particularly by males. Of course, that’s because the EOB is a marginal additional cost for the insurer, rather than only paying cost earlier.

The four leftmost columns in Table 4 show the percentage additional cost of adding EOB to a life insurance policy that already includes ADB. The Carrier C product is a work-site product with unisex pricing. Because it has a shorter extension of benefit period (25 months compared to 3 years) and because the extension starts a bit later (after 25 months compared to after 24 months), I would expect the EOB cost add-on to be lower for Carrier C than for Carrier B. Some possible explanations for Table 4 differences were mentioned earlier.

The rightmost two columns are different, showing the ratio of the extra premium to add EOB to a policy to the extra premium to add ADB to a policy. Not surprisingly, the additional cost of the EOB compared to the ADB is smaller for men than for women, because few men outlive the ADB benefit. The ratio increases with issue age because more older buyers will have coverage in their 80s.

A longer EOB would cost more; a shorter EOB would cost less.

Insurance products which offer only an ADB typically have no discounts for married people, whereas products with EOBs often discount prices for married people (for example, 10 percent). Stand-alone LTCI policies typically have the largest discounts for couples but require that both buy.

Compound Benefit Increases (CBIO)
Compound benefit increase features (CBIO; the maximum monthly benefit and potential lifetime benefit compound) add more cost than either ADB or EOB. When ADB is exercised, most (perhaps all) insurers subtract only the base benefit (not the portion attributable to compounding) from the death benefit.*

Whereas the ADB does not create additional benefits (solely paying an ultimate benefit earlier) and the EOB creates additional benefits but not until after the ADB is used up, the CBIO feature creates additional marginal benefits as soon as the insured goes on claim. Therefore, it can cost many multiples of the cost of ADB, depending on the compounding percentage and on the benefit period, etc.

Table 5 shows the cost of adding CBIO to a five-year benefit period linked-benefit product.

The percentages in Table 5 are applied to a bigger base than the percentages in Table 4 as the Table 5 denominators include the cost of the EOB feature.

*Insurers differ in how they handle benefits that are less than the maximum. Consider a base benefit of $3000/month which has grown to $6000/month. If a policyholder uses only $3000 in a month, one insurer may deduct that full $3000 payment from the death benefit, while another might consider the $3000 payment to be half base and half compounding thereby reducing the death benefit by only $1500.

Single Premium vs. Recurring Premium
Tables 1 and 2 combine single premium sales and recurring premium sales, thereby obscuring some significant differences. LIMRA shared some data with me, permitting me to determine the distributions mentioned below.

ADB sales are most commonly made to satisfy a life insurance need. The ADB feature may be automatically included because of the insurer’s product design or may be added at the suggestion of the financial advisor. Fewer than two percent of ADB policies are paid for with a single premium.

On the other hand, when EOB policies were first created, they 100 percent were sold with single premiums. The concept was to move “lazy assets” (low-yielding assets) to an EOB policy to leverage the investment for LTCI purposes. In these sales, the primary motivation was generally LTCI, the life insurance component being attractive to avoid “use it or lose it.”

However, as inforce stand-alone LTCI policies started having large price increases, and large price increases applied to new stand-alone LTCI sales also, the EOB carriers recognized an opportunity to grow by making their product available on a recurring premium basis. Originally the expansion was limited to 10 premium years at most, but in 2018 we continue to see more lifetime-pay products becoming available. In 2018, 57 percent of the EOB sales were single premiums compared to fewer than two percent of the ADB sales.

All other things being equal, I would expect EOB policies to have higher premiums because they add on an additional LTCI benefit. However, in 2018 and 2017, ADB average single premiums were roughly 50 percent larger than EOB single premiums. Perhaps the ADB single premium cases had larger death benefits, were sold at higher ages, or were more often rated due to health conditions.

On the other hand, the average recurring premium on EOB policies was more than twice the average recurring premium on ADB policies. Besides the additional cost of EOB (and sometimes CBIO), this difference might reflect that a higher percentage of ADB policies have premiums scheduled to be paid a very long time as opposed to 10 years or less.

Single premiums accounted for 61 percent of LIMRA’s reported new 2017 premium, but only 58 percent of new 2018 premium. Correspondingly, the market share of recurring premium increased. Thus the “drop” in 2018 premium seems to be balanced by an increase in future premiums. A decrease in average issue age, which seems likely with the shift toward recurring premiums, could increase the present value of future premiums.

Section 7702(b) vs. Section 101(g)
Another way that combination policies can be distinguished from one another is by which provision of the legal code applies to them. Section 7702(b) policies have LTCI benefits that can legally be called “long term care insurance” and must satisfy all the LTCI legal requirements. Most ADB policies have chronic illness provisions, which comply with Section 101(g) which permits incidental coverages to be added to life insurance policies if they do not exceed 10 percent of the value of policy benefits.

Financial advisors (FAs) are not allowed to refer to Section 101(g) policies as “long term care insurance.” I believe that puts FAs in a very tough spot. Section 101(g) provisions can be more favorable than Section 7702(b) provisions because Section 101(g) provisions are more likely to pay the full LTC benefit regardless of the cost incurred, rather than limiting the benefit to reimburse the amount of LTC cost incurred. They may satisfy requirements for Section 7702(b) policies and any such requirements they don’t satisfy may be less important to the consumer than the advantages Section 101(g) provisions may have. Rather than forbidding them to be called “LTCI,” it might be better to require that the insurer disclose any LTCI requirements which they violate.

The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA, 2006) required certification (training) to sell LTCI policies which qualified for the State LTC Partnership programs. The NAIC’s recommended wording (to implement DRA) required certification for all LTCI policies whether the policies qualify for Partnership programs or not. I prefer the NAIC wording so that all (at least all stand-alone) LTCI consumers can have access to Partnership policies.

Some states adopted the NAIC wording, while others adopted wording straight from the DRA. In states which have adopted either the DRA wording or the NAIC wording, most (if not all) insurers selling stand-alone LTCI have uniformly required certification regardless of whether a policy is Partnership-qualified or not. Insurers selling combination policies (including linked-benefit policies), on the other hand, have generally not required certification in states with DRA wording.

Evolution
Sales are shifting from stand-alone long term care insurance toward combination products, but not as much as many industry watchers think. In 2018, 56,288 stand-alone LTCI policies were sold1 vs. 35,431 EOB linked-benefit policies. The huge “wave” of combination policies consists of ADB-only policies.

Although approximately 60 percent more stand-alone LTCI policies were sold than EOB policies, the EOB market produced ten times as much new premium as the stand-alone LTCI market ($1.78 billion vs. only $0.172 billion1). To judge relative stand-alone and combination LTC sales based on premium is misleading because:

  • The inclusion of life insurance generates a higher premium, not attributable to LTC risk.
  • The prevalence of single-premium and limited-pay (e.g., 10-year-pay) sales in the EOB market tilts the comparison. One dollar of recurring premium sales is worth a lot more than one dollar of single premium sales.

I mentioned previously the shift from single premium EOB policies to recurring premium EOB policies. The availability of recurring premiums has opened the market to younger and less affluent buyers. Unfortunately, we don’t have data to demonstrate those trends.

In order to sweeten the death benefit and LTCI benefit value propositions, EOB policies have reduced their “money-back” guarantees. Whereas consumers were previously guaranteed that they could get their money back at any time, now many policies are sold with cash values equal to 80 percent of premiums paid.

A third evolution for EOB policies has been that they are now more often sold with CBIO than in the past, as they are seen as an alternative to stand-alone LTCI, but that trend might temper as the price for CBIO might increase for new sales.

With CBIO seemingly more common on linked-benefit products than in the past, and fewer CBIO sales on stand-alone policies than in the past, and with shorter benefit periods being more common on stand-alone policies than in the past, the total amount of new LTCI risk transfer seems to be shifting toward linked-benefit policies.

ADB and linked-benefit policies are also extending into the work-site market, with some linked-benefit policies on a Section 101(g) chassis. Guaranteed-issue stand-alone LTCI has disappeared but guaranteed-issue coverage is available with work-site linked-benefit products.

For younger-age employees, combination products have greater appeal than stand-alone LTCI because life insurance is important to their young families. At those younger ages the cost of ADB and EOB is reduced because the premium-paying period is long and because a lot of coverages will no longer be inforce when the young employee reaches 80 or more years old.

A potential concern in the work-site market is that buyers (especially young buyers) might think they have more LTC protection than will be the case when they need care. The lack of CBIO, possibly exacerbated by a small death benefit, may limit ultimate purchasing power for LTC services.

As the work-site market for combination products grows, if work-site policies are included in the data we’ll see more sales at younger ages and more recurring premium.

Other than in the work-site, underwriting seems to be narrowing between stand-alone LTCI and linked-benefit policies. However, linked-benefit policies are more likely to be underwritten on an “accept-reject” basis with fewer attending physician reports. “Accept-reject” underwriting generally allows a few more policies to be issued, but sometimes a deeper underwriting dive allows a policy to be issued that wouldn’t pass “accept-reject” analysis. Because of the limited risk in ADB-only policies, LTC underwriting is less important for them.

Combination policies are less likely than stand-alone policies to limit benefits to the cost of actual LTC expenses. Not only is such a “cash” or “indemnity” policy more attractive, but it is also easier to explain, which is important in the work-site.

Generally, the public is more confident of premium stability in the linked-benefit product. However, the large price increases on older inforce stand-alone LTCI policies have led to pricing and regulatory changes which greatly reduce the risk of large price increases on stand-alone LTCI policies issued today.

A new development in 2019 is that at least two EOB policies now have separate premiums for the ADB portion of the LTCI benefit as well as for the EOB and CBIO portions. The result is that all three of those premiums (ADB, EOB and CBIO) can be tax-favored as LTCI for Section 7702(b)-type policies. Without a CBIO feature, the portion of the entire policy premium which is tax-deductible may be in the 18 percent to 20 percent range for men and the 25 percent to 33 percent range for women. When CBIO is added, the tax-deductible percentage of premium can increase to 43 percent to 57 percent for males and 58 percent to 66 percent for females.

Other recent innovations include:

  • Marketing a stand-alone LTCI policy with a return of premium benefit option and cash value option to compete against linked-benefit products.
  • Designing a linked-benefit product with a seven-year LTCI benefit period where the death benefit gets spread over two years. At least most (if not all) previous seven-year benefit periods had death benefits spread over three years, which required 50 percent more death benefit to get the same monthly LTCI benefit. The new design provides more LTCI benefit but less death benefit for the same premium.
  • New approaches exist to help clients decide whether to purchase stand-alone or linked-benefit products, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
  • The ability to do §1035 exchanges and/or to use qualified assets to fund LTC insurance has increased. From my perspective, this is a market which financial advisors have barely scraped. There are wonderful things they can do for clients who have large gains in life insurance contracts or annuities.

Going forward:

  • The pricing and underwriting differences cited herein seem likely to narrow.
  • Conversion to Principles-Based Reserves and a new mortality table may increase the cost of linked-benefit products.
  • If/when interest rates rise, new combination products may have stronger LTCI benefits.
  • Increasing interest rates and Principles-Based Reserves might also result in fewer linked-benefit policies being fully guaranteed than is the case today.
  • §1035 transfers from non-qualified annuities open the possibility for gains to never be taxed. Gary Forman, SVP of Long Term Care Associates, suggested that the Federal government might decide to provide a tax incentive to use qualified funds to purchase LTC protection.
  • Viatical settlements (of existing life insurance policies which lack ADBs) seem to be increasingly used to pay for LTC. Might those insurers start competing with the viaticals to avoid policy surrender? It wouldn’t hurt to ask an insurer without an ADB whether they would be willing to negotiate.
  • A new Shoppers’ Guide was adopted by the NAIC in April and is available at https://www.naic.org/prod_serv/LTC-LP-19.pdf. It discusses combination products much more than its predecessor. I was involved in designing the new Shoppers’ Guide and respect the attention the regulators paid to these issues and their interest in learning what the industry thinks of the new Shoppers’ Guide and how the industry uses the guide (any differently than the previous one?). I would be happy to be a conduit for any comments readers might have ([email protected]).

Terminology has also evolved
The insurance industry has used many names to describe these types of policies, but wording is consolidating and may consolidate more.

“Linked-benefit” is used by LIMRA and herein solely for products which might pay LTC benefits greater than the death benefit (i.e., an extension of benefits is available), regardless of whether the EOB is purchased or not. One advantage of this nomenclature is that “linked-benefit” is unique, which reduces confusion. Another is that it distinguishes from products which offer only ADB.

“Combination” (or “combo”) is used by LIMRA and herein to include both ADB policies and EOB (“linked-benefit”) policies. One way to remember the terminology is to think of “Combo” totals as “combining” ADB and EOB.

“Hybrid” has been used a lot in the industry but is often associated with cars today. To avoid confusion, it is preferable that we avoid using different terms for the same feature.

“Asset-based” or “Savings-based” is relevant when clients are moving assets to purchase a single premium combination product. With the great expansion of recurring-premium linked-benefit sales, these terms seem less relevant.

Reference:

  1. 2019 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey, Broker World magazine, July 2019, page 30.

2019 Analysis Of Worksite LTCI

The 2019 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey, published in the July issue of Broker World magazine, was the 21st consecutive annual review of long term care insurance (LTCI) published by Broker World magazine. It analyzed individual product sales and Genworth group sales, reporting sales distributions and detailed insurer and product characteristics.

From 2006-2009, Broker World magazine published separate group LTCI surveys, but discontinued those surveys when the availability of group LTCI policies shrank. In 2011, Broker World magazine began annual analysis of worksite sales of individual products in August to complement the July overall market analysis.

The worksite market consists of individual policies and group certificates (“policies” henceforth) sold with discounts and/or underwriting concessions to groups of people based on common employment.

About the Survey
Our survey includes worksite (WS) sales and statistical distributions from Genworth group, MassMutual, New York Life, and Northwestern and worksite sales data from LifeSecure and Transamerica. We compare WS sales to individual LTCI policies that are not worksite policies (NWS) and to total sales (Total).

The July issue also included the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) program. CalPERS eligibility is based California public employment, but the program operates more like an affinity group than a worksite group, so it was counted as affinity sales in July and is not included as a worksite product in this article.

We limit our analysis to U.S. sales and exclude “combo” products, except where specifically indicated. (Also called “linked” benefits, combo products pay meaningful life insurance, annuity, or disability income benefits in addition to LTCI.)

If a business owner buys an individual policy and pays for it through her/his business, some participants may report such policies as “worksite” policies while others might not, if it was not processed as a worksite group.

If a business sponsors general long term care/LTCI educational meetings, with employees pursuing any interest in LTCI off-site, such sales are not treated as WS sales.

Highlights from This Year’s Survey

  • Participants reported 2018 WS sales of 8,436 policies (15.0 percent of total sales) for $15.64 million (9.1 percent of new annualized premium). The premium includes 2018 future purchase options exercised on policies issued in the past.
  • In 2018, the WS policies sold decreased by 41 percent and new annualized WS premium decreased 33 percent, compared to 2017 results, a much steeper drop than the whole stand-alone LTCI industry.
  • Our worksite sales are representative of nearly 100 percent of the stand-alone WS LTCI market, but our statistical distributions reflect about 65 percent of worksite sales.

MARKET PERSPECTIVE
The worksite market consists of three types of programs (which may apply to different employee classes in a single case):

  • In “core” (also known as “core/buy-up”) programs, employers pay for a small amount of coverage for generally a large number of employees; the employees can buy more coverage. “Core” programs generally have lower average ages, short benefit periods, low daily maximum benefits and few spouses insured.
  • In “carve-out” programs, employers pay for robust coverage for generally a small number of executives and usually their spouses. Generally employees can buy more coverage for themselves or spouses. Carve-out programs cover more married people and spouses and have higher age distributions than “core” programs.
  • In “voluntary” programs, employers pay nothing toward the cost of coverage. Coverage is more robust than “core” programs, but less robust than carve-out programs. Voluntary programs tend to be most weighted toward female purchasers.

MassMutual, New York Life and Northwestern write mostly executive carve-out programs, whereas Genworth, Transamerica and LifeSecure business includes a lot of voluntary and core buy-up business as well.

Prior to gender-distinct NWS pricing, many insurers simply offered a five or 10 percent worksite discount for a product that was already designed, state-approved and had illustration, sales material and administrative support.

Most people interpret Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to require that employer-involved LTCI sales use unisex pricing if the employer has had at least 15 employees for at least 20 weeks either in the current (or previous) year. Thus, to sell at the WS, insurers must create a separate unisex-priced product.

The added expense of separate pricing and administration for WS sales discourages insurers from serving both the WS and NWS markets. With the decrease in LTCI sales this century, insurers may be less confident that the effort of creating a WS program would be rewarded.

Because healthy, young, and less affluent people are less likely to buy, insurers and enrollers fear anti-selection (less-healthy people buying, while healthier people do not buy). Most WS programs offer health concessions which can exacerbate this risk.

Females get a good deal in a WS program compared to NWS pricing, but males pay more in the WS. Insurers fear that most worksite buyers might be female, hurting WS profitability. The Statistical section provides significant data in this regard. To the degree that sales skew to females, unisex pricing must approach gender-distinct female pricing (since females have higher expected future claims).

WS programs rarely offer “preferred health” discounts; insurers generally don’t get enough health information to grant such a discount. Thus, heterogeneous couples might pay more for a WS policy than a corresponding NWS policy, if the male spouse is older or buys more coverage and/or one or both spouses would qualify for a “preferred health” discount in the NWS market. In the carve-out market, a costlier LTCI product can still produce savings on an after-tax basis.

To control risk, most insurers will not accept a voluntary WS program if there are fewer than 100 employees. There is no “guaranteed issue” stand-alone LTCI coverage; however, some combo products offer some guaranteed issue with adequate WS participation. Insurers are also more careful about gender, age and income distributions of WS cases they accept. However, one insurer (which offers no health concessions) will, in half of US jurisdictions, accept voluntary LTCI programs with as few as twoemployees buying (the other jurisdictions require that three to five employees buy).

Some insurers have raised their minimum issue age to avoid anti-selection (few people buy below age 40) and reduce exposure to extremely long claims. Such age restrictions can discourage employers from introducing a program, especially a carve-out program if they have executives or spouses under age 40.

With increased remote work, more employers have employees stretched across multiple jurisdictions and eligible non-household relatives might live anywhere. But insurers are less likely than in the past to offer LTCI in jurisdictions with difficult laws, regulations or practices. So, it can be difficult to find an insurer which can cover everyone unless LTCI is sold on a group chassis and the employer does not have individuals in extra-territorial states.

One WS insurer no longer offers WS LTCI to non-household relatives. Reduced availability for such relatives does not have much impact on sales, because few non-household relatives buy WS LTCI. However, it undermines the suggestion that WS LTCI programs might reduce the negative impact of employees being caregivers.

In the past, an executive carve-out for two partners of a company with more than 15 employees could have been serviced by any LTCI company, but now it is hard to find a carrier that will offer unisex pricing under such circumstances. Thus, it is harder for some executives to benefit from the tax advantages of employer-paid coverage.

Some employee benefit brokers are reluctant to embrace LTCI because of declinations, the need to educate employees, certification requirements, their personal lack of expertise, etc. Increased WS sales are likely to depend upon LTCI specialists forming relationships with employee benefit brokers.

The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the tax savings for C-Corporations buying LTCI for their employees and employees’ life partners. Pass-through entities may be the more attractive market now. Although the eligible premium is capped in a pass-through entity, a much higher marginal tax rate might apply.

Voluntary worksite LTCI sales, which lack the tax advantages of employer-paid coverage, may, like the NWS market, gravitate toward combo products, which have the added advantage of providing valuable life insurance that is viewed as a more immediate potential need by young employees with families.

The worksite is a great venue to serve people who can benefit substantially from LTCI and the state Partnership programs (described in the Partnership section below). Unfortunately, only 10.3 percent of 2018 WS sales qualified for Partnership programs.

Regulators have “stepped up,” as more than 20 jurisdictions now accept policies in their state Partnership programs even if maximum benefits compound by only one percent. By offering one percent compounding option, insurers can make core and voluntary WS programs more attractive.

Increased ong term care exposure coupled with attractive tax breaks for employer-paid coverage and Partnership and combo opportunities in the core and voluntary market may generate significant WS LTCI growth.

However, either consciously or subconsciously, employers understand that offering LTCI to their employees has little value for the employer. By the time the employee or spouse needs long term care, the employee will likely have terminated employment. The industry can help employers much more effectively by providing services which can reduce the likelihood of employees’ elders needing long term care and can make long term care more effective, more efficient and less expensive for employee caregivers.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In reviewing the following data, remember that insurers’ sales distributions can vary greatly based on the submarket they serve (for example, in the WS market: Core, voluntary or carve-out). Therefore, distributions may vary significantly from year to year due to a change in participating insurers, in distribution within an insurer or in market share among insurers. Because our sales distributions reflect approximately 90 percent of NWS sales but only 65 percent of the worksite sales, the “total” distributions are skewed toward NWS characteristics.

Sales and Market Share
Table 1 shows historical WS sales and Table 2 shows WS sales as a percentage of total LTCI sales. The WS market dropped 41 percent in terms of number of new policies and 33 percent in new premium compared to 2016.

As shown in Table 3, most of the drop in sales resulted from an insurer which was #2 in the market in 2017 but was out of the market for most of 2018. Clearly, the other insurers did not gain market penetration as a result. The six top worksite carriers have been the same for several years and WS market share among carriers is distributed very differently from the NWS market. The percentage of each insurer’s new premium that comes from WS sales did not change dramatically from 2017 to 2018.

Average Premium Per Buyer
Table 4 shows the average premium per insured for new business (NB) in the WS market is about 50 percent as high as in the NWS market, because WS buyers are younger and purchase less robust coverage. While the NWS average premium per buying unit is 42 percent higher than the average premium per insured, the WS average premium per buying unit is only 29 percent higher because fewer spouses buy coverage in the WS.

Issue Age
Table 5 shows 2018 WS data is concentrated much more to ages 30-50 than in 2017. The reduced WS sales at ages 60+ led to a very low average WS issue age (42.2). Hence, the difference in average issue age between WS and NWS has increased from 5.3 years in 2016 to 15.4 years in 2018 (see Table 6).
Table 7 displays the relative age distribution of the population compared to purchasers in the NWS and WS markets.

Rating Classification
Most WS sales are in the “best” underwriting class (see Table 8) because there generally is only one underwriting class. Insurers often do not get enough information in WS to determine whether a “preferred health” discount could be granted and use the additional revenue (from not having a “preferred health” discount) to fund extra cost resulting from health concessions. Some carve-out programs may offer a “preferred” discount. A higher percentage of NWS cases were in the “best” class in 2018 because one insurer eliminated its preferred health discount (hence “standard” ratings were its “best”).

Benefit Period
Table 9 shows the combined WS percentage of three- and four-year benefit periods increased from 49.7 to 55.1 percent. Table 10 shows historical variation in the average WS benefit period. A large increase in two-year benefit period sales explains the lower WS average benefit period the past two years, probably caused by a difference in carriers reporting data. As discussed later, the WS market issues much less Shared Care, so the advantage of the NWS market in terms of benefit period is significantly greater than indicated in Table 9.

Maximum Monthly Benefit
Table 11 shows that the average initial monthly maximum benefit increased by $113 in 2018 in the WS market and by $50 in the NWS market. Table 12 shows how the WS initial monthly maximum has varied over time.

Benefit Increase Features
As shown in Table 13, the WS market has a lot more future purchase options (FPO; 72.1 percent vs 32.0 percent in the NWS market) because of its core programs. Correspondingly, only 13.4 percent of WS policies had automatic compound increases, compared with 49.3 percent of NWS policies.

Both markets showed an increase in indexed FPOs. In the WS market, this was caused by distribution shift among insurers. In the NWS market, it was caused by reclassifying an insurer’s sales; the insurer guarantees FPOs of indeterminate amount but bases its decision on interest rates.

Based on a $22/hour cost for non-professional personal care at home ($22 is the median cost according to Genworth’s 2018 study, the average WS initial maximum daily benefit of $137.60 would cover 6.3 hours of care per day at issue, whereas the typical NWS initial daily maximum of $161.21 would cover 7.3 hours of care per day, as shown in Table 14.

The number of future home care hours that could be covered depends upon when care is needed (we’ve assumed age 80), the home care cost inflation rate between now (age 42 for WS and 58 for NWS) and age 80 (we’ve calculated with two, three, four, five and six percent inflation), and the benefit increases provided by the LTCI coverage between now and age 80.

Table 14 shows calculations for 3 different assumptions relative to benefit increase features:

  • The first line presumes that no benefit increases occur (either sold without any benefit increase feature or no FPOs were exercised).
  • The second line reflects the average benefit increase design using the methodology reported in the July article, except that it assumes 25.8 percent elections of five percent compound FPOs, which we inferred in July is indicative of “positive” election FPOs (the increase occurs only if the client elects it).
  • The third line is like the second line except it assumes 90.0 percent FPO election, which we inferred in July is indicative of “negative” election FPOs (the increase occurs unless the client rejects it).

Table 14 indicates that:
1. Without benefit increases, purchasing power deteriorates significantly, particularly for the worksite purchaser because there are more years of future inflation for a younger buyer.
2. The “composite” (average) benefit increase design, assuming that 25.8 percent of FPO offers are exercised is much better, but still leads to significant loss of purchasing power. The exception: The WS client gains a bit of purchasing power if the inflation rate is only two percent (the composite with a 25.8 percent FPO election rate is equivalent to a bit more than two percent compounding).
3. With 90 percent FPO election rates, insured people will do much better retaining purchasing power. The average WS buyer would experience increased purchasing power if inflation averages less than four percent but would lose purchasing power if inflation exceeds four percent. The average NWS buyer would lose purchasing power even if inflation is only three percent.

Table 14 underscores the importance of considering future purchasing power when buying LTCI. Please note:
a) The average WS buyer was 16 years younger, hence has 16 more years of inflation and benefit increases in the above table. The effective inflation rate to age 80 is not likely to be the same for 42-year-olds versus 58-year-olds purchasing today.
b) WS sales have less automatic compounding and more FPOs, so WS results are more sensitive to FPO election rates.
c) Results vary significantly based on an insured’s issue age, initial maximum daily benefit, and benefit increase feature, as well as the inflation rate and the age at which the need for care occurs.
d) The median age of starting to need care is about age 83 and the median age of needing care is about age 85. By then, more purchasing power would be lost.
e) Table 14 does not reflect the cost of professional home care or a facility. According to the afore-mentioned 2018 Genworth study, the average nursing home private room cost is $275/day, which is currently comparable to 12.5 hours of non-professional home care. However, the inflation rate for facility costs is likely to differ from the inflation rate for home care.
f) Table 14 could be distorted by simplifications in our calculations. For example, we assumed that the FPO election rate does not vary by age, size of policy or market and that everyone buys a home care benefit equal to the average facility benefit.

Partnership Programs and Qualification Rates
When someone applies to Medicaid for long term care services, most states with Partnership programs disregard assets up to the amount of benefits received from a Partnership-qualified policy (some Indiana and New York policies disregard all assets). Partnership sales were reported in 44 jurisdictions in 2018, all but Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah, and Vermont, where Partnership programs do not exist. Massachusetts has a somewhat similar program (MassHealth).
To qualify for a state Partnership program, a policy must have a sufficiently robust benefit increase feature, the requirement varying by issue age. Historically, a level premium with permanent annual three percent or higher compound increases or an otherwise similar consumer price index (CPI) increase was required for ages 60 or less. For ages 61 to 75, five percent simple increases also qualified, and for ages 76 or older, policies qualified without regard to the benefit increase feature. As noted above, many states now confer Partnership status with compounding as low as one percent. Three insurers offer one percent compounding. One of those insurers and three others offer two percent compounding.
The WS venue provides an efficient opportunity to serve less-affluent employees and relatives who would most benefit from Partnership qualification. Unfortunately, only 10.3 percent of WS sales in 2018 qualified for Partnership programs. Two insurers reported that 33 to 38 percent of their WS sales qualified, but the other two insurers reported that five to 6.5 percent qualified. Unfortunately, voluntary and core plans are less likely to qualify than carve-outs. As additional states permit one percent compounding and as insurers design products to offer one percent compounding, the percentage of Partnership policies sold in the WS market is likely to grow.

Jurisdictional Distribution
On the Broker World web-site (www.BrokerWorldMag.com), you can find a chart of the market share of each US jurisdiction relative to the total, WS and NWS markets, split by Partnership combined with non-Partnership policies and separately solely Partnership policies. This chart indicates where relative opportunity may exist to grow LTCI sales.

Elimination Period
Nearly 90 percent of the NWS market buys 90-day elimination periods (EPs). For that reason, most WS programs offer only a 90-day EP and 96 percent of 2018 WS sales had a 90-day EP, as shown in Table 15.

Table 15 also shows how many policies had a 0-day home care feature and a longer facility EP and how many policies had a calendar-day EP (as opposed to a service-day EP). We have reflected LifeSecure and Transamerica in the 0-day HC and calendar-day EP figures for both years. Policies which have 0-day EP, but define their EP as a service-day EP operate almost identically to a calendar-day EP.

Gender Distribution and Sales to Couples and Relatives
In 2018, women constituted 51.2 percent of the US age 20-79 population, but 54.8 percent of LTCI buyers in the NWS market. That’s not surprising; it has long been clear that women are more interested in LTCI. However, women constituted only 46.8 percent of the workers, but 57.7 percent of LTCI buyers in the worksite. This much larger discrepancy (10.9 vs. 3.6 percent in the NWS market) demonstrates that gender anti-selection occurs in the worksite. Table 16 shows that, in 2014 and prior years, more men purchased LTCI in the WS than women, because a significant part of the market was executive carve-out and more executives were male. But the LTCI industry adopted gender-distinct pricing in 2013 which spread through the industry the next few years. Since 2015, more women than men purchase WS LTCI. As noted earlier, carriers have taken a variety of steps to reduce such anti-selection or to reduce its impact. Considering that it is harder to find WS LTCI programs for employers with high percentages of females makes the statistics herein more striking. *Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm

For insurers selling mostly executive carve-out programs, the percentage of females is lower than for insurers selling core and voluntary programs.

Table 17 digs deeper. In 2018, the difference in single females buying, between the WS and NWS markets, was the same as the difference for all females.

Not surprisingly, a higher percentage of the WS market consists of sales to single people and only one of a couple (core programs being one of the reasons). Over sixty percent (60.7 percent) of couples in the WS market insure only one person, which is particularly striking because the WS market should have fewer declines due to a younger age distribution, health concessions, and better health among working people than non-workers.

Shared Care is less common in the WS market because it is less commonly offered than in the NWS market.

As noted earlier, between 2006 and 2009, Broker World magazine published group LTCI surveys. At that time, parents and grandparents accounted for less than one percent (approximately 0.75 percent) of sales. This year, one insurer (one that focuses on the executive carve-out market) was able to share family sales data; 1.9 percent of its policies were issued on other relatives, which is a little broader net than parents and grandparents. Sixty-eight (68) spouses were written for every 100 employees, which seems to be characteristic of the executive carve-out market.

Type of Home Care Coverage
Table 18 summarizes sales by type of home care coverage. Historically, the WS market sold few policies with a home care maximum equal to the facility maximum. But with increasing emphasis on home care and simplicity, that difference faded. However, in 2018, one insurer sold 22 percent of its WS policies with a home care maximum equal to 75 percent of the facility maximum. Table 18 also shows that monthly determination dominates the NWS market, but daily determination still dominates the WS market.

Many worksite products embed a “partial cash alternative” feature (which allow claimants, in lieu of any other benefit that month, to use approximately one-third of their benefit for whatever purpose they wish, with the balance extending the benefit period) or a small informal care benefit.

Other Features
Return of Premium (ROP, see Table 19) dropped from 54.7 percent of WS policies in 2015 to 12.7 percent in 2018 (different participants). In the WS, 94.2 percent of the ROP benefits were embedded automatically versus 84.2 percent in the NWS market. In the WS market, 70.5 percent of the embedded ROP sales had death benefits that expire (such as expiring at age 67) or don’t reach 100 percent. ROP with expiring death benefits can provide an inexpensive way to encourage more young people to buy coverage, but may not provide a meaningful benefit.

Table 20 shows that Shared Care and Restoration of Benefits are less frequently sold in the WS market and that all WS sales are tax-qualified.

CLOSING
We thank insurance company staff for submitting the data and responding to questions promptly. We also thank Nicole Gaspar and Alex Geanous of Milliman for managing the data expertly.

We reviewed data for reasonableness. Nonetheless, we cannot assure that all data is accurate.

If you have suggestions for improving this survey, please contact one of the authors.

2019 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey

The 2019 Milliman Long Term Care Insurance Survey is the 21st consecutive annual review of stand-alone long-term care insurance (LTCI) published by Broker World magazine. It analyzes the marketplace, reports sales distributions, and describes available products including group insurance.

More analysis of worksite sales will appear in the August issue of Broker World magazine.

Unless otherwise indicated, references are solely to U.S. stand-alone LTCI sales, excluding exercised future purchase options (FPOs) or other changes to existing coverage. “Stand-alone” refers to LTCI policies that do not include death benefits (other than returning premiums upon death or waiving a surviving spouse’s premiums) or annuity or disability income benefits. Where referenced, “combo” policies provide LTCI combined with life insurance or annuity coverage.

Highlights from This Year’s Survey

Participants
Eleven carriers participated broadly in this survey. Four others provided sales information so we could report more accurate aggregate industry individual and multi-life sales. From these submissions, we estimated total industry production.

We estimate our statistical distributions reflect up to 90 percent of total industry sales and about 65 percent of worksite sales.

State Farm discontinued stand-alone LTCI sales in May 2018, hence is no longer included in the Product Exhibit.

Although not displaying products, Northwestern LTC and State Farm provided background statistical information. Auto-Owners, LifeSecure, Transamerica and United Security Life contributed total and worksite sales (new premium and lives insured) but did not provide broad statistical information.

Sales Summary

  • The 15 carriers reported sales of 56,288 policies and certificates (“policies” henceforth) with new annualized premium of $171,537,644 (including exercised FPOs) in 2018, compared to 2017 restated sales of 64,800 policies ($181,506,770 of new annualized premium), a 13.1 percent drop in the number of policies and a 5.5 percent drop in the amount of new annualized premium. As noted in the Market Perspective section, sales of policies combining LTCI with other risks continue to increase.
  • Five of the top 10 insurers sold more new premium than in 2017, but only three sold more new policies. This difference emerges because elected FPOs add on-going premium but not new policies.
  • With FPO elections included in new premium, Northwestern garnered the number one spot in new sales. Mutual of Omaha was a strong second and had a large lead in annualized premium from new policies sold. Together, they combined for 57 percent of new premium including FPOs and 52 percent of new premium excluding FPOs.
  • For the fourth straight year (and fourth time ever), our participants’ number of inforce policies dropped, this time by 1.1 percent, after 5.1 percent (2017), 0.3 percent (2016) and 0.2 percent (2015) drops previously.
  • Nonetheless, year-end inforce premium per policy continues to increase (3.0 percent in 2018) to $2,169. Inforce premium increases from sales, price increases, and benefit increases (including FPOs), and reduces from lapses, reductions in coverage, deaths, and shifts to paid-up status for various reasons.
  • Participants’ individual claims rose 5.9 percent. Overall, the stand-alone LTCI industry incurred $11.0 billion in claims in 2017 based on companies’ statutory annual filings, raising total incurred claims from 1991 through 2017 to $129.9 billion. (Note: 2017 was the most recent year available when this article was written.) Most of these claims were incurred by insurers that no longer sell LTCI. The reported 2017 incurred claims is similar to the $11.1 billion of incurred claims reported in 2016. Combo LTC claims are in their infancy and amounted to $5.9 million. The claim figures are even more startling considering that only a small percentage of the 7 million covered individuals were on claim at the end of 2017.
  • The average processing time in the industry was eight percent faster in 2018 than in 2017. Nonetheless, active policies resulted from only 58.8 percent of applications, even lower than 2017’s record low of 59.0 percent. Financial advisors often are reluctant to risk a bad experience by recommending that clients apply for LTCI. As noted in the Market Perspective section, the industry may be able to improve placement rates in a variety of ways.

About the Survey
This article is arranged in the following sections:

  • Highlights provides a high-level view of results.
  • Market Perspective provides insights into the LTCI market.
  • Claims presents industry-level claims data.
  • Sales Statistical Analysis presents industry-level sales distributions reflecting data from 11 insurers
  • Partnership Programs discusses the impact of the state partnerships for LTCI.
  • Product Exhibit (click here for PDF) shows, for nine insurers: financial ratings, LTCI sales and inforce, and product details.

Click here to view the following additional information available only online.

  • Product Details, a row-by-row definition of the product exhibit entries, with a little commentary.
  • Premium Exhibit shows lifetime annual premiums for each insurer’s most common underwriting class, for issue ages 40, 50, 60, and 70 for single females, single males, and heterosexual couples (assuming both buy at the same age), based on $100 per day (or closest equivalent weekly or monthly) benefit, 90-day facility and most common home care elimination period, three-year and five-year benefit periods or $100,000 and $200,000 maximum lifetime buckets, with and without Shared Care and with flat benefits or automatic three percent or five percent annual compound benefit increases for life. Worksite premiums do not reflect any worksite-specific discount, though some carriers offer this.
  • Premium Adjustments (from our published prices) by underwriting class for each participant.
  • Distribution by underwriting class for each participant.
  • State-by-state results: percentage of sales by state, average premium by state and percentage of policies qualifying for Partnership by state.

Market Perspective (more detail in subsequent parts of the article)

  • The stability of current prices bears no resemblance to the past instability because today’s prices reflect much more conservative assumptions based on far more credible data and low investment yields. Unfortunately, many financial advisors presume that new policies will face steep price increases. It is likely to take a long time before the market becomes comfortable that prices are stable.
  • Combo products have increased market share because: i) their other benefits mean that regardless of whether the policyholder has a long term care claim, they will receive benefits, ii) they often have guaranteed premiums and benefits, and iii) they now offer alternatives besides single premium.

According to LIMRA, combo life policies (LTCI combined with life insurance) represented 16 percent of new 2017 annualized life insurance premium (25 percent and $4.1 billion, if you include 100 percent of single premium sales). Fourteen percent of the 260,000 combo policies included LTCI benefits after the death benefit had been fully advanced (“extension of benefits; EOB”). Of the 86 percent in which LTCI benefits could not exceed the death benefit, nearly six in 10 (57 percent) used “chronically ill” provision that is not allowed to be called “long term care insurance”, rather than a §7702 LTCI provision.

Looking at the total LTCI market, stand-alone policies accounted for 20.0 percent of the 2017 policies sold, policies with extensions of benefits (EOB) accounted for 11.2 percent and policies with accelerated death benefits but no EOB accounted for 68.8 percent.

  • As anticipated in last year’s report, a new entrant offers unisex LTCI pricing for the worksite market, another carrier re-entered the worksite market and a third carrier is test-marketing a worksite product for possible release. In addition, more combo products are being proposed in the worksite market. For businesses with employees residing in multiple jurisdictions, consistent product availability can be a challenge. Worksite LTCI is more attractive to employers when packaged with solutions for employees who are caregivers for their elders.
  • As noted earlier, fewer than 59 percent of applications have resulted in issued policies in the past two years. The low placement rate makes financial advisors hesitant to recommend that clients consider LTCI. The industry may be able to improve placement rates in a variety of ways.
    • E-applications make the process faster, secure better health information (some applications may then not be submitted) and avoid long delays on apps that are “not in good order” when submitted. In our 2018 survey article, we reported that eApps were 71 percent more likely to be in good order and were less likely to be declined. It would be helpful if brokerage general agents could populate an eApp with quote information, then forward that partial eApp to the broker for completion.
    • Better pre-qualification of prospects’ health will guide applications to an insurer most likely to accept the applicant. As noted above, eApps help. If advisors are reluctant to discuss health issues with their clients, some general agencies interview the client on behalf of the advisor or provide a link to a website where the client can answer health questions. Data quantifying the positive impact of thorough pre-qualification would be helpful.
    • Higher placement rates result when cash is required with the application (CWA). This year, we asked insurers for data regarding placement (excluding worksite business) based on whether cash was required with the application. Carriers who accept applications with or without cash reported a combined placement rate of 58.1 percent with cash and 54.0 percent without cash. Insurers which reported only CWA data placed 60.4 percent of their cases. Insurers which reported only data without CWA placed 55.0 percent.
    • Faster processing may help. However, as noted earlier, the average processing time was 10 percent faster in 2018 than in 2017, yet the placement rate still dropped 0.2 percent. Maybe it would have dropped more without the faster processing.
    • Better messaging regarding the value of LTCI and about the value of buying now (rather than in the future) would improve the placement rate (as well as increase the number of applications).
    • Insurers may be able to educate their distribution system more effectively, such as with drill-down questions in on-line underwriting guides.
  • Three participants have never increased premiums on policies issued under “rate stabilization” laws. Three insurers reported that their highest cumulative increase on such policies has been about 40 percent and two had increased prices 100 percent or more. Two carriers did not indicate their maximum increase, one of which we believe was in the lower end and one in the higher end.

All the insurers allow clients to reduce the maximum daily/monthly benefit (typically not below the original minimum) with a proportionate reduction in future premium. All allow clients to move to a shorter originally-available benefit period with premiums the same as they would currently be had they purchased that benefit period originally. Eighty percent of the insurers allow clients to select a longer elimination period, with premiums the same as they would currently be had they purchased that longer elimination period initially. Some insurers may not offer this option because they do not have longer elimination periods available.

If a client drops a compound benefit increase rider, most insurers freeze the current benefit and charge the premium that the client would be paying today had the client purchased the current amount originally with no compound benefit increases. One insurer takes a more consumerist approach, freezing the benefit and reducing the current premium by the cost of the benefit increase rider. Some policyholders may face reversion to the original maximum daily or monthly benefit.

One insurer explained that the above approaches for dropping a compound benefit increase rider result in higher future premiums as a result of sacrificing future benefit increases if the maximum daily/monthly benefit has increased beyond the additional percentage cost for the compound benefit increase rider. Therefore, that insurer suggests that clients reduce the daily/monthly maximum benefit and retain compounding.

  • Our projected amount of issued protection on new policies increased significantly in 2018 because an insurer with negative-election FPOs (negative-election FPOs activate automatically unless the client rejects them, as opposed to positive-election FPOs which activate only if the client makes a request) submitted FPO election rate data this year but not last year. For the average 57-year-old purchaser in 2018, we project a maximum benefit in 2041 of $313/day, equivalent to an average 3.0 percent compounded benefit increase. Had he/she purchased last year’s average policy at age 56, he/she would have had $279/day by age 80, equivalent to 2.3 percent compounding. Without the change in insurers providing FPO data, the age 80 maximum daily benefit would have dropped from $279 to $276. Purchasers may be disappointed if the purchasing power of their LTCI policies deteriorates over time.
  • Claimants rarely challenge insurer claim adjudications. Since 2009 (varies by jurisdiction), if an insurer concludes that a claimant is not chronically ill, the insurer must inform the claimant of his/her right to appeal the decision to independent third-party review (IR). The IR determination is binding on insurers. As shown in our Product Exhibit, most participants have extended IR beyond statutory requirements, most commonly to policies issued prior to the effective date of IR. At least four participating insurers report never having a request for IR. Four other insurers have reported a total of 72 IR requests resulting in the insurers’ denials being upheld more than 90 percent of the time. This data is consistent with the experience of LTCI Independent Eligibility Review Specialists, LLC. Steve LaPierre, president of that firm, indicated that they have performed approximately 125 IRs and have upheld the insurer more than 90 percent of the time. The existence of IR, the insurers’ voluntary expansion of IR and the insurer success rate when appeals occur help justify confidence in claim decisions.
  • Only four participants offer coverage in all U.S. jurisdictions and no worksite insurer does so. Insurers are reluctant to sell in jurisdictions which are slow to approve new products, restrict rate increases, or have unfavorable legislation or regulations.
  • Seven of our 11 participants use reinsurers and seven use third party administrators (TPAs). The reinsurers are Reinsurance Group of America, LifeCare, Manufacturers, Swiss Re and Union Fidelity. The TPAs are Long-Term Care Group, Life Plans, LifeCare Assurance, and CHCS. Other reinsurers and TPAs support insurers not in our survey. In some cases, affiliated companies provide reinsurance or guarantees.
  • A significantly-changed LTCI Shopper’s Guide was recently adopted by the NAIC. We’re interested in readers’ reviews of the new Guide and comments as to how much it is used to educate consumers. (Please email comments to [email protected].)

Claims

  • Ten participants reported 2018 claims. The consistency of the data is improving, but some companies were not able to respond to some questions or could not respond in a way that justified including their data for some questions.
  • For the ten insurers which reported individual claims for both 2018 and 2017, claim dollars rose 5.9 percent, despite a 1.1 percent decrease in inforce policies.
  • The LTCI industry has had a much bigger impact than indicated above, because a lot of claims are paid by insurers that no longer sell LTCI.

LTCI claims paid by insurers no longer selling LTCI likely differ significantly from data reported below as their claimants are more likely to have facility-only coverage, be older, etc.

Table 1 shows the total dollar and number of individual LTCI claims paid by those carriers which provided information to use.

Table 2 shows the distribution of those claims by venue. In the distribution based on number of claims, a person who received care in more than one venue is counted once for each venue, but not double-counted in the total line. Individual claims in general continue to shift away from nursing homes. We expect on-going shift away from nursing homes due to consumer preferences and more claims coming from comprehensive policies.

Six of eight carriers that submitted their number of open claims at year-end reported a pending number of claims between 57 percent and 84 percent of the number of claims paid during the year.

Table 3 shows average size individual claims since inception, all of which rose compared to 2017. Because claimants can submit claims from more than one type of venue, the average total claim generally exceeds the average claim paid for any particular venue. Nonetheless, individual ALF claims are consistently high, probably because:

a) ALF claims appear to last long compared with other venues.

b) Nursing home costs are most likely to exceed the policy daily/monthly maximum. Hence the maximum daily benefit negates part of the additional daily cost of nursing homes.

c) People who maximize the use of their maximum monthly benefits can spend as much on an ALF as on a nursing home.

d) Although some surveys report that ALFs cost about half as much as nursing homes on average, ALFs often charge more for a memory unit or more substantial care for levels of assistance that align more closely with nursing home care. And upscale ALFs seem to cost a higher percentage of upscale nursing home costs than the average ALF/nursing home ratio.

Some people may have expected ALF claims to be less expensive than nursing home claims because ALFs cost less per month. But that has not been the case. Some observers applaud insurers which have extended ALF coverage to policies which originally did not include ALF coverage, even though such action has contributed to rate increases on in force policies.

The following factors cause our average claim sizes to be understated.

  • Roughly 1/8 of the inception-to-date individual claims are still open. Our data does not include reserve estimates for future payments on open claims.
  • People who recover, then claim again, are counted as multiple insureds rather than adding their various claims together.

The range of average claim results by insurer (see Table 3) is startling. What can contribute to such differences?

  • Different markets (by affluence; worksite vs. individual; by geography; etc.).
  • Different lengths of time in the business. A newer issuer may have a higher percentage of open claims bringing down the average.
  • Percentage of policies sold to women or with compound benefit increases, monthly home care determination, or 50 percent home care benefits or reduced benefits for ALFs.
  • Distribution by elimination period. Zero-day EP policies might result in a lot of small claims. Ironically 180-day or longer EPs could also result in relatively small claims.
  • Perhaps erroneous reporting. In some of our calculations we have eliminated some submitted data because it seemed very unlikely to be accurate.

Average claim data understates the value of buying LTCI because the many small claims drive down the average claim. LTCI can provide significant financial return for people who need care one year or longer. The primary purpose of insurance is to protect against adverse results, so the amount of protection, as well as average claim, is important.

Six insurers were able to provide data regarding their current monthly exposure. The average current monthly maximum nursing home benefit per inforce claimant ranged from $4,575 to $8,182.

The six insurers’ total monthly exposure (including non-claimants) exceeds $5.5 billion, more than thirty times their corresponding monthly premium income. Recognizing that claims can continue up to the full benefit period, these insurers’ potential claim exposure is about 120 times their monthly premium income.

Nursing home (NH) claims are more likely to use the policy’s maximum daily/monthly benefit than ALF claims, because ALF costs are generally lower and because policies sometimes have lower maximums for ALFs. ALF claims correspondingly are more likely to use the policy maximum than are adult day care and home care claims.

Statistical Analysis
Eleven insurers contributed significant background data, but some were unable to contribute data in some areas. Four other insurers (Auto-Owners, LifeSecure, Transamerica and United Security) contributed their number of policies sold and new annualized premium, distinguishing worksite from other sales.
Sales characteristics vary significantly among insurers. Year-to-year variations in policy feature distributions may reflect changes in participants, participant practices and designs, participant or worksite market shares and industry trends.

Market Share
Table 4 lists the top 10 participants in 2018 new premium, among those still offering LTCI. Because we include FPO elections, Northwestern surpassed Mutual of Omaha. Without FPOs, Mutual of Omaha would have been number one. Together, they produced 57 percent of annualized new premium in 2018 and 52 percent of annualized premium on new policies. They are followed by five insurers with four percent to 10 percent market share each.

Worksite Market Share
Worksite business produced 15.0 percent of new insureds (see Table 5), but only 9.1 percent of new premium (including FPOs) because of its younger issue age distribution and less robust coverage. Worksite sales consist of three different markets:

  • Voluntary group coverage generally is less robust than individual coverage.
  • Core/Buy-Up programs have particularly young age distributions and modest coverage because a lot of people do not buy-up and are least likely to insure spouses.
  • Executive carve-out programs generally provide the most robust coverage. One- or two-couple executive carve-out sales may not qualify for a multi-life discount with some insurers, hence may not be labeled as worksite sales in submissions to our survey.

The amount of worksite sales reported and its distribution among the three sub-markets significantly impact product feature sales distributions. Although Table 5 reflects the full market, this year’s policy feature distributions underweight the voluntary and core/buy-up markets because carriers in those markets shared less policy feature distribution data. More information about worksite sales will appear in the August issue of Broker World magazine.

Affinity Market Share
The affinity sales percentage is based on the participants who provide significant statistical data. Their reported affinity sales produced 7.8 percent of their new insureds (see Table 6), but only 6.2 percent of premium. Only about 20 percent of the lower affinity average premium is attributable to the affinity discount. The balance may be due to younger issue age or less robust coverage.

Characteristics of Policies Sold
Average Premium
As noted last year, our inclusion of FPOs as new business premium overstated the average premium per new insured and buying unit (Table 7) increasingly over time. More precise queries this year allow us to quantify the impact. The average premium per new life ($2,544) is 18 percent less than we would have quoted including FPOs in the numerator. Three insurers reported average premiums for new insureds below $1,700, while five insurers were over $2,800. The average premium per new buying unit (counts a couple only once) was $3,598.

The lowest average new premium (including FPOs) was in Puerto Rico ($1,960), followed by Kansas ($2,448), while the highest was in New York ($4,243), followed by Connecticut ($3,886).

Due to rate increases, FPO elections and termination of older policies, the average inforce premium jumped to $2,168, 3.0 percent more than our restated 2017 figure.

Issue Age
Table 8 summarizes the distribution of sales by issue age band based on insured count. The average issue age was 56.6. The higher average issue ages of the past two years are partly caused by not having issue age distribution for some worksite business. Furthermore, two participants have a minimum issue age of 40, one won’t issue below 30, and two won’t issue below 25.

Benefit Period
Table 9 summarizes the distribution of sales by benefit period. The average notional benefit period slightly increased from 3.73 to 3.74. Because of Shared Care benefits, total coverage was higher than the 3.74 average suggests. For the first time, a single benefit period (3-year) accounted for half the sales.

Monthly Benefit
Table 10 shows that monthly determination applied to 77.8 percent of 2018 policies. With monthly determination, low-expense days leave more benefits to cover high-expense days. When it is offered as an option, we conclude that more than 50 percent of buyers opt for monthly determination. Measuring election rates for optional monthly determination can be challenging due to influences such as insurers switching products during the course of a year and state variations.

Table 11 summarizes the distribution of sales by maximum monthly benefit at issue. Sales were more clustered between $4,500 and $5,999/month than in any year since 2011. The average initial maximum monthly benefit was $4,763, almost exactly the average of 2015-2017.

Benefit Increase Features
Table 12 summarizes the distribution of sales by benefit increase feature. “Other compound” has grown a lot in the past two years; most involve three percent compounding.

The increase in “FPO: Indexed” and the decrease in policies having “no benefit increases” were caused by a reclassification of an insurer’s sales. The insurer guarantees to offer FPOs of indeterminate amount, but the insurer bases its decision on interest rates.

Five percent compounded for life, which represented 56 percent of sales in 2003 and more than 47.5 percent of sales each year from 2006 to 2008, now accounts for only two percent of sales. Simple five percent increases for life were 19 percent of 2003 sales but are now only 0.4 percent of sales.

“Indexed Level Premium” policies are priced to have a level premium, but the benefit increase is tied to an index such as the consumer price index (CPI).

We project the age 80 maximum daily benefit by increasing the average daily benefit purchased from the average issue age to age 80, according to the distribution of benefit increase features, using current future purchase option (FPO) election rates, a five percent/year offer for fixed FPOs and assuming a long-term three percent CPI. The maximum benefit at age 80 (in 2041) for our 2018 average 57-year-old purchaser projects to $313/day (equivalent to 3.0 percent compounding). Had our average buyer bought an average 2017 policy a year ago at age 56, her/his age 80 benefit would be $279/day (equivalent to 2.3 percent compounding). This healthy increase in age 80 maximum benefit (from $279/day to $313/day) is attributable to the inclusion of an additional carrier in the data (see Table 14 discussion). Without that insurer, the projected age 80 maximum daily benefit would have dropped from $279 to $276. Most policyholders seem likely to experience eroding purchasing power over time if cost of care trends exceed three percent.

Eight insurers reported new premium from FPO elections; the percentage of their new premium that came from FPOs ranged from two percent to 43 percent.

Seven insurers provided the number of available FPOs in 2018 and the number exercised. Six of those insurers provided similar data last year; overall, they had a small increase in election rate from 34.7 percent to 36.8 percent. By insurer, election rates varied from 13 percent to 91 percent. The insurers with the three lowest FPO election rates averaged a 25.8 percent election rate; they probably use a “positive election” approach. The other four insurers averaged 90.0 percent election; they probably use a “negative election” approach; i.e., the increase applies unless specifically rejected. The carrier which did not contribute such data last year caused the huge increase in election rate (Table 14); it probably uses a negative election rate.

Elimination Period
Table 15 summarizes the distribution of sales by facility elimination period. Ninety percent of buyers opt for 90-day elimination periods, however, two carriers report fewer than 60 percent of their policies have 90-day EPs (one has many shorter EPs and the other has many longer EPs). The percentage of purchasers buying 180-day or longer EPs hit a record (6.7 percent vs. 6.1 percent in 2012).

Table 16 shows that the percentage of policies with zero-day home care elimination period (but a longer facility elimination period), with adjustments for two carriers which reported only sales, but we know has either type of provision. With most insurers, fewer than 25 percent of buyers purchased a zero-day home care elimination period, but one insurer had nearly a 50 percent election rate.

The percentage of policies with a calendar-day elimination period (EP) definition (33.7 percent) also dropped back toward 2017 levels. For insurers which offer calendar-day EP, 79.4 percent of policies had the feature; in some cases, it was automatic. It is important to understand that most calendar-day EP provisions do not start counting until a paid-service day has occurred.

Sales to Couples and Gender Distribution
Table 17 summarizes the distribution of sales by gender and single/couple status.

The percentage of purchasers who consisted of couples who both buy (55.5 percent) and the percentage of all buyers who were female (67.7 percent) were the lowest percentages since at least 2010.

The 77.8 percent of accepted applicants who purchased coverage when their partners were declined was the highest over that time period. Three factors contributed approximately equally to the increase: General improvement; change of practice to allow a lower marital discount instead of no discount when one spouse is declined; and a change in participants reporting this data.

Fifty-five percent (55.1 percent) of all buyers were female, the lowest percentage since 2012. Insurers’ sales ranged from 47.2 percent female to 61.4 percent female, varying based on market (older age; fraternal, worksite vs. individual) and whether unisex rates were offered. Likewise, insurers ranged from 54.4 percent of single buyers being female to 79.8 percent.

Among couples, 51.0 percent are females, with insurers ranging from 47.9 percent (no other insurer showed less than 49.9 percent) to 52.1 percent. When only one of a couple buys, 56.4 percent are females, probably because the male partner is likely to be older and less likely to be insurable.

Shared Care and Other Couples’ Features
Table 18 summarizes sales of Shared Care and other couples’ features.

  • Shared care—allows one spouse/partner to use the other’s available benefits if their own coverage has been depleted or offers a third independent pool that the couple can share.
  • Survivorship—waives a survivor’s premium after the first death if specified conditions are met.
  • Joint waiver of premium (WP)—both insureds’ premiums are waived if either qualifies for benefits.

Changes in distribution by carrier can greatly impact year-to-year comparisons in Table 18, because some insurers embed survivorship or joint waiver automatically (sometimes only in some circumstances) while others offer it for an extra premium or do not offer the feature. These percentages are lower than in the past, because one carrier reported the number of sales to couples last year, but not this year.

In the top half of Table 18, the percentages are based on the number of policies sold to couples who both buy. The bottom half of Table 18 shows the (higher) percentage that results from dividing the number of buyers by sales of insurers that offer the feature. Two insurers sold Joint WP to 56 to 60 percent of their couples and Survivorship to 10 to 12 percent of their couples.

Table 19 provides additional breakdown on the characteristics of Shared Care sales. As shown on the right-hand side of Table 19, three-year and four-year benefit period policies are most likely (nearly 30 percent) to add Shared Care. Partly because three-year benefit periods comprise 50 percent of sales, most policies with Shared Care are three-year benefit period policies (61.1 percent, as shown on the left side of Table 20).

Above, we stated that Shared Care is selected by 33.4 percent of couples who both buy limited benefit period policies. However, Table 19 shows Shared Care comprised no more than 29.8 percent of any benefit period (it was elected by 25.4 percent of purchasers overall). Table 19 has lower percentages because Table 18 denominators are limited to people who buy with their spouse/partner whereas Table 19 denominators include all buyers. Shared care is more concentrated in two- to four-year benefits periods (89.4 percent of shared sales) than are all sales (72.6 percent). Couples seem more likely to buy short benefit periods, perhaps because couples plan to help provide care to each other, because Shared Care makes shorter benefit periods more acceptable and because single buyers are more likely to be female, hence opt for a longer benefit period. On the other hand, we also see a relatively high percentage of Shared Care on longer benefit periods; these people are probably trying to cover catastrophic risk and might prefer an endless benefit period. Some insurers were more likely to sell Shared Care on their short benefit-period policies, while others were more likely to sell Shared Care on their long benefit-period policies.

Existence and Type of Home Care Coverage
One participant reported home-care-only policies, which accounted for 0.7 percent of industry sales. Four participants reported sales of facility-only policies, which accounted for 0.9 percent of total sales. Ninety-five percent (95.1 percent) of the comprehensive policies included home care benefits at least equal to the facility benefit. These percentages are all lower than in 2017.

Partial cash alternative (and similar) features (which allow claimants, in lieu of any other benefit that month, to use between 30 percent and 40 percent of their benefits for whatever purpose they wish) were included in 41.3 percent of sales (lower than last year’s 44.1 percent).

Other Characteristics
As shown in Table 20, return of premium (ROP) features were included in 12.7 percent of all policies. ROP returns some or all premiums (usually reduced by paid LTCI benefits) when a policyholder dies. Approximately 79 percent of policies with ROP arise from ROP features embedded automatically in the product, compared to 93 percent in 2016. Embedded features are designed to raise premiums minimally, typically decreasing the ROP benefit to $0 by age 75.

Twelve percent (12.4 percent) of policies with limited benefit periods included a restoration of benefits (ROB) provision, which typically restores used benefits when the insured does not need services for at least six months. Approximately 87 percent of policies with ROB arose from ROB features automatically embedded, compared with 79 percent in 2016.

Shortened benefit period (SBP) nonforfeiture option was included in 1.8 percent of policies. Although every insurer is obligated to offer SBP, some carriers did not report any SBP sales. It seems appropriate to remove their sales from the denominator when determining the percentage of purchasers who selected SBP. On that basis, the percentage was 2.9 percent. Only one insurer reported a percentage above six percent (13.3 percent). SBP makes limited future LTCI benefits available to people who stop paying premiums after three or more years.

Only one insurer issued non-tax-qualified (NTQ) policies, which accounted for 0.1 percent of industry sales.

“Captive” (dedicated to one insurer) agents produced 55.8 percent of the policies. At one time, “captive” agents who sold LTCI tended to specialize in LTCI. Now many are agents of mutual companies. The 1.5 percent “other” sales did not involve a broker or agent.

Sales distribution by jurisdiction is posted on the Broker World website.

Limited Pay and Paid-Up Policies
In 2018, only two insurers sold policies that become paid-up, accounting for fewer than 0.5 percent of sales.

Because today’s prices are more stable, premium increases are less likely. One of the key reasons for buying 10-year-pay (avoidance of rate increases after the tenth year) is greatly reduced, while the cost of 10-year-pay has increased, making it less attractive than in the past. Nonetheless, limited-pay and single-pay policies are attractive to minimize post-retirement outflow and to accommodate §1035 exchanges.

Partnership Program Explanations
When someone applies to Medicaid for long term care services, states with Partnership programs disregard assets up to the amount of benefits received from a Partnership-qualified policy. Partnership sales were reported in 44 jurisdictions in 2018, all but Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Utah, and Vermont, where Partnership programs do not exist. Massachusetts has a somewhat similar program (MassHealth).

The Partnership rules in California, Connecticut, Indiana and New York (“original” Partnership states) are significantly different than in other Partnership jurisdictions (“DRA” jurisdictions). The “original” states legislated variations of the Robert Woods Johnson Partnership proposal, whereas the “DRA” jurisdictions use more consistent rules based on the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. For example, the “original” states require a separate Partnership policy form, generally still have more stringent benefit increase requirements and assess a fee for insurers to participate (none of which applies in DRA states). As a result, only two to four insurers sell Partnership policies in CA (2), CT (3), IN (4) and NY (2).

National Reciprocity Compact (NRC) requires member states to recognize Medicaid Asset Disregard earned in any other member state. States creating Partnerships under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 were automatically enrolled in the NRC but had the right to secede. The four original Partnership states (California, Connecticut, Indiana and New York) had the right to opt in. California is now the only jurisdiction with a Partnership program that is not a member of the NRC. However, New Hampshire (NH) created a unique regulation in 2018, limiting asset disregard related to policies sold in other jurisdictions to coverage issued on or after April 1, 2007, and only if the policy form was approved by the NH Insurance Department. We’ve asked NH about this regulation in 2018 and 2019, but have not received an explanation yet, so we’ll venture some thoughts below.

NH natives did not have an opportunity to purchase a Partnership policy until April 1, 2007. NH’s April 1, 2007, deviation from NRC standards seems intended to avoid extending asset disregard to an insured who moved in from another state if a NH resident who purchased on the same date can’t benefit from asset disregard.

The requirement that the policy form need have been approved by the NH Insurance Department is puzzling. Why should a NH citizen be harmed because they bought a policy as a resident of another jurisdiction? The impact may be limited because NH has been a member of the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission since June 1, 2007. The IIPRC (“Compact”) approves LTCI policy forms for about 40 states. Policyholders with IIPRC-approved Partnership coverage issued since April 1, 2007, might still qualify for asset disregard if they move to NH.

It seems unlikely that individuals considering relocating to NH and their financial advisors will understand the potential Partnership ramifications. In the unlikely event that they are aware of NH’s unique law, it seems unlikely that they would know whether their policy form was approved by NH.

Partnership Program Sales
Insurers sometimes delay certifying policy forms as “Partnership” because of other priorities (e.g., needing time to comply with state-specific requirements to notify existing policyholders or offer an exchange). Such delay is not harmful, as certification is retroactive to policies already issued on that policy form if the policies have the required characteristics. For this reason and the “original” Partnership issues mentioned above, none of our participants sold Partnership policies in more than 40 jurisdictions in 2018. Five sold Partnership in 35-40 jurisdictions, three sold Partnership in 26-32 jurisdictions, one sold Partnership in eight jurisdictions, one in one jurisdiction (it sells in only one jurisdiction) and the other has never certified Partnership conformance and apparently does not intend to do so.

In the DRA states, 52.5 percent of policies qualified for Partnership status, whereas in the original states only 1.0 percent qualified. In Minnesota, more than 82 percent of the policies sold qualified as Partnership and Wisconsin and Wyoming both had 75 percent of their policies qualify.

Generally speaking, experts have expected Partnership policies to have higher average premiums because of the benefit increase requirements for Partnership policies. Only 26 of the 44 Partnership states demonstrated that pattern, with the other 18 having higher average premiums on non-Partnership policies.

In past survey articles, we noted that Partnership programs could be more successful if states broadened the eligibility requirements. Now, approximately 60 percent of Partnership states allow one percent compounding to qualify for Partnership, which can help low-budget buyers qualify for Partnership and also enables worksite core programs to be Partnership-qualified. A higher percentage of policies should qualify for Partnership in the future if insurers and advisors leverage these opportunities. Currently only three insurers offer one percent compounding.

Partnership programs could be more successful if:

  • Advisors offer small maximum monthly benefits more frequently to the middle class. For example, a $1,500 initial maximum monthly benefit covers about four hours of home care every two days and, with compound benefit increases, may maintain buying power. Many middle-class citizens would like LTCI to help them stay at home while not “burning out” family caregivers and could be motivated further by Partnership asset disregard. (This approach does not work where a Partnership initial maximum monthly benefit must be at least $8608 (CT) and $9114 (NY). When policies reflecting CA SB 1248 become available in California, California’s minimum size policy will drop to $3000/month.)
  • Middle-class clients were better educated about the importance of benefit increases to maintain LTCI purchasing power and to qualify for Partnership asset disregard.
  • The four original Partnership steps migrate to DRA rules.
  • More jurisdictions adopt Partnership programs.
  • Programs that privately finance educational LTCI direct mail from public agencies were adopted more broadly.
  • Financial advisors were to press reluctant insurers to certify their products.
  • More financial advisors were certified. Some people argue that certification requirements should be loosened. At a minimum, the renewal certification process could be improved.
  • More insurers offer one percent compounding.
  • Combo products became Partnership-qualified.

Underwriting Data
Case Disposition
Ten insurers contributed application case disposition data to Table 21. In 2018, 58.8 percent of applications were placed, including those that were modified, a new low slightly below 2017’s previous record low of 59.0 percent.

One insurer reported a 77.1 percent placement rate; the second highest being 56.0 percent. The lowest placement rate was 34.0 percent. Low placement rates increase insurers’ cost per placed policy. More importantly, low placement rates can discourage advisors from discussing LTCI with clients. In addition to wasting time and effort encouraging clients to apply for LTCI, advisors fear disappointment for clients who are rejected.

Although the placement rate dipped slightly, the decline rate also dipped slightly to 25.1 percent of applications (28.2 percent of insurer decisions). Unfortunately, both the suspended/withdrawn and the Free Look refusals/not takens increased. The decline rate by carrier varied from 12.0 percent to 39.3 percent, affected by factors such as age distribution, market, underwriting requirements, underwriting standards.

Perhaps the best way to improve placement rates is to do a better job of pre-qualifying clients’ health profiles prior to submitting applications. General agencies and insurers are promoting approaches which make it easier for advisors to get detailed health information or have a third party ask health questions. For example, eApps should develop better health information and result in speedier processing which may help placement rates.

Our placed percentages reflect the insurers’ perspective. A higher percentage of applicants secure coverage because applicants denied by one carrier may be issued either stand-alone or combination coverage by another carrier or may receive coverage with the same insurer after a deferral period.

Underwriting Tools
Nine insurers contributed data to Table 22, which divides the number of uses of each underwriting tool by the number of applications processed. For example, the number of medical records was 86 percent of the number of applications. That does not mean that 86 percent of the applications involved medical records, because some applications resulted in more than one set of medical records being requested.

Insurers are trying to speed underwriting to increase placement rates. Thus, phone interviews without cognitive screening, prescription profiles and MIB have increased significantly compared to levels of several years ago.

Year-to-year changes in distribution of sales among insurers significantly impact results. Lower maximum ages result in fewer face-to-face exams. Insurers might underreport the use of an underwriting tool because they may lack a good source for that statistic.

*MIB Underwriting Services alert underwriters to errors, omissions, misrepresentations and fraud on applications for life, health, disability income, long term care and critical illness coverage. MIB, Inc. provides its Underwriting Services exclusively to authorized individuals in MIB Group, Inc. member companies.

Underwriting Time
Table 23 shows that the average time from receipt of application to mailing the policy was the lowest since 2012. The improvement came at both ends of the spectrum, a much higher percentage processed within 29 days and many fewer taking 60 or more days. One insurer averaged only 29 days and four others average about 5 weeks or less. Three insurers averaged 51 to 59 days.

Rating Classification
In 2017, a higher percentage of policies was issued in the most favorable rating classification (and in the top two most favorable rating classifications) than in any year since 2012. Table 24 shows 2018 showed similar results, with 48.3 percent in the most favorable classification and 89.5 percent of the policies in the two most favorable classifications. The “most-favorable” results in the past two years benefited from lack of reporting of rating classification distribution from insurers which do not offer preferred health discounts in the worksite and because one insurer eliminated its preferred health discount (hence “standard” ratings were its “best”). However, the reduction in the third-best and less attractive categories were not influenced by fewer worksite business participants being included in this part of the survey.

Table 25 shows that the percentage of policies issued in the most favorable category increased for each age range in 2018 and Table 26 shows that the decline rate went up in each age range except for ages 70+. Perhaps insurers are declining cases that previously might have been placed in the third-best or less attractive rating classifications. Tables 25 and 26 exclude most (perhaps all) policies underwritten with health concessions.

The by-age decline rates are a little high compared to the overall decline rate reported above. That’s because a significant carrier with a low decline rate was unable to provide their data by age.

Click here to view the following additional information available only online.

  • Product Details, a row-by-row definition of the product exhibit entries, with a little commentary.
  • Premium Exhibit, which shows lifetime annual premiums for each insurer’s most common underwriting class, for issue ages 40, 50, 60, and 70 for single females, single males, and heterosexual couples (assuming both buy at the same age), based on $100 per day (or closest equivalent monthly) benefit, 90-day facility and default home care elimination period (other aspects vary), three-year and five-year benefit periods or $100,000 and $200,000 maximum lifetime buckets, with and without Shared Care and with flat benefits or automatic three percent and five percent annual compound benefit increases for life. The exhibit includes facility-only policies, as well as comprehensive policies. Worksite products do not reflect any worksite-specific discount.
  • Premium Adjustments (from our published prices) by underwriting class for each participant.
  • Distribution by underwriting class for each participant.
  • State-by-state results: percentage of sales by state, average premium by state and percentage of policies qualifying for Partnership by state.

Closing
We thank insurance company staff for submitting the data and responding to questions promptly. We also thank Nicole Gaspar and Alex Geanous of Milliman for managing the data expertly.

We reviewed data for reasonableness and insurers reviewed their product exhibit displays. Nonetheless, we cannot assure that all data is accurate.

If you have suggestions for improving this survey (including new entrants in the market), please contact one of the authors.

Footnote:
Society of Actuaries (November 2017). Long-Term Care Insurance: The SOA Pricing Project. Retrieved May 16, 2018, from https://www.soa.org/Files/Sections/ltc-pricing-project.pdf.

LTCI Panel

Q What is your outlook for the stand-alone LTCI market? In what market segments are you seeing sales activity and/or optimism?

Glickman
The stand-alone LTCI market will continue to be a major part of the LTCI solution, with over 50 percent of the present value of the long term care premiums on new policies being generated by stand-alone policies, and almost all of the rest being generated by the hybrids where most of the premium is actually life insurance premium. With the stand-alone LTCI new business premiums now quite stable and the future rate increase risk on those new policies minimal, I expect the new business volume for stand-alone LTCI to start increasing, especially among those carriers involved in offering tax advantaged, benefit advantaged, or worksite solutions.

In addition, everyone at the state and federal regulatory level realizes that a vibrant stand-alone market is necessary to help deal with the long term care crisis that will be created by the baby boomers if better penetration of LTCI does not occur. Both the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and the Federal Insurance Office are working with the industry, the ACLI, and non-profit think tanks to develop potential changes (including possible tax incentives) to spur the market.

All of this bodes well for not only the stand-alone market, but for the hybrid market as well, and most important for society at large.

Hughes
My personal outlook on the stand-alone LTCI market is hopeful. Hopeful that the advisors will continue or start the long term care conversation. You can’t have a fire unless you create a spark! I’m finding that if my agents/advisors make the initial contact with their clients, instead of waiting to be asked about it, there are more chances for success. Now with that being said, I never miss an opportunity to turn every phone call into something related to long term care and always ask about any business opportunities due to the tax deductibility of some or all of the premiums.

Levin
We are on the verge of a tsunami that will quickly overtake the United States in terms of caring for the elderly. China faces an even more dire set of circumstanced due to the failed policies associated with one child per family and the wanton killing of female babies.

Even with the need for long term care increasing annually, market penetration has never exceeded 10 percent of the market over the last twenty years. That means that there are still over 72 million baby boomers and 84 million Gen X-er’s who need to talk to us!

Sales continue in the Baby Boomer market, but have definitely reached down to the GenX-ers and the following generations. The younger generations are clearly looking at the lessons learned by their parents in terms of being caregivers and are making long term care planning part of their long term financial plans and portfolios.

Financial advisors, estate planning attorneys, and other insurance producers are grasping the significance of not addressing long term care with their clients and, as a result, are embracing the products as well as working with experts like us for this one specific aspect of their clients long term plans.

For all of these reasons, I remain optimistic that the industry overall (to include hybrids, combo products, and life insurance with long term care riders) will continue to rise to meet the ever growing needs of our country as it ages in place.

Thau
a) It will probably rebound somewhat.

b) We can improve our consumer messaging significantly, both in the individual market and the work-site market (messaging to employers, as well as employees).

c) To help the middle market, we can sell more smaller policies, leveraging the State Partnerships.

d) People will arrange a variety of financial resources to address their potential long term care needs; stand-alone policies will be only one piece.

e) The industry raised prices, limiting the market to the affluent (especially with the benefit designs we were selling), yet took away the endless benefit period which is what affluent people want. We now have an endless benefit period available again. It leads to more sales, even of shorter benefit periods. Yes, I do mean to say that the availability of an endless benefit period increases the sales of shorter BPs as well as generating endless BP sales.

Q In your view what can the industry, and perhaps legislators, do to make stand-alone LTCI affordable for a larger percentage of the population?

Glickman
As I mentioned in the prior question, the industry, the trade organizations, the state regulators, and the federal regulators are all focused on potential legislative solutions that will spur more LTCI adoption across a cross section of potential insureds.

Chief among these potential solutions are:

  • Tax advantaged solutions to pay premiums, including penalty free/tax free withdrawals from retirement accounts (401Ks, 403Bs, IRAs), allowing FSAs to elect, and above the line deductions. While this option seems remote, it can be actuarially demonstrated that the savings available from privately financed LTCI on a broad scale will more than offset the cost of the foregone taxes initially.
  • Employer based solutions such as an LTCI savings plan for paying LTCI premiums or direct LTCI expenses on an opt out basis (where the employee is automatically enrolled and must choose to opt out) similar to how 401Ks are handled. A Department of Labor determination in December, 2018, allows employers to payroll deduct disability insurance for all employees automatically. Employees then need to opt out to avoid paying for the disability coverage. A similar provision for LTCI would vastly expand the LTCI market. A smaller and easier change in the ERISA law, specifically exempting LTCI, would expand the offerings of voluntary purchase LTCI in the workplace.
  • Changes in the IRS code such as allowing cash values to spur new and consumer exciting products such as Universal LTCI policies. Eliminating the minimum two ADL requirement from the TQ policy definition would allow for deferred annuities to be included as a basic LTCI benefit, creating a product that would start paying monthly benefits once a person became old and frail, even if they were not yet ADL dependent. Expanding the current 1035 exchange rules to allow NTQ annuities to fund LTCI premiums for one or both insureds who are married and filing taxes jointly. This modest enhancement would vastly expand LTCI coverage to trillions of dollars in NTQ annuities which cannot be utilized for long term care expenses (or premiums) without severe tax consequences.
  • Changes in state regulation that are widely and uniformly adopted, such as partnership plans allowing, without additional rules, the non-partnership policies approved in their state. In particular, this would allow insureds to avoid unaffordable compound inflation and minimum benefit amount requirements. Another easy change would be to eliminate the risk based capital penalty that currently prevents insurers from seriously considering noncancelable LTCI policy designs.

Some companies are already starting to expand their product within current laws through offerings that appeal to a broader base of consumers by offering a unisex product through employers, creating single and ten pay alternatives, offering lifetime benefit periods, and offering return of premium death benefits that are payable in addition to LTCI benefits.

Hughes
In my opinion we missed the mark on the LTC Partnership Program. It appears the hybrids have found their home with those that can afford single premium transfers or higher than traditional LTCI premiums and traditional LTCI has found its home on a budget. I don’t mind that view, however where we missed the mark is by requiring inflation on the traditional plans. If the biggest swath of buyers that could really benefit from LTCI plans is middle America, then don’t force them to add the most expensive rider to their contract. Don’t get me wrong, I believe inflation is important and, quite frankly, that’s what sets LTCI apart from hybrids—the ability to grow the benefits—but if we have something to lose, but not millions to lose, let us build the proper policy without having to slap inflation protection on there. Maybe just a higher daily/monthly benefit for a shorter duration is the answer.

Levin
Tax qualification of the Section 7702(b) stand-alone long term care insurance plans was a huge step. The availability of State Partnership to all fifty states an even larger one. Now we need to be able to offer clients the ability to pay for these plans with qualified funds, especially if it is a hybrid or combo plan falling under Section 101(g). They may be running their cash reserves down by paying for their parents’ care and childrens’ college educations, leaving them non-qualified cash poor. Being able to use qualified funds would require additional federal legislation. While this has been bantered about for many years, I firmly believe that the time for action is now. I hope that organizations like NAIFA, NLTCN, the Society of Financial Service Professionals, et al, as well as insurance carriers currently in the marketplace offering these products, will expend appropriate levels of lobbying to bring forth this necessary legislation—providing relief to consumers and promoting even greater sales.

Thau
I suggest expanding the question to include regulators as well as legislators and to include media. As noted in my first response, there is a lot the industry can do to provide improved messaging.

Government and media could provide better messaging as well. Things we/they could do:
a) Explain that past price increases on existing business have led to today’s prices being more stable. (Government and media reports on rate increases lead financial advisors and consumers to fear rate increases on policies being issued today. This is a “look through the rear window” approach, as I can explain.)

b) Government and media have publicized and questioned claim denials, sometimes being right but sometimes falsely accusing carriers. Why not publicize evidence that the industry is doing a good job?

  • The Federal government engaged LifePlans to do a study regarding claim payment. The study concluded that the industry was doing very well.
  • California published a study that was hugely biased against the industry. For example, if a client contacted an insurer during the elimination period and the insurer provided the desired information, CA counted that as a denied claim because no claim payments were due. Furthermore, their methodology ignored that claim later when it was paid! I successfully got CA to agree that their method was flawed, but they refused to issue a correction.
  • The Independent Review (IR) process helps protect consumers. Each year, our Broker World survey publishes some data relative to IR. That data has been impressive for the industry, but we are limited in what we can obtain. I’ve asked regulators to get data themselves, or to ask me to act on their behalf, so that we can get better data.

c) Of course, the government and politicians continually give mixed signals, making it easy for people to conclude that the government will pay for care “by the time I need it.” Many years ago, some states did “Own Your Future” mailings in which they informed consumers that the consumer is primarily responsible for long term care expenses. We reported on results in the Broker World survey. It would be timely to send more such mailings now.

d) More states could adopt State Partnerships and the original four states could shift to the Deficit Reduction Act Partnership to provide more consistency.

e) The LTCI certification process could be improved in a variety of ways, leading to better education of advisors.

f) Slowing the fiduciary bandwagon might help. Emphasis on fiduciary responsibility discourages financial advisors from discussing long term care issues because:

  • With increased documentation, they have less time to discuss ancillary issues, particularly as those issues then generate more need to document.
  • The threat of fiduciary charges causes them to focus on the areas of their expertise. Discussing areas in which they are less familiar (long term care) exposes them to what they perceive to be disproportionate fiduciary risk.
  • You might think FAs would then outsource long term care discussion to LTCI specialists. It does not always work that way because:
    • Advisors are fearful of referring people to third-party experts because, if the third party screws up, they could lose their client.
    • They also fear that if the third party screws up, they could be blamed (fiduciary).
    • They also fear that the third party might poach their client or inadvertently introduce the client to a competitor.

g) The industry, media and others often suggest that LTCI should not be bought before age 60 (or so). That advice is incorrect, as we can demonstrate.

h) Protect the industry from people doing genetic testing, then buying LTCI if they have the APOE gene. We may need an assigned risk pool for people who fall into that category.

i) Tax breaks would help, but we should be able to sell without tax breaks.

j) One percent CBIO qualifying for Partnership can be important for core/buy-up programs.

k) By the way, the new NAIC Shopper’s Guide is significantly better than its predecessors. It will be interesting to see its impact. I’m not expecting much impact, because I think it is treated as a compliance document and is very long.

l) This strays to the combo side, but §101g features can be excellent contributions to long term care planning. Yet the regulators forbid the use of “long term care” relative to such features. I think that is a very counterproductive position.

The industry needs to improve significantly the quality of pre-qualification of health conditions. Doing so would lower the decline rate and also get more people insured. It would result in noticeably more interest in LTCI among financial advisors. How might we do so?

a) General agents could perhaps do analysis demonstrating the improved results for cases which were pre-qualified.

b) The message should be trumpeted repeatedly.

Q Much of the current long term care risk abatement activity seems focused on asset-based long term care solutions. What are your thoughts and/or experience with these products?

Glickman
Asset-based LTCI is quite attractive to many insurance companies due to its minimal LTCI cost structure and its maximal appeal to consumers. It makes a lot of sense for anyone purchasing a life insurance policy to have this additional flexibility to use the life insurance proceeds to pay for their LTCI expenses, as long as they realize that if they need to do so, they will no longer have the life insurance benefits that instigated the original purchase. Likewise, if someone determines they need LTCI, and doesn’t need the life insurance coverage, this is a very expensive way to purchase LTCI. I would be hard pressed to advise anyone to buy one of these types of hybrids that only pay LTCI benefits up to the death benefit, if it is being bought for its LTCI coverage, while I would equally oppose not including it, at a minimal additional charge to a life insurance policy being bought for the client’s need for life insurance, just in case.

However, one of the hybrid designs, only offered by a handful of companies, is one that provides life insurance with LTCI and an extension of benefits rider that continues the LTCI coverage after the life insurance benefits are essentially exhausted, providing much more significant LTCI coverage especially if the compound inflation option is elected. With the liberalization of underwriting rules that are generally available on the life hybrids when compared to the stand-alone policies, it is a good fall back plan for even stand-alone LTCI specialists to have access to sell.

Hughes
I have lots of experience with asset-based long term care planning solutions. They work where they work but they are not the be all, end all, for long term care planning. I still say you will never get more out of a life/long term care contract then you will out of a traditional LTCI policy. Now I have found that I have younger agents, who don’t have a history of explaining rate increases on older traditional blocks, and they are ok selling traditional LTCI—as they should be. You must understand the pricing of today’s policies and the rate increase regulations. On the flip side I have those that don’t ever want to have a conversation with a client about why their policy took a rate increase, so they gravitate to the life-based solutions. As an advisor to the advisors I have to keep my eyes and ears open to the industry and listen to what agents’ clients want their long term care solutions to do for them and pick the best one. Nothing is one size fits all.

Levin
There is no doubt that a great deal of the demise of the traditional long term care insurance market (declining from $1.024 billion of sales in 2002 to 2017’s $176 million—LIMRA statistics) can be attributed to fewer carriers in the marketplace and a decline in interest rates, as well as the attrition of the career agent forces with several of the major players. Factor in the advent of a wide range of asset-based products giving producers the ability to better tailor solutions to the desires of their clients—this has led to unprecedented growth in this market to the point that it is now surpassing the traditional market.

All of that notwithstanding, we are discovering that many financial advisors are not thrilled about losing the assets under management required to purchase these asset-based products because such purchases serve to deprive them of an ongoing stream of income. For this reason alone the pendulum is swinging back towards stand-alone LTCI.

In the same vein, all professionals (advisors, attorneys, other insurance producers) in positions that can be construed as possessing a fiduciary responsibility to their clients who do not broach the subject of LTCI in the course of regular reviews run the risk of being held personally liable under the Doctrine of Reliance. Courts are becoming increasingly sympathetic to the plaintiff bar bringing these claims.

I also believe that there is still no better way to leverage a client’s money than with a stand-alone LTCI insurance product. Factoring in the ability for the monthly maximum and pool of benefits to grow by virtue of inflation protection riders, as well as the tax qualification and partnership considerations of these plans, I suspect that the pendulum will continue to swing back in the direction of traditional stand-alone coverage.

Thau
a) Linked products could appropriately be called “asset-based” in the past because they were usually sold as single premium policies which involved moving an asset into the combo policy. Today, most of these policies are not sold as a single premium. Therefore the “Combo,” “Linked” and “Hybrid” terms fit, but “asset-based” no longer fits well.

b) These are excellent alternatives to stand-alone LTCI. For many clients, linked benefit should be the default solution.

c) However, often they are sold illogically. For example, as indicated above, stand-alone LTCI policies issued today do not have the premium instability of the older LTCI policies. However, regardless of whether the client favors linked policies for a sound reason or not, it often makes sense to provide what they are requesting. We don’t do people a favor if our educational efforts result in them doing nothing, especially if they otherwise would have secured valuable protection.

d) The industry and regulators could make it easier to compare linked benefit products to each other.

e) Comparing linked to stand-alone also is difficult. Insurers could position linked products more effectively in their portfolio, etc.

f) The shift toward linked benefit policies is not as momentous as people think. The statistics are distorted because:

  • They are based on premium rather than eventual coverage.
    • Single premium linked benefit policies and 10-pay linked benefit policies distort the results.
    • A higher percentage of stand-alone policies may have benefit increase features, which is significant to future coverage.
    • However, the average benefit period of linked policies with extensions of benefits might be longer than for stand-alone (although shared care should be factored in).
  • Lots of statistics include, in the linked benefit totals, policies with no extension of benefits. Depending on the purpose of the analysis, including such policies can be misleading.

Q In your opinion, should LTCI professionals be shifting a significant amount of their effort to point-of-care planning?

Glickman
Although I would not encourage agents to emphasize selling to those already needing care, and with a very limited life expectancy, I would always encourage LTCI professionals to be knowledgeable and have access to all possible LTCI solutions for their clients. However, I believe that point-of-care solutions (essentially substandard annuities packaged inside an LTCI policy form) are a very limited market opportunity for anyone involved in any other form of LTCI planning.

Hughes
If by that you mean maximizing their assets, using all avenues to maintain choice, then I would say that we’ve forgotten the definition of insurance. Why would one use every penny from every dollar of their own money when they could pay a premium and transfer the larger risk to the insurance company. If choice or control is the concern, there are options still available that allow for that flexibility. It’s called a cash benefit or an indemnity contract. That’s your maximum flexibility. Therefore, working with someone that maintains knowledge of the long term care industry is critical. If this isn’t your focus, let someone else do the hard work and you just keep options open for your clients. I have found that I would rather have a plan in place before, rather than having to plan at point of crisis. Planning is the key to anyone’s financial future and, of course, all well laid plans can change, but you must have a road map to know where you are going.

Levin
This business remains all about it being client-centric.

The wide array of products (despite the shrinking number of carriers in the marketplace) both allows and requires us to genuinely listen to the client, perform serious fact-finding, and then serve as their advocate by providing them with both suitable and appropriate coverage—whether it is stand-alone, hybrid, combo, short term, or critical care coverage.

Remaining client-centric, demonstrating the utmost of professionalism, and constantly growing in product and industry knowledge, will allow LTCI professionals—Planning Advocates—to better serve their clients.

Thau
a) I think we can and should be doing a lot more to help people who currently need care and/or are caregivers.

b) I think we should be doing more to help people who are uninsurable.

c) I think we should do more to help even insurable people reduce their exposure to long term care and reduce the likely cost and caregiver burdens.

d) However, I’m not comfortable with the word “shifting.” I think doing a) through c) will give us an opportunity to do more effective family long term care planning which might result in more LTCI policies being sold.